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Dear Robin,
Thanks for sharing this brilliant piece. Wonderful work by Laura
DeNardis. We have shared it widely within our networks.
Many more thanks and best wishes
Shahzad
Bytes for All, Pakistan
On 8/18/15 5:47 AM, Robin Gross wrote:
> Friends,
>
> Fellow NCSG member Laura DeNardis has written a thoughtful new article
on the
> topic of Internet architecture as proxy for state power that is
relevant to our
> work. Check it out in the IP Justice Journal:
> http://www.ipjustice.org/?p=3459 <http://t.co/ZWxgeg99Q4>
>
> Thank you,
> Robin
> _____________________________
>
>
> IP JUSTICE JOURNAL: Internet Architecture as Proxy for State Power
by Laura
> DeNardis
>
>
> *Internet Architecture as Proxy for State Power*
>
> By Laura DeNardis, Ph.D. – August 15, 2015/
> /
>
> Full Article as .PDF
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IPJustice_Journal_DeNardis_Internet_Architecture.pdf>
>
>
> Internet-Architecture
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Internet-Architecture1.jpg>*Internet
> Freedom in the Age of Internet Control*
>
> The Internet is no longer just a communication system. It is also a
control
> system in which more objects than people are connected to the network.
Society
> is moving from a world in which content is digitally mediated to one
in which
> all of life is digitally mediated. Beneath content, the Internet’s
physical and
> logical infrastructure is the technical scaffolding holding up basic
systems of
> finance, commerce, transportation, industrial control systems, and
surveillance
> technologies, as well as social interactions and access to knowledge.
Already
> measured in billions, there will soon be 50 billion objects online
ranging from
> wireless heart monitors, home alarm systems, weather sensors,
surveillance
> monitors, cars, energy system sensors, and drones.[1]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn1>
In
> cyberspace, the Internet of Things is rapidly morphing into the
Internet of
> Self, aggregating not only cyber physical systems but everything from
> communications to commercial transactions to biometric identifiers.
What are the
> prospects for Internet freedom in this context?
>
> Internet freedom is no longer merely about content. Fundamental
human rights
> depend upon an underlying system of technological infrastructure that
> creates the conditions for innovation and civil liberties online.
>
> These conditions are not preordained but have to be deliberatively
designed into
> technical architecture, which in turn creates the conditions for
economic and
> expressive liberty online. Since the Internet’s inception, its
development has
> embodied aspirational principles that have influenced how the network
is both
> designed and administered.
>
> The Internet Society, the not-for-profit organizational home of the
Internet
> Engineering Task Force (IETF), has described these technical
characteristics as
> “Internet invariants,” the enduring principles that have shaped how
the Internet
> is designed and administered.^^[2]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn2>
These
> technical norms include /global reach/, the potentiality of any end
device to
> reach any other regardless of location, and /interoperability /among
devices
> made by different manufacturers. They also include /permissionless
> innovation/ in which anyone can introduce a new Internet application
without a
> gatekeeper’s consent as well as a network marked by/accessibility/ and
/general
> purpose/ support of any application or service. The Internet Society’s
> invariants related to governance include /collaboration among
stakeholders,
> mutual agreement/, and the principle of /no permanent favorites/ so
essential
> for ongoing Internet innovation. As Internet engineer Leslie Daigle has
> summarized, “A network that does not have these characteristics is a
lesser
> thing than the Internet as it has been experienced to date.”^^[3]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn3>
While
> imperfect and always marked by conflicting interests and competing
values, these
> norms have contributed to the Internet’s growth, its architectural
capacity for
> open innovation and expression, and a stable system of Internet
governance.
>
> Several trends in various governments’ Internet policies are in
tension with the
> technical stability and openness of Internet governance and
architecture. These
> developments exist well outside of the enormous attention to the
functions
> performed by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN).
> There is not a single system of Internet administration, but many
layers of
> distinct functions, many carried out by the private sector, some by
new global
> institutions, some by governments, and some by all of the above in shared
> coordination arrangements. PQ4
> <http://www.ipjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/PQ4.png>Even ICANN’s
> oversight of names, numbers, and protocol parameters is distributed
across
> domain name registrars that sell domain name registrations,
governments, and
> Internet registries that administer names and numbers in a given
top-level
> domain (TLD). Other functions of Internet governance include: the
establishment
> of technical standards by the IETF, the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C), and
> others; interconnection agreements among private network operators;
> cybersecurity governance; the policymaking role of private information
> intermediaries such as Facebook and Google via their terms of service and
> privacy policies; and technical architecture-based intellectual
property rights
> enforcement.^^[4]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn4>
> All of these functions have policy implications ranging from privacy to
> property to speech rights.
>
> Beyond the intrinsic public interest implications embedded in keeping
> systems of Internet infrastructure operational, another feature of
Internet
> governance involves the phenomenon of governments attempting to
use the very
> infrastructure of the Internet for geopolitical objectives having
nothing to
> do with Internet operations.
>
> This phenomenon can be loosely termed the “turn to infrastructure” in
Internet
> governance.[5]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn5>
Policymakers
> view systems of Internet infrastructure and governance as part of
their arsenal
> for achieving various political and economic objectives.
>
> This paper extends this concept of examining the phenomenon of
/governance by
> Internet infrastructure/, such as using authoritative DNS registries,
as they
> exist, to enforce intellectual property rights, to the phenomenon of
/governance
> by tampering with Internet infrastructure/, in other words, imposing
statutory,
> technical, or other requirements to modify the actual design of Internet
> technical architecture for purposes completely extraneous to keeping the
> Internet operational. Discrete examples of this phenomenon include:
government
> interest in weakening encryption technologies to achieve national
security and
> law enforcement goals; nation-specific data localization laws; and
attempts to
> politically impose modifications to the Domain Name System (DNS) for
content
> control. Many of these policies conflict with how technologies work in
practice
> and also create challenges for civil liberties online.
>
> The rising geopolitical attention to the Internet and inextricable
linkages
> between human rights and infrastructure provide a moment of
opportunity to
> assess potential implications of politically driven infrastructure
> modifications for the future of Internet stability and freedom.
>
>
> *Geopolitical Back Doors in Encryption Protocols Can Weaken
Internet Security
> *
>
> New digital technologies, and new patterns of technology usage, always
> complicate the question of how to balance individual privacy and law
> enforcement. Consider the following statement: “Cell phones… are now
such a
> pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor
from Mars
> might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”[6]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn6>
The
> statement was not uttered on a late night comedy show but penned by
United
> States Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts in a Supreme Court
ruling about
> cell phone privacy. In /Riley v. California/, the Court took up the
question of
> whether police are constitutionally permitted to search cell phones
without a
> warrant. The Supreme Court ruled that warrantless searches of cell phones
> constituted a Fourth Amendment violation and were impermissible. Cell
phones
> were deemed inherently different, privacy-wise, from other items a
person might
> carry because of their enormous storage capacity, their ability to
hold personal
> photographs, medical records, locational information, and other data
stored over
> long periods of time, and because different types of information
contained on a
> cell phone, in combination, reveal much more than a particular record.
Does a
> right to encryption follow?
>
> In an almost Orwellian turn, searching a phone raises more privacy
issues than
> searching a house, as “a phone not only contains in digital form many
sensitive
> records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array
of private
> information never found in any form…”[7]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn7>
The
> same technologies and networks that have provided unprecedented
opportunities
> for freedom of expression and content aggregation, along with advances in
> storage and processing power, have also provided unprecedented
opportunities for
> government surveillance. American government contractor Edward
Snowden’s 2013
> disclosures about the expansiveness of National Security Agency (NSA)
> surveillance practices provoked a number of reactions from
governments, the
> technical community, and other stakeholders. In December of 2013, the
United
> Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on the right to privacy
in the
> digital age, affirming that “the rights held by people offline must
also be
> protected online.”[8]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn8>
>
> The Internet’s technical community has called for “hardening the
Internet” with
> greater end-to-end encryption.[9]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn9>
The
> consensus position of the IETF is that pervasive surveillance, whether of
> content or protocol metadata, is “a technical attack” that should be
addressed
> by protocol design choices that would, at a minimum, make indiscriminate
> surveillance more expensive or less feasible.[10]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn10>
By
> 2014, the Internet Architecture Board released a statement suggesting
that
> encryption throughout the protocol stack be a norm and a default
approach in
> order to restore trust in the Internet.[11]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn11>
Google
> announced it would “always use an encrypted HTTPS connection when you
check or
> send email,” effectively preventing someone from ‘listening in’ even if
> accessing email from an open public Wi-Fi network.[12]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn12>
>
> One government response to these trends has been a call for building
backdoors
> into encryption protocols and implementations so that agencies can
readily
> access information. In an era of rising Islamic terrorism and associated
> employment of Internet technologies for recruitment and strategic
communication,
> national security and law enforcement agencies, of course, turn
attention to
> online intelligence practices and oppose efforts of technology
companies to make
> these practices more difficult. For example, United States FBI
Director James
> Comey has criticized corporate efforts to implement end-to-end
encryption,
> arguing that encryption could prohibit law enforcement efforts to
access vital
> information and calling for a reconsideration of encryption.[13]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn13>
In
> the UK, a proposed bill could require private technology companies to
build
> backdoors to user data as a tool for combatting global terrorism.[14]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn14>
>
> Encryption has always been a politically charged technology, and one that
> historically has been embroiled in conflicts between individual
privacy and
> national security. Conflicts have manifested as questions about legally
> restricting encryption strength (e.g. key length), banning certain
types of
> encryption, or imposing export restrictions. The United States at one
point
> regulated encryption along with firearms under International Traffic
in Arms
> Regulations (ITARS). Initiatives to build “back doors” into encryption
are part
> of an ongoing trajectory of political tensions over a technology
inherently
> designed to provide security (e.g. public key authentication) and privacy.
>
> One problem with “back doors” – no matter how well meaning – is that
they build
> in inherent security vulnerabilities that could be exploited for other
purposes.
> As Apple CEO Tim Cook warned, “If you put a key under the mat for the
cops, a
> burglar can find it, too. Criminals are using every technology tool at
their
> disposal to hack into people’s accounts. If they know there’s a key
hidden
> somewhere, they won’t stop until they find it.”[15]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn15>
>
> The Global Commission on Internet Governance, an independent group
chaired by
> Sweden’s former Prime Minister Carl Bildt, has issued a consensus
recommendation
> that:
>
> “Governments should not create or require third parties to create
‘back doors’
> to access data that would have the effect of weakening the security of
the
> Internet. Efforts by the Internet technical community to incorporate
> privacy-enhancing solutions in the standards and protocols of the
Internet,
> including end-to-end encryption of data in transit and at rest, should be
> encouraged.”[16]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn16>
>
> Security experts, in their report “Keys Under Doormats,” raise similar
concerns
> about building encryption backdoors: “These proposals are unworkable in
> practice, raise enormous legal and ethical questions, and would undo
progress on
> security at a time when Internet vulnerabilities are causing extreme
economic
> harm.”[17]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn17>
>
> **The early 21^st century has thus far been marked by numerous
high-profile
> cybersecurity breaches, some geopolitically motivated, such as the
Sony Pictures
> attack and presumably the massive data breach at the US Office of
Personnel
> management (OPM). In the US alone, contemporary data breaches at large
companies
> such as Target, Home Depot, and Premera Blue Cross have affected
almost 200
> million citizens. The concept of deliberatively designing additional
security
> vulnerabilities into the Internet’s infrastructure is incongruous.
>
>
> *Data Localization Laws Can Promote Fragmentation Rather than
Universality*
>
> Internet infrastructure design does not map neatly onto national
borders. Seeing
> a simple traceroute of packets moving from point A to point B helps
illustrate
> how transmission paths depend on efficient routing rather than
circumscribed
> borders. Physical infrastructure – fiber optic cable, antennas, switching
> centers, and server farms – resides within fixed geographic locations.
But the
> distributed storage and processing systems and the flow of packets
over this
> architecture do not comport with national boundaries. Even an exchange of
> information between two network operators within a single country can
> potentially route through an Internet Exchange Point (IXP) in another
region.
> Companies can locate customer support centers in any location around
the world.
> A retail company with a .COM address can reside anywhere in the world.
Large
> multinational companies such as financial services firms use network
systems
> spanning the globe rather than neatly circumscribed within a nation’s
border.
> Large content companies (e.g. Google) and Content Delivery Networks (e.g.
> Akamai) globally distribute content to bring it closer to users via
replication
> (mirroring) and caching. Companies optimize information distribution
across
> servers based on traffic patterns and variables such as bandwidth,
processing
> power, and storage capacity.
>
> A significant shift in policymaking has been the introduction of laws
regulating
> where private companies store data and how infrastructure is physically
> configured. Much of the policy interest in imposing borders around
Internet
> infrastructure has cited foreign surveillance, and in particular, the
expansive
> NSA surveillance program as inducements. Political interest has ranged
from
> wanting to avoid switching traffic through a US-based IXP in order to
route
> around the United States to investing in new undersea cable routes, to
data
> localization approaches requiring companies to store customer data on
servers
> located within a nation’s borders or otherwise controlling the
cross-border
> movement, sharing, taxation or storage of customer information. Data
> localization laws, in particular, are already in place or pending in many
> countries.^^[18]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn18>
A
> Russian law requiring companies to store data of Russian citizens
within the
> nation’s border takes effect in late 2015.
>
> There are engineering, innovation, and civil liberties complications
embedded
> within these policy-driven alterations to Internet infrastructure.
“Holding”
> data in a fixed location is incompatible with engineering principles like
> reducing latency, load balancing, and basic traffic engineering. It is
also
> incommensurable with business models predicated upon global customer
bases and
> workforces. As civil society advocates have expressed, it moves the
Internet
> from a /de facto/ universal network to “a world with country-specific
> ‘internets’ that don’t connect with each other to form today’s global
> network.”[19]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn19>Large
> content intermediaries like Google have also expressed concern. In
testimony
> before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and
the Law,
> Google’s Director for Law Enforcement and Information Security,
Richard Salgado,
> warned that data localization laws could result in the “Balkanization
of the
> Internet” and constitute a challenge to the “free and open Internet
that we
> benefit from today.”[20]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn20>
>
> From an innovation perspective, consider the prohibitive cost burden
to new
> entrepreneurs having to locate servers in any country in which they
wished to
> operate. New entrants would not be able to compete in global markets.
Only
> already-dominant companies would have the resources to comply with
> infrastructure localization requirements, a violation of the principle
of “no
> permanent favorites.” These laws would also have effects far beyond
the tech
> industry. Sectors ranging from financial services to retail have large
data
> stores of customer information that routinely cross borders for customer
> service, billing services, or direct delivery of information and goods to
> customers wherever they are in the world. Data localization laws apply
to these
> companies as well. A McKinsey & Company survey of chief executives in the
> financial services sector revealed concern about data localization
regulation,
> with problems ranging from increased organizational complexity to
constraints on
> efficiency due to having to locate employees and infrastructure in local
> markets.^^[21]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn21>
>
> From a civil liberties standpoint, the ensuing concentration of
data in
> data localization scenarios could actually facilitate new forms of
efficient
> surveillance,[22]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn22>
either
> by the home nation or through foreign surveillance. Before data
localization
> laws become a global norm, there is an opportunity for governments to
> rethink the potential political, economic, and technical
collateral damage
> of these policies.
>
>
> *DNS Modifications Can Affect Internet Stability*
>
> The Domain Name System is another layer of the Internet’s
infrastructure which
> has attracted policymaker attention. The DNS translates human-friendly
domain
> names, such as IPJustice.org <http://www.ipjustice.org/>, into
corresponding
> binary numbers called Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. As such, it
can be
> referred to as the Internet’s phone book. This is a critical technical
function
> involving the resolution of hundreds of bPQ5
> <http://www.ipjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/PQ5.png>illions
of queries
> a day via servers located in every corner of the world. It is also a
function
> that carries public interest implications, shaped by DNS technical design
> features. The hierarchical DNS provides points of control for redirecting
> queries away from certain websites, whether for censorship or
intellectual
> property rights enforcement. The names and numbers the DNS administers
are
> designed to be globally unique identifiers, both necessitating some
degree of
> centralized coordination and also creating the conditions for IP
addresses to be
> used as unique personal identifiers, in combination with other
information.
>
> Because the DNS inherently contains content (domain names) it is
therefore a
> speech space embroiled with controversies such as free expression and
> intellectual property rights considerations. Trademark disputes are
difficult
> enough, involving ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) and
ICANN’s
> contractual relationship with domain name registrars and registries.[23]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn23>There
> are many other complicated questions. What new top-level domains
(TLDs) may be
> introduced in a universal Internet supporting divergent cultural norms
across
> regions (e.g. .GAY, .SUCKS, .WINE)? What happens when territorial
interests
> clash with private trademark holders, as when countries with the Amazon
> rainforest within their borders objected to the proposal from Amazon,
Inc. to
> introduce and operate a .AMAZON TLD? ICANN is at the center of
decision making
> around these critical speech and property policy problems. Thus, the
global
> attention to ICANN and, in particular, the ongoing and politically
charged
> question of how to transition the US government’s historic oversight
functions
> to a global multistakeholder community.[24]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn24>
>
> PQ6 <http://www.ipjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/PQ6.png>
>
> The DNS also raises privacy policy conflicts in the query resolution
process.
> DNS queries are almost always unencrypted.[25]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn25>
A
> contemporary policy concern involves the question of enhancing privacy
in DNS
> queries versus keeping this information unencrypted for law
enforcement or other
> purposes. How this lookup information is retained and shared
potentially exposes
> information about websites queried, which may contain private or
sensitive
> information such as visiting websites addressing medical, substance
abuse, or
> mental health issues.
>
> As these examples convey, the DNS in its day-to-day operation already
implicates
> complicated rights issues. A separate circumstance involves government
efforts
> to modify or block DNS records and architecture to achieve objectives
unrelated
> to keeping the Internet operational or dealing with public policy
questions
> arising in normal DNS operation.[26]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn26>
The
> most routine example is the practice of using the DNS to block access to
> websites infringing intellectual property rights, such as those
offering pirated
> movies or selling counterfeit luxury goods or pharmaceutical
products.^^[27]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn27>
Domain
> name seizures have been regularly carried out by the US Department of
Homeland
> Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) group. These
redirections
> can occur by requesting that the authoritative Internet registry
responsible for
> a top-level domain (e.g. .org, .com) remove the data mapping the
infringing
> domain name or redirect it to another server, such as one containing a
law
> enforcement message. When the registry operating the appropriate
TLD is in
> a different jurisdiction, an alternative with greater potential
repercussions
> for technical stability and universality involves local DNS
redirection. When it
> is not possible to request a query redirection in the universal record
> maintained by an authoritative registry, presumably because the
registry is
> extra-jurisdictional, it is possible to approach a local, albeit
> non-authoritative DNS operator to disregard the universal name and number
> mapping for the infringing site and instead modify it in local
records. This
> technique changes the DNS from one that is universally consistent to
one that
> has inconsistent records that vary by region. This same local redirection
> technique is used by governments to censor certain websites, such as
blocking
> access to Twitter in countries with repressive information policies. One
> technical vulnerability caused by altering the universality of DNS
records is
> the possibility, as has occurred, of locally modified records being
broadcast
> more globally and creating security complexities related to the use of
DNSSEC
> for cryptographically authenticating DNS records.
>
> Identity theft techniques already exploit security vulnerabilities in
the DNS to
> appropriate and alter queries (called DNS injection techniques) with
the purpose
> of redirecting a user to a fraudulent site to extract financial
information or
> to collect information for identity theft. These same techniques are
sometimes
> used to censor content as part of the Great Firewall of China.[28]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_edn28>
>
> Once it becomes the norm for the DNS to be altered for content
blocking and
> manipulation, it will be difficult to veer the DNS back toward universal
> consistency. Consideration of the technical implications to Internet
stability,
> security, and universality, as well as the human rights implications of
> over-blocking and censorship, is critical before the DNS becomes the
default
> gatekeeper for almost any type of blocking or security attack.
>
>
> *The Future of Internet Governance Should Consider Implications
for Technology
> *
>
> One of the most pressing 21^st century developments in Internet
governance is
> the increasing entanglement between often well-meaning government
policies and
> Internet infrastructure alterations. Much attention to Internet
governance
> focuses on the /global/ /institutions/ of Internet governance (e.g.
ICANN),
> /content regulations/, the public interest implications of /technical
design/,
> or, increasingly, the role of technology /corporations/ in
establishing public
> policy. There are also many points of infrastructure intervention in
which
> governments can help promote the health of the global Internet: the
deployment
> of IXPs, IPv6 adoption, open standards, or restoring trust in the
system through
> security cooperation. In addition to interrogating sociopolitical
effects of
> technology on society; what are the potential effects of government
policies on
> the stability and security of the technology?
>
> The three policy examples this article addresses – encryption
backdoors,
> data localization, and DNS alterations – share several
characteristics. They
> are examples of government interest in altering the design of Internet
> infrastructure to achieve policy objectives. They all raise
questions about
> the implications of these alterations for the stability and
security of the
> Internet itself; for civil liberties; and for the pace of
innovation online.
>
> Each of these alterations raises questions about the possibility of
technical
> fragmentation and the state of Internet “universality.” Since the
> non-interoperable and fragmented 1990s era of proprietary online
systems like
> Prodigy and the early America Online service, the desire for a
consistent and
> universal system in which any device could reach any other device has
always
> been a given for the public Internet. Of course, corporate Intranets and
> security-intensive networks supporting sensitive information have
designed
> access controls and restrictions into the system. It is also easy to
argue that
> a world with access divides, language barriers, and economic
disparities hardly
> constitutes a universal Internet. But the technological building
blocks for
> universality are present. These examples also suggest the types of
security
> concerns that can arise from governmental interventions in Internet
> infrastructure. Encryption backdoors build in security vulnerabilities
that
> could be exploited for criminal or other activities; data localization
> approaches concentrate rather than distribute data and can serve as
targets for
> data breaches; DNS modifications can complicate the implementation of DNS
> cryptographic signing via DNSSEC.
>
> These cases also help emphasize the contradictory values that always
exist in
> Internet policy. On one hand, governments seek to protect citizen
privacy with
> data localization requirements; on the other, they seek to have
encryption
> backdoors to be able to access citizen data. Regardless of which
values prevail,
> it is increasingly important to view Internet governance as not just
about
> keeping Internet infrastructure operational and promoting access to
knowledge,
> innovation, and economic growth.
>
> Internet governance and architecture has become a proxy for state
power. And
> this exertion of state power by seeking modifications to Internet
architecture
> must be accompanied by concern for the implications of these technical
> alterations for Internet stability and security and the characteristics
> necessary to preserve or promote a free and open Internet.
>
>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> FullSizeRender
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/FullSizeRender.jpg>*About
> the Author*: Dr. Laura DeNardis is a globally recognized scholar of
Internet
> governance and technical infrastructure and a tenured Professor in the
School of
> Communication at American University in Washington, DC
> <http://www.american.edu/soc/faculty/denardis.cfm>. Her books include
/The
> Global War for Internet Governance/ (Yale University Press 2014);
/Opening
> Standards: The Global Politics of Interoperability/ (MIT Press 2011);
/Protocol
> Politics: The Globalization of Internet Governance/ (MIT Press 2009); and
> /Information Technology in Theory/ (Thompson 2007 with Pelin Aksoy).
With a
> background in information engineering and a doctorate in Science and
Technology
> Studies (STS), her research studies the social and political
implications of
> Internet technical architecture and governance. She is an affiliated
fellow of
> the Yale Law School Information Society Project and served as its
Executive
> Director from 2008-2011. Her expertise and scholarship have been
featured in
> /Science Magazine/, /The Economist/, /National Public Radio/, /New
York Times/,
> /ABC news/, /Bloomberg/, /Time Magazine/, /Christian Science Monitor/,
/Slate/,
> /Reuters/, /Forbes/, /The Atlantic/, the /Globe and Mail/, /Investor’s
Business
> Daily/, and the /Wall Street Journal/ and she is a frequent speaker at
the
> world’s most prestigious universities and events. She is a Senior
Fellow of the
> Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) and currently
holds an
> international appointment as the Research Director for the /Global
Commission on
> Internet Governance/. Domestically, she is an appointed member of the
U.S.
> Department of State’s Advisory Committee on International
Communications and
> Information Policy (ACICIP). Dr. DeNardis holds an AB in Engineering
Science
> from Dartmouth College, an MEng from Cornell University, a PhD in
Science and
> Technology Studies from Virginia Tech, and was awarded a postdoctoral
fellowship
> from Yale Law School. Laura DeNardis was elected to membership in the
/Cosmos
> Club /in 2015. She resides in Washington, DC.
>
>
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> [1]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref1>
Cisco
> White Paper, Dave Evans, “The Internet of Things: How the Next
Evolution of the
> Internet is Changing Everything,” April 2011. Accessed at
> http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf.
>
> ^^[2]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref2>
Internet
> Society, “Internet Invariants: What Really Matters,” February 3, 2012.
Accessed
> athttp://www.internetsociety.org/internet-invariants-what-really-matters.
>
> ^^[3]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref3>
Leslie
> Daigle, “On the Nature of the Internet,” /Global Commission on Internet
> Governance Paper Series/ No. 7, March 2015. Accessed at
> https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig_paper_no7.pdf.
>
> ^^[4]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref4>
Laura
> DeNardis, /The Global War for Internet Governance/, Yale University
Press, 2014.
>
> [5]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref5>
For
> an account of this turn to infrastructure for Internet governance, see
Laura
> DeNardis, “Hidden Levers of Internet Control: An Infrastructure-Based
Theory of
> Internet Governance,” /Journal of Information, Communication and
Society/,
> Volume 15, Issue 3, February 2012.
>
> [6]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref6>
From
> the Supreme Court opinion /Riley v. California/, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014), opinion
> delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts, June 25, 2014, p. 13.
>
> [7]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref7>
> /Riley v. California/, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), pp. 20-21.
>
> [8]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref8>
Report
> of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the right
to privacy
> in the digital age A/HRC/27/37, p. 2, June 30, 2014. Accessed at
> http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DigitalAge/Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx.
>
> [9]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref9>
Hardening
> the Internet” was the title of the Technical Plenary of the IETF 88
meeting of
> the Internet Engineering Task Force in Vancouver, Canada, in November
2013.
>
> [10]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref10>
Stephen
> Farrell and Hannes Tschofenig, /Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack/,
IETF RFC
> 7258, May 2014. Accessed at www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7258.txt
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7258.txt>.
>
> [11]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref11>
“IAB
> Statement on Internet Confidentiality,” November 14, 2014. Accessed at
> https://www.iab.org/2014/11/14/iab-statement-on-internet-confidentiality.
>
> [12]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref12>
Official
> Google blog posting by Nicolas Lidzborski, Gmail Security Engineering
Lead,
> “Staying at the forefront of email security and reliability:
HTTPS-only and
> 99.978 percent availability,” March 20, 2014.
>
> [13]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref13>
Spencer
> Ackerman, “FBI chief wants ‘backdoor access’ to encrypted
communications to
> fight Isis,” /The Guardian/, July 8, 2015. Accessed at
>
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/08/fbi-chief-backdoor-access-encryption-isis
>
> [14]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref14>
Theo
> Priestly, “All Instant Messaging Could be Killed in the UK within Weeks,”
> /Forbes/, July 13, 2015. Accessed
>
athttp://www.forbes.com/sites/theopriestley/2015/07/13/all-instant-messaging-could-be-killed-in-the-uk-within-weeks.
>
> [15]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref15>
Tim
> Cook cited in Matthew Panzarino, “Apple’s Tim Cook delivers blistering
speech on
> encryption, privacy,” /TechCrunch/, June 2, 2015. Accessed at
>
http://techcrunch.com/2015/06/02/apples-tim-cook-delivers-blistering-speech-on-encryption-privacy.
>
> [16]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref16>
Statement
> by the Global Commission on Internet Governance, “Toward a Social
Compact for
> Digital Privacy and Security,” April 15, 2015. Accessed at
>
https://www.ourinternet.org/publication/toward-a-social-compact-for-digital-privacy-and-security.
>
> [17]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref17>
Hal
> Abelson et al., “Keys under doormats: Mandating insecurity by requiring
> government access to all data and communications,” Computer Science and
> Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Technical Report, /MIT/, 2015.
Accessed
>
athttp://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-026.pdf?sequence=8.
>
> ^*^[18] *
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref18>
Anupam
> Chander and Uyen Le, “Data Nationalism,” /Emory Law Journal/, Vol. 64,
No. 3, 2015.
>
> [19]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref19>
Emma
> Llanso, Center for Democracy and Technology, CNN op/ed “How
Politicians are
> Trying to Break the Internet,” September 5, 2014. Accessed at
> http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/05/business/opinion-internet-post-snowden/.
>
> [20]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref20>
Written
> testimony of Richard Salgado, Director, Law Enforcement and Information
> Security, Google, before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy,
> Technology and the Law hearing on “The Surveillance Transparency Act
of 2013,”
> November 13, 2013. Accessed at
>
http://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google_testimony_transparency_nov132013.pdf.
>
> ^^[21]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref21>
James
> Kaplan and Kayvaun Rowshankish, “Addressing the Impact of Data Location
> Regulation in Financial Services,” /Global Commission on Internet
Governance
> Paper Series/ No. 14, May 2015.
>
> [22]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref22>
Ania
> Nussbaum, “Russia’s data law will hurt its economy,” /Wall Street
Journal/, June
> 18, 2015. Accessed
>
athttp://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/06/18/russias-data-law-will-hurt-its-economy-think-tank
>
<http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/06/18/russias-data-law-will-hurt-its-economy-think-tank/>.
>
> [23]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref23>
See,
> for example, David G. Post, “Internet Infrastructure and IP
Censorship,” /IP
> Justice Journal/, 1 August 2015. Accessed
>
athttp://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-infrastructure-and-ip-censorship-by-david-post.
>
> [24]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref24>
For
> background on the IANA transition, see, for example, Emily Taylor,
“ICANN:
> Bridging the Trust Gap,” /Global Commission on Internet Governance Paper
> Series/ No. 9, March 2015. Accessed at
>
https://ourinternet-files.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/gcig_paper_no9.pdf.
>
> [25]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref25>
Stephane
> Bortzmeyer, IETF Draft, “DNS Privacy Considerations,” January 7, 2015.
Accessed
> athttps://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dprive-problem-statement-01.
>
> [26]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref26>
A
> detailed delineation of various approaches to co-opting the DNS is
addressed in
> Samantha Bradshaw and Laura DeNardis, “The Politicization of the
Internet’s
> Domain Name System: Implications for Internet Security, Stability,
Universality,
> and Freedom,” Refereed paper presented at the 56th Annual
International Studies
> Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, 2015
>
> ^^[27]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref27>
For
> information about the practice and technical implications of domain name
> seizures, see Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), “Advisory
> Impacts of Content Blocking via the Domain Name System,” 2012, available
> athttps://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/sac-056-en.pdf.
>
> [28]
>
<http://www.ipjustice.org/digital-rights/internet-architecture-redesign-as-proxy-for-state-power-by-laura-denardis/#_ednref28>
Jonathan
> Zittrain and Benjamin Edelman, “Internet Filtering in China,” /IEEE
Internet
> Computing/, March/April 2003. Accessed at
>
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan011043.pdf.
>
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