Good points, Alain.  Some thoughts:


 (1) "How does one bring significant uncommitted funding to, say NCSG, to
promote better civil society and end-users voices inside ICANN to
contribute to the improvement of the MSM process?"

I wish I had a compelling answer to this.  It has remained a puzzle from
the start, AIUI.  Since the resources of narrow interests come from
outside ICANN, it seems that either these resources need to also come from
outside ICANN, or else ICANN would need to officially recognize this as a
special need to level the playing field and provide it internally. 
Neither of these two options is without serious flaws.  (Is there a third
option, or more?)

Externally, the collective-action problem dominates and is a significant
natural obstacle to overcome.  I'm not familiar with any silver bullets in
the realm of organizational theory, but that's not my narrow expertise.

Internally, there is the problem of who picks the winners/losers, and all
of the politics surrounding that.  Maybe resources can be given to the
SOs/ACs that represent broad interests, but there would need to be
accountability in those allocation processes.  It's a big can of worms.

But, it's a big issue and worth further thought.


 (2) Appoint and support an independent outside Advisory Board.

But who appoints the Advisory Board, how does that happen, and what real
enforcement power would it have in the event of Board misdeeds?  Another
fundamentally political process, subject to gaming by those with more
resources.  Devil in the details.

Again, a great idea in bird's eye principle, but how would such a thing be
constructed in detail so as to avoid capture by the very forces it is
supposed to check and balance?  At least, the mission of the AB needs to
be written explicitly, and enforcement powers specifically delineated.

Does this happen completely inside the bottle, or does it involve the
parents in USG?


 (3) Individual ethics such that longer-term interests must take priority
over vested interests.

How can this be formalized in a tangible, bureaucratic governance
structure?  Behavioral norms and collective culture only go so far with
individuals.  If such norms don't also have formal teeth to reinforce them
in some way they will erode.  If there is no penalty for sticking your
hand in the cookie jar, the cookies will inevitably disappear faster than
intended.

The pure honor system ultimately will not work, especially when many
participants (especially those in the TM business) are coming from a
culture derived from the adversarial/advocacy-based legal system where the
*system* is supposed to provide the balance, not the *individual*.  It's a
very different culture, apples and oranges, night and day, oil and water. 
"Trust but verify."


If we could solve these fundamental issues, we'd be in good shape.  If
they were easy to solve, they might have been solved a long time ago.

But perhaps we have more hope if we simply recognize that these are the
issues to solve, and make it a priority to keep them in mind over time. 
Clarity of mission is a prerequisite to action toward that mission.  This
at least helps clarify the mission.

Best,
Dan


-- 
Any opinions expressed in this message are those of the author alone and
do not necessarily reflect any position of the author's employer.



On Thu, March 28, 2013 9:12 am, Alain Berranger wrote:
> Thanks Dan,
>
> I find your analysis spot on. All is there to make it work and all is
> there
> for it to fail!
>
> I would underline that resources available to the *"narrow interests using
> ad hoc pathways" *inside ICANN are very large and even more so when
> compared with the meagre resources available to the "bottom-up broader
> interests", like we represent at NCSG.
>
> So, one question I have is "How does one bring significant ucommitted
> funding to, say NCSG, to promote better civil society and end-users voices
> inside ICANN to contribute to the improvement of the MSM process?".
>
> *Dan says "...This is the Achilles Heel of all QUANGOs, unless they set up
> effective and formal
> public-interest oversight structures."*
>
> One typical way is to appoint and support an independant outside Advisory
> Board (AB). It is one final oversight of "check and verify" where the
> Board
> gets its hands slapped if it goes off the essence of its mission.
> Obviously
> stepping out of the MSM process would be a no-no. Given the way Board
> appointees are allocated, such an AB seems very much needed at ICANN
> today.
>
> That would still leave on the table the issue of moving operational issues
> in a timely fashion when policy issues take so much time. Of course, the
> way the GNSO Councillors get appointed is again a carrying-forward of the
> "balancing act" between narrow and broader interests.
>
> A solution that can drive individuals is: "Yes my vested interests (narrow
> or broad or in-between) are OK, *ONLY if they come second to the longer
> term interests of ICANN"*
>
> Alain
>
> On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 5:46 PM, Dan Krimm <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>> A seemingly simple and yet actually tricky question.
>>
>> There are multiple ways that ICANN can be "an international body"...
>>
>> There is the GAC of course.  International in the sense that nations can
>> participate as nations.
>>
>> There is ALAC, with its regional hierarchy, formally international in
>> its
>> representation structure.
>>
>> And then there are the SOs, which can admit members from around the
>> world.
>>  Especially the ccNSO is explicitly internationalized following the
>> internationalization of the ccTLDs.  But GNSO SGs obviously admit
>> international members too, such as NCSG admits members from all over.
>>
>> So, the MSM has these multiple, parallel expressions of
>> internationalism.
>>
>> All inside the bottle.
>>
>> As long as USG keeps its hands off the MS governance process (which it
>> has
>> tried to do from the beginning), the existing internationalism has a
>> potential to operate in all of these ways.  While none of these is
>> perfect
>> in and of itself, at least there is some attempt to enable international
>> voice in policy-making in more than one formal manner.
>>
>> So, if one wants to preserve and build on this internationalism, one
>> ought
>> to want to fix the MSM from inside the bottle.  If we call in the
>> parents,
>> they are all USG, and then there will likely be outcry that USG is
>> getting
>> preferential treatment.
>>
>> That's one aspect of unintended consequences for taking such action, and
>> should be prepared for if indeed such action is pursued.  OTOH, the
>> unintended consequence of USG taking a hands-off attitude to ICANN MS
>> governance is that the kids are messing up the game.  This is the
>> Achilles
>> Heel of all QUANGOs, unless they set up effective and formal
>> public-interest oversight structures.  Is an international governance
>> process acceptable if the bottom-up aspect of that process is subverted
>> by
>> narrow interests using ad hoc pathways enabled by staff outside the MS
>> process?
>>
>> In that case, the process is only as international as the staff itself,
>> when the staff call the shots.  I think ad hoc process pre-empts the
>> internationalization issue.  All bets are off.
>>
>> The establishment and entrenchment of powerful ad hoc staff procedures
>> to
>> circumvent MS governance IMHO represents brinksmanship and a "nuclear
>> option" with regard to MS governance.  It just calls out for other
>> "nuclear option" responses, like going to USG if we can't fix the mess
>> inside the bottle.
>>
>> In some sense, this represents all of the long-standing governance
>> issues
>> at ICANN coming to a head, after brewing under the surface for well over
>> a
>> decade.  The time bomb is apparently finally ticking down.
>>
>> Dan
>>
>>
>> --
>> Any opinions expressed in this message are those of the author alone and
>> do not necessarily reflect any position of the author's employer.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, March 27, 2013 2:06 pm, Alain Berranger wrote:
>> > Thanks Dan,
>> >
>> > ...very clear and for my own purpose quite educating...
>> >
>> > Can the current ICANN structure actually devolve into an international
>> > body
>> > while maintaining a judicial or regulatory body under US law only?
>> >
>> > Alain
>> >
>> > On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:56 PM, Dan Krimm <[log in to unmask]>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Alain,
>> >>
>> >> Back for a while, in flight.  I'm not sure exactly what you are
>> saying
>> >> when you say:
>> >>
>> >> > The sharp line in the sand distinction in an organization between
>> >> policy
>> >> > and implementation is arbitrary if you have an independant
>> judiciary
>> >> > function or an oversight/regulatory body above the organization.
>> >>
>> >> There is certainly a sharp line in the sand for example in USG
>> >> governance:
>> >> policy is made by Congress and implemented by the Administration.
>> So,
>> >> statute defines the policy writ large, and regulations define the
>> >> execution of that policy in detail.  And the independent courts
>> >> interpret
>> >> any fuzzy areas of statute, and oversee the regulation from the
>> >> standpoint
>> >> of the statute and case law, and with regard to procedural matters.
>> >>
>> >> In the case of ICANN, its authority comes from the USG executive
>> branch,
>> >> but given the "internal" MS governance structure, the USG judiciary
>> does
>> >> not currently get involved in policy/implementation issues "inside
>> the
>> >> MS
>> >> bottle" and even the NTIA does not concern itself with "details" on
>> any
>> >> sort of ongoing basis -- NTIA does not micromanage ICANN.
>> >>
>> >> So at present any such judicial or regulatory body outside ICANN is
>> not
>> >> affecting ICANN's activities in any important manner.  If there is
>> going
>> >> to be such oversight, either it has to occur inside the bottle as a
>> >> feature of MS governance structure, or else the external oversight
>> >> functions would need to be activated somehow.
>> >>
>> >> I've argued recently that if this can't be fixed inside the bottle,
>> we
>> >> should definitely explore activating that external authority.  As you
>> >> say
>> >> (I think?), think outside the ICANN box (or bottle). One must of
>> course
>> >> recognize that this would be a dramatic course of action, never
>> having
>> >> occurred previously in the history of the organization. As Avri said
>> >> earlier, this would represent an admission that the MSM has in fact
>> >> failed, and the "parents" are being brought in to clean up the kids'
>> >> mess.
>> >>
>> >> ICANN was not supposed to operate as a normal (nonprofit) corporate
>> >> organization.  That corporate framework was just supposed to set up
>> an
>> >> operational infrastructure within which a completely new governance
>> >> structure could be set up.  The corporate framework was not supposed
>> to
>> >> get involved in the real meat of governance, just to execute those
>> >> policies after development by a bottom-up MSM and approved by the
>> Board
>> >> (or sent back to MSM for further work).
>> >>
>> >> Staff was never supposed to have any significant policy-making power
>> of
>> >> its own, AIUI.  But, in the real world it is certainly true these
>> >> distinctions are fuzzy at best.  In Congress for example,
>> legislators'
>> >> policy-expert staff have a great deal of individual influence over
>> the
>> >> writing of legislation.  Of course, lobbyists also can have a great
>> deal
>> >> of influence in writing legislation.
>> >>
>> >> Bottom line, don't think of ICANN governance as that of the
>> NPOcorporate
>> >> framework itself.  That's the bottle.  What's in the bottle(MS policy
>> >> making) is supposed to be independent of the bottle as much as
>> possible
>> >> --
>> >> the bottle is only meant to facilitate and implement policy, not to
>> >> direct
>> >> or constrain the formulation of policy.
>> >>
>> >> If this distinction has been lost, the MS governance process itself
>> has
>> >> been lost, or at least co-opted.  It's worth seeing if we kids can
>> clean
>> >> up the mess on our own, but if not let's definitely consider if and
>> when
>> >> to bring in the parents to do it for us.  Alas.
>> >>
>> >> Dan
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> Any opinions expressed in this message are those of the author alone
>> and
>> >> do not necessarily reflect any position of the author's employer.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> On Wed, March 27, 2013 11:48 am, Alain Berranger wrote:
>> >> > Dan,
>> >> >
>> >> > Thank you for that moment of opportunity!
>> >> >
>> >> > The sharp line in the sand distinction in an organization between
>> >> policy
>> >> > and implementation is arbitrary if you have an independant
>> judiciary
>> >> > function or an oversight/regulatory body above the
>> organization.This
>> >> > distinction has been "invented" at ICANN to protect GNSO's
>> territory -
>> >> > policy - and leaving implementation to "staff"... It is a mine
>> field,
>> >> from
>> >> > what I have seen since I joined ICANN in San José and the
>> discussion
>> >> > between policy and implementation is flawed by design.... but makes
>> >> for
>> >> > passionate discussions...and will for a long time to be.
>> >> >
>> >> > I do not know who the ICANN ombudsman reports to (I have not done
>> the
>> >> > research) but his office does not seem to have the authority or the
>> >> > resources to dictate to ICANN what to do. It should report to the
>> >> Board
>> >> in
>> >> > any case and maybe it does? But where is the bigger ICANN
>> oversight?
>> >> How
>> >> > do
>> >> > you move from the current situation, as described by Dan, to a
>> truly
>> >> > international organization (some of the very first words of our CEO
>> >> last
>> >> > summer)?
>> >> >
>> >> > Normally, a corporation or an NGO  or a government dept has a
>> policy
>> >> dept
>> >> > which makes evidence-based policy recommendations. These go to the
>> >> Board
>> >> > for decision, weighting in all the factors, internal and external,
>> >> that
>> >> > impact on the mission.
>> >> >
>> >> > We need to think outside the ICANN box on this one!
>> >> >
>> >> > Alain
>> >> >
>> >> > On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 2:13 PM, Dan Krimm <[log in to unmask]>
>> >> wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> >> Alain,
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Thanks for the discussion.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> First, I think we should file all Ombudsman complaints (and
>> >> definitely
>> >> >> recruit allies), though I don't expect it would necessarily be a
>> >> silver
>> >> >> bullet solution -- holding it to that standard would make it
>> appear
>> >> >> ineffective.  But it builds a track record, a case that we are
>> trying
>> >> >> everything pro forma, jumping through the hoops as expected,
>> playing
>> >> the
>> >> >> procedural game, the bureaucracy, as specified.  We climb the
>> ladder
>> >> one
>> >> >> step at a time, appealing to ever greater authorities like in the
>> >> court
>> >> >> system.  This is the step of establishing facts, formal basis of
>> >> >> objection, etc.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Next, the difference between what you call closely vested
>> interests
>> >> and
>> >> >> principled interests exhibits one well-known characteristic: the
>> >> >> "collective-action problem".  Vested interests tend to be narrow
>> >> >> interests, whereas principled interests tend to be broad
>> interests.
>> >> >> Narrow interests that are well-endowed are always at a relative
>> >> >> advantage
>> >> >> compared to broadly distributed interests, because while there may
>> be
>> >> >> enough resources distributed broadly to counteract the
>> concentrated
>> >> >> resources of narrow interests, there is a much higher cost to
>> >> >> motivating,
>> >> >> coordinating and marshaling distributed resources.  The cliche
>> that
>> >> >> comes
>> >> >> to mind is "herding cats".  Especially, since all participation in
>> MS
>> >> >> processes at ICANN is on a volunteer basis, narrow interests can
>> much
>> >> >> more
>> >> >> easily allocate paid resources to this volunteer activity, whereas
>> >> >> distributed interests have a much harder time making this
>> allocation.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This dynamic has been present at ICANN as long as I've been
>> involved,
>> >> >> which goes back to 2006.  I suspect it has been this way from the
>> >> start
>> >> >> --
>> >> >> it's a structural dynamic that relates to the whole SO
>> organizational
>> >> >> model.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Soto your question, how does a MS organization balance this
>> inherent
>> >> >> imbalance in the ability to participate effectively?  The
>> big-picture
>> >> >> answer is that the little guys at the bottom of the pyramid need
>> to
>> >> be
>> >> >> given ways to neutralize the resource advantage. Not to be given
>> any
>> >> >> special advantage above narrow interests, but to play on a level
>> >> playing
>> >> >> field.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> One obvious tactic is to create formal operational structures that
>> >> >> enable
>> >> >> bottom-up participation without doing anything to disadvantage
>> those
>> >> >> with
>> >> >> the resources to participate in other ways.  There has been some
>> >> effort
>> >> >> to
>> >> >> do so at ICANN, but this is constantly being undermined by the
>> narrow
>> >> >> interests -- if policy is a "war" then opponents will seek to win
>> the
>> >> >> war
>> >> >> any way they can, and that can involve tweaking the rules of the
>> game
>> >> to
>> >> >> one's advantage, if they are being systematically set up to reduce
>> >> one's
>> >> >> advantage.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> So, if there is a structure to provide equitable participation,
>> >> finding
>> >> >> an
>> >> >> ad hoc alternative path to avoid that equity is again to one's
>> >> >> advantage,
>> >> >> to the extent that equity is a reduction in influence.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Separation of power in a governance structure is imperative if
>> equity
>> >> is
>> >> >> to be maintained.  One big problem with ICANN is that there is
>> little
>> >> >> evidence of the equivalent of an "independent judiciary" in the
>> org
>> >> >> structure.  If there is no distinction between the executive and
>> >> >> judicial
>> >> >> functions, then the executive hierarchy is unchecked.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> In short, ICANN used a conventional non-profit organizational
>> >> structure
>> >> >> with weak oversight from the USG (DoC/NTIA) to create a "bottle"
>> in
>> >> >> which
>> >> >> the MSM was intended to operate.  A sort of "virtual world" of
>> >> >> governance.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> But within that virtual world of governance, the staff has
>> embedded
>> >> >> itself
>> >> >> in policy-making, rather than just being part of the bottle, which
>> >> was
>> >> >> presumably what it was intended to do.  AIUI, staff was supposed
>> to
>> >> >> provide infrastructure, not to get involved in the content of MS
>> >> >> activity.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> This Chinese Wall has been breached.  So one prerequisite is that
>> >> staff
>> >> >> needs to be confined to acting as only the bottle, once again. In
>> >> order
>> >> >> for that to happen, there needs to be some independent oversight
>> of
>> >> >> staff
>> >> >> to prevent policy-relevant activity.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Several folks have mentioned the policy/implementation split.
>> This
>> >> is
>> >> >> part of that problem: implementation can be considered part of the
>> >> >> bottle,
>> >> >> but policy must be seen as only "contents" of the bottle.  Fudging
>> >> this
>> >> >> split is a major way to break through the Chinese Wall.  So I
>> think
>> >> this
>> >> >> point should be pressed firmly, front and center, not as some sort
>> of
>> >> >> tangential point.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Another conceptual problem is that ICANN in practice is not just
>> an
>> >> >> "operational organization" -- the policies it makes can have
>> profound
>> >> >> political ramifications, and thus politics gets into the picture
>> in
>> >> >> practice, even if the terms of discourse center on operational
>> >> >> principles.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> There is frequent mention of keeping ICANN to just operational
>> >> matters
>> >> >> (I'm definitely a proponent of that mission), however it should be
>> >> >> acknowledged that such a position is inherently political: it's
>> all
>> >> >> about
>> >> >> protecting the broadly-distributed interests against narrow
>> >> interests,
>> >> >> and
>> >> >> the broad-narrow contest is fundamentally political.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> I'm afraid I don't have the time to pound on ICANN's org structure
>> >> from
>> >> >> a
>> >> >> detailed theoretical basis (part of that difficulty of resource
>> >> >> allocation: I don't get paid to do this, and I need to get to do
>> >> >> *something*,so that competes for my time).  I wish I could.  The
>> only
>> >> >> reason I can offer this contribution right now is that I'm
>> traveling
>> >> and
>> >> >> currently waiting at the airport for a flight -- one fleeting
>> moment
>> >> of
>> >> >> opportunity (more moments on the flight, a bit later).
>> >> >>
>> >> >> These are big questions, and deserve big answers.  I don't have
>> those
>> >> >> answers in any detailed form, because that takes a lot of work to
>> >> make
>> >> >> one's way through the forest at the individual-tree level.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Suffice it to say that as the MSM at ICANN has "matured" the
>> narrow
>> >> >> interests have found ways to twist both the bottle and the
>> contents
>> >> to
>> >> >> their systematic advantage, which the MSM was intended to
>> neutralize
>> >> >> (since they start with the advantage naturally, without special
>> >> efforts
>> >> >> to
>> >> >> privilege them).
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> At this point, we take the system as it stands and do everything
>> >> >> possible
>> >> >> to get it to work, but as I said earlier, I think we should be
>> >> prepared
>> >> >> to
>> >> >> address everything -- the bottle and not just the contents -- to
>> push
>> >> >> for
>> >> >> the distributed-interest agenda.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Dan
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> --
>> >> >> Any opinions expressed in this message are those of the author
>> alone
>> >> and
>> >> >> do not necessarily reflect any position of the author's employer.
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >> On Wed, March 27, 2013 8:45 am, Alain Berranger wrote:
>> >> >> > Dear Robin, dear Colleagues:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > I agree that GNSO should file too... but will they (Maria's
>> >> question)?
>> >> >> Two
>> >> >> > complaints (GNSO + NCSG) are better than one (Avri's
>> statement)...
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > 3 questions:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > 1) From my little experience, I find the ICANN Ombudsman process
>> >> >> > ineffective - it is time consuming (we are volunteers/the other
>> >> side
>> >> >> is
>> >> >> > paid), a lot of pain for usually not much gain! Not saying we
>> >> should
>> >> >> not
>> >> >> > do
>> >> >> > it, just wondering out loud if we have a chance at all of being
>> >> >> > successful?
>> >> >> > or even partially successful? or if we should invest our time in
>> >> other
>> >> >> > ways?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > 2) Robin, I fully understand your TM arguments and they make
>> sense
>> >> to
>> >> >> me
>> >> >> > as
>> >> >> > a non-specialist. Can you please elaborate a bit on who the
>> >> >> "*powerful
>> >> >> > political interests"* you refer to are? This may help me and
>> others
>> >> at
>> >> >> the
>> >> >> > base of the NCSG pyramid understand the context and the issue
>> >> >> better...
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > 3) Did Maria fill a complaint to the Ombudsman? and where is it
>> at
>> >> >> now?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > 4) I also have a point of view or perhaps an hypothesis to
>> share,
>> >> from
>> >> >> > many
>> >> >> > years of applied MS practice funding developmental and applied
>> >> policy
>> >> >> > research in developing countries - may not be relevant but here
>> it
>> >> is
>> >> >> > anyway for feedback and reflexion...
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > I see the MS process as one of fundamental inclusion and
>> >> >> participation...
>> >> >> > It is more relevant than ever because of the internet and the
>> >> networks
>> >> >> > that
>> >> >> > spring from it...
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > ...the more you are at the bottom of the pyramid ($, knowledge,
>> >> assets
>> >> >> > like
>> >> >> > land ownership, cash, access to resources, etc...) the more you
>> >> seek
>> >> >> > participation as a way of climbing up the pyramid (getting
>> yourself
>> >> >> out
>> >> >> of
>> >> >> > poverty). The higher you are in the pyramid, the less you
>> welcome
>> >> >> > participation because it is disruptive at the very least.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Inherent to this "MS model" is the power struggle between
>> closely
>> >> >> vested
>> >> >> > interests (in our case the CHP and part of the NCHP) and higher
>> >> level
>> >> >> or
>> >> >> > principled interests (in our case  the rest of NCHP). Not that
>> >> there
>> >> >> are
>> >> >> > not closely vested interests as well as principled interests
>> >> >> everywhere
>> >> >> in
>> >> >> > an MS organization, including ICANN.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Closely vested interests are very time sensitive (profits,
>> status
>> >> and
>> >> >> > privileges are lessened by indecision and ambiguity - the rules
>> of
>> >> the
>> >> >> > game
>> >> >> > are not clear driving the the "powerful political interests"
>> >> crazy!)
>> >> >> while
>> >> >> > principled interests are less time sensitive (although short
>> term
>> >> >> costs
>> >> >> > are
>> >> >> > usually huge too) because they are universal.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > So here comes a question: How does an *operational organization*
>> >> like
>> >> >> > ICANN
>> >> >> > wishing to become better at MS behavior (we can assume that
>> anyway
>> >> for
>> >> >> the
>> >> >> > eternal optimist) resolves the issue of closely vested vs.
>> >> principled
>> >> >> > interests?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > They are by nature in tension and should be... What is essential
>> is
>> >> to
>> >> >> > keep
>> >> >> > a balance... For instance, taking just one of the financial
>> >> >> dimensions,
>> >> >> it
>> >> >> > is the DNS supply side that keeps feeding extra cash into ICANN
>> and
>> >> >> the
>> >> >> > DNS
>> >> >> > demand side does not have the means to bring this in balance,
>> >> although
>> >> >> it
>> >> >> > is the market.... it is a bit of a class struggle (or
>> concentration
>> >> of
>> >> >> > power differentials on the supply and demand sides) in the sense
>> >> that
>> >> >> if
>> >> >> > you do not keep this delicate balance the system will eventually
>> >> fail.
>> >> >> It
>> >> >> > is a matter of time!
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > I for one would like to see ICANN survive as an MS organization,
>> >> being
>> >> >> > able
>> >> >> > to keep the "rapport de forces" in equilibrium.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > I would love to hear a criticism of this model's assumption and
>> >> also
>> >> >> > perhaps if it can help in bringing back balance... or is it
>> simply
>> >> a
>> >> >> > theoretical treatment?
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Best, Alain
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 5:51 AM, Horacio T. Cadiz
>> <[log in to unmask]>
>> >> >> wrote:
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >> I support filing a case.
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> --
>> >> >> >> Bombim Cadiz
>> >> >> >> *******************************************
>> >> >> >> *  Free/Open Source Software (FOSS) --  *
>> >> >> >> * No windows. No gates. It is open.     *
>> >> >> >> * No Bill. It is Free.                  *
>> >> >> >> *******************************************
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > --
>> >> >> > Alain Berranger, B.Eng, MBA
>> >> >> > Member, Board of Directors, CECI,
>> >> >> > http://www.ceci.ca<
>> >> >> http://www.ceci.ca/en/about-ceci/team/board-of-directors/>
>> >> >> > Executive-in-residence, Schulich School of Business,
>> >> >> www.schulich.yorku.ca
>> >> >> > Treasurer, Global Knowledge Partnership Foundation,
>> >> >> www.gkpfoundation.org
>> >> >> > NA representative, Chasquinet Foundation, www.chasquinet.org
>> >> >> > Chair, NPOC, NCSG, ICANN, http://npoc.org/
>> >> >> > O:+1 514 484 7824; M:+1 514 704 7824
>> >> >> > Skype: alain.berranger
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > AVIS DE CONFIDENTIALITÉ
>> >> >> > Ce courriel est confidentiel et est à l’usage exclusif du
>> >> destinataire
>> >> >> > ci-dessus. Toute personne qui lit le présent message sans en
>> être
>> >> le
>> >> >> > destinataire, ou l’employé(e) ou la personne responsable de le
>> >> >> remettre
>> >> >> au
>> >> >> > destinataire, est par les présentes avisée qu’il lui est
>> >> strictement
>> >> >> > interdit de le diffuser, de le distribuer, de le modifier ou de
>> le
>> >> >> > reproduire, en tout ou en partie . Si le destinataire ne peut
>> être
>> >> >> joint
>> >> >> > ou
>> >> >> > si ce document vous a été communiqué par erreur, veuillez nous
>> en
>> >> >> informer
>> >> >> > sur le champ  et détruire ce courriel et toute copie de
>> celui-ci.
>> >> >> Merci
>> >> >> de
>> >> >> > votre coopération.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > CONFIDENTIALITY MESSAGE
>> >> >> > This e-mail message is confidential and is intended for the
>> >> exclusive
>> >> >> use
>> >> >> > of the addressee. Please note that, should this message be read
>> by
>> >> >> anyone
>> >> >> > other than the addressee, his or her employee or the person
>> >> >> responsible
>> >> >> > for
>> >> >> > forwarding it to the addressee, it is strictly prohibited to
>> >> disclose,
>> >> >> > distribute, modify or reproduce the contents of this message, in
>> >> whole
>> >> >> or
>> >> >> > in part. If the addressee cannot be reached or if you have
>> received
>> >> >> this
>> >> >> > e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this
>> >> e-mail
>> >> >> and
>> >> >> > destroy all copies. Thank you for your cooperation.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > --
>> >> > Alain Berranger, B.Eng, MBA
>> >> > Member, Board of Directors, CECI,
>> >> > http://www.ceci.ca<
>> >> http://www.ceci.ca/en/about-ceci/team/board-of-directors/>
>> >> > Executive-in-residence, Schulich School of Business,
>> >> www.schulich.yorku.ca
>> >> > Treasurer, Global Knowledge Partnership Foundation,
>> >> www.gkpfoundation.org
>> >> > NA representative, Chasquinet Foundation, www.chasquinet.org
>> >> > Chair, NPOC, NCSG, ICANN, http://npoc.org/
>> >> > O:+1 514 484 7824; M:+1 514 704 7824
>> >> > Skype: alain.berranger
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > AVIS DE CONFIDENTIALITÉ
>> >> > Ce courriel est confidentiel et est à l’usage exclusif du
>> destinataire
>> >> > ci-dessus. Toute personne qui lit le présent message sans en être
>> le
>> >> > destinataire, ou l’employé(e) ou la personne responsable de le
>> >> remettre
>> >> au
>> >> > destinataire, est par les présentes avisée qu’il lui est
>> strictement
>> >> > interdit de le diffuser, de le distribuer, de le modifier ou de le
>> >> > reproduire, en tout ou en partie . Si le destinataire ne peut être
>> >> joint
>> >> > ou
>> >> > si ce document vous a été communiqué par erreur, veuillez nous en
>> >> informer
>> >> > sur le champ  et détruire ce courriel et toute copie de celui-ci.
>> >> Merci
>> >> de
>> >> > votre coopération.
>> >> >
>> >> > CONFIDENTIALITY MESSAGE
>> >> > This e-mail message is confidential and is intended for the
>> exclusive
>> >> use
>> >> > of the addressee. Please note that, should this message be read by
>> >> anyone
>> >> > other than the addressee, his or her employee or the person
>> >> responsible
>> >> > for
>> >> > forwarding it to the addressee, it is strictly prohibited to
>> disclose,
>> >> > distribute, modify or reproduce the contents of this message, in
>> whole
>> >> or
>> >> > in part. If the addressee cannot be reached or if you have received
>> >> this
>> >> > e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this
>> e-mail
>> >> and
>> >> > destroy all copies. Thank you for your cooperation.
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > Alain Berranger, B.Eng, MBA
>> > Member, Board of Directors, CECI,
>> > http://www.ceci.ca<
>> http://www.ceci.ca/en/about-ceci/team/board-of-directors/>
>> > Executive-in-residence, Schulich School of Business,
>> www.schulich.yorku.ca
>> > Treasurer, Global Knowledge Partnership Foundation,
>> www.gkpfoundation.org
>> > NA representative, Chasquinet Foundation, www.chasquinet.org
>> > Chair, NPOC, NCSG, ICANN, http://npoc.org/
>> > O:+1 514 484 7824; M:+1 514 704 7824
>> > Skype: alain.berranger
>> >
>> >
>> > AVIS DE CONFIDENTIALITÉ
>> > Ce courriel est confidentiel et est à l’usage exclusif du destinataire
>> > ci-dessus. Toute personne qui lit le présent message sans en être le
>> > destinataire, ou l’employé(e) ou la personne responsable de le
>> remettre
>> au
>> > destinataire, est par les présentes avisée qu’il lui est strictement
>> > interdit de le diffuser, de le distribuer, de le modifier ou de le
>> > reproduire, en tout ou en partie . Si le destinataire ne peut être
>> joint
>> > ou
>> > si ce document vous a été communiqué par erreur, veuillez nous en
>> informer
>> > sur le champ  et détruire ce courriel et toute copie de celui-ci.
>> Merci
>> de
>> > votre coopération.
>> >
>> > CONFIDENTIALITY MESSAGE
>> > This e-mail message is confidential and is intended for the exclusive
>> use
>> > of the addressee. Please note that, should this message be read by
>> anyone
>> > other than the addressee, his or her employee or the person
>> responsible
>> > for
>> > forwarding it to the addressee, it is strictly prohibited to disclose,
>> > distribute, modify or reproduce the contents of this message, in whole
>> or
>> > in part. If the addressee cannot be reached or if you have received
>> this
>> > e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this e-mail
>> and
>> > destroy all copies. Thank you for your cooperation.
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Alain Berranger, B.Eng, MBA
> Member, Board of Directors, CECI,
> http://www.ceci.ca<http://www.ceci.ca/en/about-ceci/team/board-of-directors/>
> Executive-in-residence, Schulich School of Business, www.schulich.yorku.ca
> Treasurer, Global Knowledge Partnership Foundation, www.gkpfoundation.org
> NA representative, Chasquinet Foundation, www.chasquinet.org
> Chair, NPOC, NCSG, ICANN, http://npoc.org/
> O:+1 514 484 7824; M:+1 514 704 7824
> Skype: alain.berranger
>
>
> AVIS DE CONFIDENTIALITÉ
> Ce courriel est confidentiel et est à l’usage exclusif du destinataire
> ci-dessus. Toute personne qui lit le présent message sans en être le
> destinataire, ou l’employé(e) ou la personne responsable de le remettre au
> destinataire, est par les présentes avisée qu’il lui est strictement
> interdit de le diffuser, de le distribuer, de le modifier ou de le
> reproduire, en tout ou en partie . Si le destinataire ne peut être joint
> ou
> si ce document vous a été communiqué par erreur, veuillez nous en informer
> sur le champ  et détruire ce courriel et toute copie de celui-ci. Merci de
> votre coopération.
>
> CONFIDENTIALITY MESSAGE
> This e-mail message is confidential and is intended for the exclusive use
> of the addressee. Please note that, should this message be read by anyone
> other than the addressee, his or her employee or the person responsible
> for
> forwarding it to the addressee, it is strictly prohibited to disclose,
> distribute, modify or reproduce the contents of this message, in whole or
> in part. If the addressee cannot be reached or if you have received this
> e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this e-mail and
> destroy all copies. Thank you for your cooperation.
>