> In effect Avri, you are admitting that you (and ALAC, apparently) are using the transition to alter the balance in accordance with some notions of a "more equal" footing for certain ACs. That's not only a violation of the prior agreement not to alter the balance, it's dangerous, because such rebalancing can have major unintended and unanticipated effects on how ICANN works.
Not at all. I am arguing the the voting in the SMCM should correspond
to the influence each of the AC/SO has in the bottom up process and that
it should not be based on a simple mathematical calculation of who
elected which Board member. I also recall that each Board member serves
a broader interest than the members of the SMCM can be expected to
serve, as they will be representing the partisan interests of their
appointing group..
My parity imperative has to do with an analysis of the architecture of
an ICANN as an organizatiion that includes SOs and ACs that each have a
set of equivalent but diverse roles and of responsibilities in the
overall bottom up multistakeholder processes. I am looking to keep the
balance we currently have, but am willing to compromise on the issue of
SSAC and RSSAC because while they choose their own members, they are
vetted by the Board, and because they don't seem to really care.
avri
On 24-Aug-15 09:54, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>>
>> I think it is a mistake to equate the apportionment in the SM with the
>> apportionment of seats on the Board of Directors, as the model suggested in
>> the comments does. For one thing, it ignores the fact that half of the
>> directors are appointed by a Nomcom that represents the wider
>> community's interests. Those interests need to be included in the SM.
> Actually our approach does not ignore the Nomcom at all. Where does the Nomcom come from? Members are appointed by Constituencies in the SOs, and by the ACs - except no members are appointed by GAC, which is as it should be. So all the interests in Nomcom ARE represented in the SM in the more reasonable voting allocation we have proposed, which should reflect the _existing_ balance of stakeholder groups.
>
> Brenden's quantitative analysis of board influence shows that if you weight AC/SO representation on Nomcom and combine that weight with the Board members elected through the SOs and ALAC, ACs have about 24% influence on the board. Yet the CCWG voting allocation proposed would give them 48%. This is not "equal footing" this is a massive change in footing that tilts the balance that existed before. And it was an agreed principle of the enhanced accountability arrangements that we would NOT do that.
>
> In effect Avri, you are admitting that you (and ALAC, apparently) are using the transition to alter the balance in accordance with some notions of a "more equal" footing for certain ACs. That's not only a violation of the prior agreement not to alter the balance, it's dangerous, because such rebalancing can have major unintended and unanticipated effects on how ICANN works.
>
>> The issue the SM deals with are not specifically supporting organization
>> issues, they won't be talking about gTLDS. They will concern oversight issues
>> of budget/strategy, changes to the bylaws, and the removal of the Board or
>> of individual Board members. These are issues that require greater diversity
> I don't agree. Yes, some oversight issues deal with pure corporate governance, but most of the issues will deal with the accountability of the policy development process. This whole accountability movement was sparked by ICANN staff/board's refusal to follow policies recommended by the SOs and by its attempt to unilaterally impose policies on us, either due to lobbying by business groups or by GAC.
>
>
>
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