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Reply To: | Dr Andrew A. Adams |
Date: | Wed, 12 Apr 2017 09:41:25 +0900 |
Content-Type: | text/plain |
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I agree with Nils that this kind of censorship system can be designed at the
protocol level to be resistant to abuse, or to be easier to abuse. For
content which it is illegal to access, there is an argument to opaquely block
it from users. For content where it is primarily the user at risk, however,
specifying a protocol which exposes the reason for the blocking, and perhaps
which provides a mechanism for choosing to get around the block, seems less
of a problem. However, we must also consider how ordinary users will see the
results, and work on HTTPS certificate problems could provide a good guide
here on bad practice to avoid. We've trained people to ignore warning labels
on web sites by producing so many false positives that many people will
switch off the alert because they don't understand the information or the
risk levels. So, providing the information at a deep technical level
accessible to those with sufficient knowledge to know when to ignore it would
seem the right approach, on an initial shallow analysis.
Such blocking is, of course, also linked to issue of net neutrality
regulation.
--
Dr Andrew A Adams [log in to unmask]
Deputy Director of the Centre for Business Information Ethics
Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan http://www.a-cubed.info/
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