I'm inclined to agree with Milton, but I want to consider Bill's
alternative view first.

Whatever philosophy applies to GAC should apply to other SGs as well.  If 2
is not enough to "represent" the full spectrum of government interests,
then why should that be enough to represent the full spectrum of other
stakeholder group interests?  Should consensus be assumed to be any more
likely within other SGs (at the SG level) than for governments as a group?
Proportional parity between SGs seems in order, here.

Also, is it not possible for a single representative to express a
multiplicity of positions within a group, if such varied positions exist,
and to bring a full spectrum of positions to the discussion?

Structure of the CG depends partly on the mandate and mission of the CG
(can someone reiterate a quick sound-bite on what the CG is trying to
accomplish, under what authority?).  If important outcomes are going to be
arrived at by vote, then that speaks to a voting structure.  If it is more
of a consensus process, then voting should not be quite as important as
long as all views are being aired.  (Devil-in-the-details caveat, as usual.
Even in consensus processes, an informal counterpart to voting still
applies: there is greater perceived influence when greater numbers of
participants voice a similar opinion, even if "the ideas" are supposed to
have full weight unto themselves.  The realities of human psychology --
especially unconscious processes -- erode the pure rationality of the
process.  The practical measure of whether a "pure idea" has weight tends
to involve how many people in the group are convinced by the idea.)

But how large a body is the CG (as Bill asks), and does the number of
participants affect the productivity of its work?  If one multiplies the
number of participants all around (proportionally), then that dilutes the
influence of any single participant.  I'm not sure whether that's better or
worse, depends on the mission and decision processes at hand.  Will it be
easier or harder to get things done with more or less participants?

If GAC is really trying to gain proportionally greater influence on the CG,
then I think that should be forcefully resisted.  If GAC just wants to have
accurate expression of its varied views (and thinks that requires all
"viewers" being explicitly present), then that should be extended equally
to other SGs at the same time.  All or nothing.

The guiding principle, to me, is resisting any increase in proportional
influence of the GAC in the CG, according to whatever excuse, valid or not.

Dan


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At 6:36 PM +0200 7/12/14, William Drake wrote:
>Hi MM
>
>On Jul 12, 2014, at 5:45 PM, Milton L Mueller <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>> The coordination group will meet in London next week for its first f2f
>>meeting. We've also had an initial conference call.
>>
>> I want to solicit your opinion on two immediate issues we will face.
>>
>> 1. GAC representation.
>> Governments have been allotted 2 seats on the coordination group (CG).
>>They want 5, one for each world region.
>> ICANN has indicated that it will follow the CG's lead on whether to add
>>additional seats or keep it at two.
>> I have an opinion on this, but want to see what others think.
>> My opinion is that the GAC should not be allowed to add more members;
>>the basic fallacy they are making is to see the CG as a voting body
>>rather than seeing its members as liaisons to the specific communities
>>represented. 2 seats allows them to keep tabs on what the CG is doing and
>>carry that info back to the GAC and the GAC's reaction back to the CG.
>>With 5 seats you are not only inflating the size of an already large
>>committee but inflating the representation of a stakeholder group that,
>>according to the NTIA mandate, is not supposed to play a controlling role
>>in the outcome. Other perspectives welcome.
>
>Not at all surprising, since they are used to following regional
>coordination processes in many UN settings, 2 governments can hardly
>represent their various coalitions in any meaningful way, etc.  Leaving
>aside our standard ideological differences, to the extent that one seeks
>political buy-in and sustainability for whatever solution will be found
>and that 5 GACsters are unlikely to control outcomes in an overwhelmingly
>business and technical community group, a priori I'd be more favorably
>inclined than you and McTim to say that the world's governments should get
>more reps than the ALAC, ISOC, etc.  But it'd be easier to say for sure if
>I was up to speed on the larger discussion about composition.  Are we
>still at 27 people? Will the GNSO representation be increased as asked
>for?  Are any other groups asking for and likely to get more?
>>
>> 2. Transition scope and expectations about work in the communities.
>> Our working agenda says: "It would be good to clarify the CG's
>>understanding of the scope of the work of the transition, what the
>>community processes need to produce, and where/how areas of overlap will
>>be handled." Advice on how we want this scope issue to be handled is
>>welcome. We obviously want to avoid making "scope" a code word for
>>eliminating certain outcomes or end states that certain forces don't want
>>to happen.
>
>I'd need to have my head more inside the process than I do at the moment
>to say anything useful.  Since yours is there, maybe you could share a
>little more how you see the issues and choices?
>
>Thanks
>
>Bill