Hi,

I too think this is a good thing to discuss.  But I have a very
different take on the issue.  Perhaps it is a little less fortress GNSO
centric.

I am one of those proposing alternative 1.  Since arguments for this has
already been deemed misleading, I probably should not waste my time
defending it.  Though I do ntend to submit my own comment on the issue.

However, I do not care that there are 5 votes, that is a different
issue.  I personally preferred that each of the ACSO get 3 votes to
split up anyway they wanted. I wanted to keep it small. What I care
about is that in the application of powers, AC s and SOs should be on an
equal footing.  I know that not everone belives in the theory of equal
footing.  I am dedicated to it.

The 5 powers have nothing to do with gTLDs.  One could ask why the GNSO
should have a say on anything not to do with gTLDs. All things gTLD and
only things gTLD are within their tightly defined mission.  That is not,
however, my issue.  What I have an issue on is that in an system
architecture that has a balance of different perspectives, these sorts
of powers should be on an equal footing and that it is inappropriate for
one group to look at another and say they are less important that us. 
Some argue that I carry this egalitarian ethic too far, but as far as I
can tell, ICANN needs it in order to be able to do the right thing.

The argument that this decreases GNSO power is hard to understand.  What
power does the GNSO have now in the area of 5 powers? The only time we
have power is when we all work together - we have seen that several
times this year.  The powers are about the community working together to
overrule the board.  The community cannot work together if one group
deems other groups as less important than themselves.

So as I say, good topic for discussion.

avri



On 12-Aug-15 07:50, William Drake wrote:
> Really useful piece from Brenden, really working problem to fix.
>
> Bill
>
>> On Aug 12, 2015, at 3:25 AM, Robin Gross <[log in to unmask]
>> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
>>
>> Excellent analysis from Brenden on one key flaw in the CCWG
>> Accountability's existing proposal - how the proposed SOAC "voting
>> weights" empowers some parts of the ICANN community (ACs) while
>> disempowering others (including the GNSO) as compared to the existing
>> balance of power in ICANN's structure.  So this is one gaping hole we
>> need to fix in the draft proposal, which otherwise has recommended
>> some significant improvements (like the Independent Review process
>> and Reconsideration Request process).
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Robin
>>
>> On Aug 11, 2015, at 11:20 AM, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
>>
>>> Dr. Brenden Kuerbis of IGP has developed a very important analysis
>>> of the CCWG’s proposed voting distribution model, which we need to
>>> take into account when developing our comments.
>>> Read it
>>> here: http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/08/11/ccwg-community-mechanism-threatens-to-upset-icann-balance/#comment-40415
>>>  
>>> Dr. Milton L. Mueller
>>> Professor, School of Public Policy
>>> Georgia Institute of Technology
>>>  
>>>  
>>
>


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