Dear all,
In CIS's submissions to the WSIS process, to the ICG, to the CCWG-Acct,
we have raised the multi-faceted issue of jurisdiction, and why dealing
with that now (before the transition) is important. Given that it
hasn't been dealt with as part of WS1, I believe the "IANA transition"
ends up being meaningless in terms of what it set out to achieve, and
what were the goals laid down in the Montevideo Statement and in the
NETmundial Statement.
I believe civil society actors ought to discuss our positions on the
topic of jurisdiction, which frankly hasn't really happened on this list.
To instigate debate, I've written a long-ish piece on the topic:
http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann
Regards,
Pranesh
Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN
======================================
In March 2014, the [US government announced] that they were going to end
the contract they have with ICANN to run the [Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority] (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder
community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come
through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the
global Internet community”.
Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract?
------------------------------------------------------
The main reason for the U.S. government’s action is that it will get rid
of a political thorn in the U.S. government’s side: keeping the contract
allows them to be called out as having a special role in Internet
governance (with the Affirmation of Commitments between the U.S.
Department of Commerce and ICANN, the IANA contract, and the cooperative
agreement with Verisign), and engaging in unilateralism with regard to
the operation of the root servers of the Internet naming system, while
repeatedly declaring that they support a multistakeholder model of
Internet governance.
This contradiction is what they are hoping to address. Doing away with
the NTIA contract will also increase — ever so marginally — ICANN’s
global legitimacy: this is something that world governments, civil
society organizations, and some American academics have been asking for
nearly since ICANN’s inception in 1998. For instance, here are some
demands made [in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance
Caucus at WSIS, in 2005]:
> “ICANN will negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to replace its California Incorporation, being careful to retain those aspects of its California Incorporation that enhance its accountability to the global Internet user community.”ICANN’s decisions, and any host country agreement, must be required to comply with public policy requirements negotiated through international treaties in regard to, inter alia, human rights treaties, privacy rights, gender agreements and trade rules. … “It is also expected that the multi-stakeholder community will observe and comment on the progress made in this process through the proposed \[Internet Governance\] Forum.”
In short: the objective of the transition is political, [not technical].
In an ideal world, we *should* aim at reducing U.S. state control over
the core of the Internet’s domain name system.[^1]
It is our contention that **U.S. state control over the core of the
Internet’s domain name system is *not* being removed** by the transition
that is currently underway.
Why is the Transition Happening Now?
------------------------------------
Despite the U.S. government having given commitments in the past that
were going to finish the IANA transition by “September 30, 2000”, (the
[White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses] states: “The
U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be complete before the
year 2000. To the extent that the new corporation is established and
operationally stable, September 30, 2000 is intended to be, and remains,
an ‘outside’ date.”) and later by “fall of 2006”,[^2] those turned out
to be empty promises. However, this time, the transition seems to be
going through, unless the U.S. Congress manages to halt it.
However, in order to answer the question of “why now?” fully, one has to
look a bit at the past.
In 1998, through the [White Paper on Management of Internet Names and
Addresses] the U.S. government [asserted it’s control over the root],
and asserted — some would say arrogated to itself — the power to put out
contracts for both the IANA functions as well as the ‘A’ Root (i.e., the
Root Zone Maintainer function that Network Solutions Inc. then
performed, and continues to perform to date in its current avatar as
Verisign). The IANA functions contract — a periodically renewable
contract — was awarded to ICANN, a California-based non-profit
corporation that was set up exclusively for this purpose, but which
evolved around the existing IANA (to placate the Internet Society).
Meanwhile, of course, there were criticisms of ICANN from multiple
foreign governments and civil society organizations. Further, despite it
being a California-based non-profit on contract with the government,
domestically within the U.S., there was pushback from constituencies
that felt that more direct U.S. control of the DNS was important.
As Goldsmith and Wu summarize:
> “Milton Mueller and others have shown that ICANN’s spirit of “self-regulation” was an appealing label for a process that could be more accurately described as the U.S. government brokering a behind-the-scenes deal that best suited its policy preferences … the United States wanted to ensure the stability of the Internet, to fend off the regulatory efforts of foreign governments and international organizations, and to maintain ultimate control. The easiest way to do that was to maintain formal control while turning over day-to-day control of the root to ICANN and the Internet Society, which had close ties to the regulation-shy American technology industry.” \[footnotes omitted\]
And that brings us to the first reason that the NTIA announced the
transition in 2014, rather than earlier.
### ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough
The NTIA now sees ICANN as being mature enough: the final transition was
announced 16 years after ICANN’s creation, and complaints about ICANN
and its legitimacy had largely died down in the international arena in
that while. Nowadays, governments across the world send their
representatives to ICANN, thus legitimizing ICANN. States have largely
been satisfied by participating in the Government Advisory Council,
which, as its name suggests, only has advisory powers. Further, unlike
in the early days, there is [no serious push for states assuming control
of ICANN]. Of course they grumble about the ICANN Board not following
their advice, but no government, as far as I am aware, has walked out or
refused to participate.
### L’affaire Snowden
Many within the United States, and some without, believe that the United
States not only plays an exceptional role to play in the running of the
Internet — by dint of historical development and dominance of American
companies — but that *it ought to* have an exceptional role because it
is the best country to exercise ‘oversight’ over ‘the Internet’ (often
coming from [clueless commentators]), and from dinosaurs of the Internet
era, like [American IP lawyers] and [American ‘homeland’ security
hawks], Jones Day, who are ICANN’s lawyers, and other [jingoists] and
those policymakers who are controlled by these narrow-minded interests.
The Snowden revelations were, in that way, a godsend for the NTIA, as it
allowed them a fig-leaf of [international][] [criticism][] [with which]
to counter these domestic critics and carry on with a transition that
they have been seeking to put into motion for a while. The Snowden
revelations led Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, to state in
September 2013, at the 68th U.N. General Assembly, that Brazil would
“present proposals for the establishment of a [civilian multilateral
framework for the governance and use of the Internet]”, and as [Diego
Canabarro] points out this catalysed the U.S. government and the
technical community into taking action.
Given this context, a few months after the Snowden revelations, the
so-called [I\* organizations] met — seemingly with the blessing of the
U.S. government[^3] — in Montevideo, and put out a [‘Statement on the
Future of Internet Governance’] that sought to link the Snowden
revelations on pervasive surveillance with the need to urgently
transition the IANA stewardship role away from the U.S. government. Of
course, the signatories to that statement knew fully well, as did most
of the readers of that statement, that there is no linkage between the
Snowden revelations about pervasive surveillance and the operations of
the DNS root, but still they, and others, linked them together.
Specifically, the I\* organizations called for “accelerating the
globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in
which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an
equal footing.”
One could posit the existence of two other contributing factors as well.
Given political realities in the United States, a transition of this
sort is probably best done before an ultra-jingoistic President steps
into office.
Lastly, the ten-yearly review of the World Summit on Information Society
was currently underway. At the original WSIS (as seen from the civil
society quoted above) the issue of US control over the root was a major
issue of contention. At that point (and during where the 2006 date for
globalization of ICANN was emphasized by the US government).
Why Jurisdiction is Important
-----------------------------
Jurisdiction has a great many aspects. *Inter alia*, these are:
- Legal sanctions applicable to changes in the root zone (for
instance, what happens if a country under US sanctions requests a change
to the root zone file?)
- Law applicable to resolution of contractual disputes with
registries, registrars, etc.
- Law applicable to labour disputes.
- Law applicable to competition / antitrust law that applies to ICANN
policies and regulations.
- Law applicable to disputes regarding ICANN decisions, such as
allocation of gTLDs, or non-renewal of a contract.
- Law applicable to consumer protection concerns.
- Law applicable to financial transparency of the organization.
- Law applicable to corporate condition of the organization, including
membership rights.
- Law applicable to data protection-related policies & regulations.
- Law applicable to trademark and other speech-related policies &
regulations.
- Law applicable to legal sanctions imposed by a country against another.
Some of these, but not all, depend on where bodies like ICANN (the
policy-making body), the IANA functions operator (the proposed
“Post-Transition IANA”, insofar as the names function is concerned), and
the root zone maintainer are incorporated or maintain their primary
office, while others depend on the location of the office \[for
instance, Turkish labour law applies for the ICANN office in Istanbul\],
while yet others depend on what’s decided by ICANN in contracts (for
instance, the resolution of contractual disputes with ICANN, filing of
suits with regard to disputes over new generic TLDs, etc.).
However, an issue like sanctions, for instance, depends on where
ICANN/PTI/RMZ are incorporated and maintain their primary office.
As [Milton Mueller notes], the current IANA contract “requires ICANN to
be incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA
functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides
America with greater political influence over ICANN.”
He further notes that:
> While it is common to assert that the U.S. has never abused its authority and has always taken the role of a neutral steward, this is not quite true. During the controversy over the .xxx domain, the Bush administration caved in to domestic political pressure and threatened to block entry of the domain into the root if ICANN approved it (Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, 2010). It took five years, an independent review challenge and the threat of litigation from a businessman willing to spend millions to get the .xxx domain into the root.
Thus it is clear that even if the NTIA’s role in the IANA contract goes
away, jurisdiction remains an important issue.
U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction
--------------------------------
In March 2014, when NTIA finally announced that they would hand over the
reins to “the global multistakeholder community”. They’ve laid down two
procedural condition: that it be developed by stakeholders across the
global Internet community and have broad community consensus, and they
have proposed 5 substantive conditions that any proposal must meet:
- Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
- Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;
- Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners
of the IANA services; and,
- Maintain the openness of the Internet.
- Must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is
government-led or an inter-governmental organization.
In that announcement there is no explicit restriction on the
jurisdiction of ICANN (whether it relate to its incorporation, the
resolution of contractual disputes, resolution of labour disputes,
antitrust/competition law, tort law, consumer protection law, privacy
law, or speech law, and more, all of which impact ICANN and many, but
not all, of which are predicated on the jurisdiction of ICANN’s
incorporation), the jurisdiction(s) of the IANA Functions Operator(s)
(i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to
obey), and the jurisdiction of the Root Zone Maintainer (i.e., which
executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey).
However, Mr. Larry Strickling, the head of the NTIA, in his [testimony
before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology],
made it clear that,
> “Frankly, if \[shifting ICANN or IANA jurisdiction\] were being proposed, I don’t think that such a proposal would satisfy our criteria, specifically the one that requires that security and stability be maintained.”
Possibly, that argument made sense in 1998, due to the significant
concentration of DNS expertise in the United States. However, in 2015,
that argument is hardly convincing, and is frankly laughable.[^4]
Targetting that remark, in ICANN 54 at Dublin, we asked Mr. Strickling:
> “So as we understand it, the technical stability of the DNS doesn’t necessarily depend on ICANN’s jurisdiction being in the United States. So I wanted to ask would the US Congress support a multistakeholder and continuing in the event that it’s shifting jurisdiction.”
Mr. Strickling’s response was:
> “No. I think Congress has made it very clear and at every hearing they have extracted from Fadi a commitment that ICANN will remain incorporated in the United States. Now the jurisdictional question though, as I understand it having been raised from some other countries, is not so much jurisdiction in terms of where ICANN is located. It’s much more jurisdiction over the resolution of disputes.
>
> “And that I think is an open issue, and that’s an appropriate one to be discussed. And it’s one I think where ICANN has made some movement over time anyway.
>
> “So I think you have to … when people use the word jurisdiction, we need to be very precise about over what issues because where disputes are resolved and under what law they’re resolved, those are separate questions from where the corporation may have a physical headquarters.”
As we have shown above, jurisdiction is not only about the jurisdiction
of “resolution of disputes”, but also, as Mueller reminds us, about the
requirement that ICANN (and now, the PTI) be “incorporated in, maintain
a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This
makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater
political influence over ICANN.”
In essence, the U.S. government has essentially said that they would
veto the transition if the jurisdiction of ICANN or PTI’s incorporation
were to move out of the U.S., and they can prevent that from happening
*after* the transition, since as things stand ICANN and PTI will still
come within the U.S. Congress’s jurisdiction.
Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction?
------------------------------------------------
Will the ICG proposal or the proposed new ICANN by-laws reduce existing
U.S. control? No, they won’t. (In fact, as we will argue below, the
proposed new ICANN by-laws make this problem even worse.) The proposal
by the names community (“the CWG proposal”) still has a requirement (in
Annex S) that the Post-Transition IANA (PTI) be incorporated in the
United States, and a similar suggestion hidden away as a footnote.
Further, the proposed by-laws for ICANN include the requirement that PTI
be a California corporation. There was no discussion specifically on
this issue, nor any documented community agreement on the specific issue
of jurisdiction of PTI’s incorporation.
Why wasn’t there greater discussion and consideration of this issue?
Because of two reasons: First, there were many that argued that the
transition would be vetoed by the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress
if ICANN and PTI were not to remain in the U.S. Secondly, the
ICANN-formed ICG saw the US government’s actions very narrowly, as
though the government were acting in isolation, ignoring the rich
dialogue and debate that’s gone on earlier about the transition since
the incorporation of ICANN itself.
While it would be no one’s case that political considerations should be
given greater weightage than technical considerations such as security,
stability, and resilience of the domain name system, it is shocking that
political considerations have been completely absent in the discussions
in the number and protocol parameters communities, and have been
extremely limited in the discussions in the names community. This is
even more shocking considering that the main reason for this transition
is, as has been argued above, political.
It can be also argued that the certain IANA functions such as Root Zone
Management function have a considerable political implication. It is
imperative that the political nature of the function is duly
acknowledged and dealt with, in accordance with the wishes of the global
community. In the current process the political aspects of the IANA
function has been completely overlooked and sidelined. It is important
to note that this transition has not been a necessitated by any
technical considerations. It is primarily motivated by political and
legal considerations. However, the questions that the ICG asked the
customer communities to consider were solely technical. Indeed, the
communities could have chosen to overlook that, but they did not choose
to do so. For instance, while the IANA customer community proposals
reflected on existing jurisdictional arrangements, they did not reflect
on how the jurisdictional arrangements should be post-transition , while
this is one of the questions at the heart of the entire transition.
There were no discussions and decisions as to the jurisdiction of the
Post-Transition IANA: the Accountability CCWG’s lawyers, Sidley Austin,
recommended that the PTI ought to be a California non-profit
corporation, and this finds mention in a footnote without even having
been debated by the “global multistakeholder community”, and
subsequently in the proposed new by-laws for ICANN.
Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why “Work Stream 2” Can’t Address
Most Jurisdiction Issues
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The by-laws could have chosen to simply stayed silent on the matter of
what law PTI would be incorporated under, but instead the by-law make
the requirement of PTI being a California non-profit public benefit
corporation part of the *fundamental by-laws*, which are close to
impossible to amend.
While “Work Stream 2” (the post-transition work related to improving
ICANN’s accountability) has jurisdiction as a topic of consideration,
the scope of that must necessarily discount any consideration of
shifting the jurisdiction of incorporation of ICANN, since all of the
work done as part of CCWG Accountability’s “Work Stream 1”, which are
now reflected in the proposed new by-laws, assume Californian
jurisdiction (including the legal model of the “Empowered Community”).
Is ICANN prepared to re-do all the work done in WS1 in WS2 as well? If
the answer is yes, then the issue of jurisdiction can actually be
addressed in WS2. If the answer is no — and realistically it is — then,
the issue of jurisdiction can only be very partially addressed in WS2.
Keeping this in mind, we recommended specific changes in the by-laws,
all of which were rejected by CCWG’s lawyers.
The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement
--------------------------------------------------
The [NETmundial Multistakeholder Document], which was an outcome of the
NETmundial process, states:
> In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with the participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN community
>
> \[…\]
>
> It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN speeds up leading to a truly international and global organization serving the public interest with clearly implementable and verifiable accountability and transparency mechanisms that satisfy requirements from both internal stakeholders and the global community.
>
> The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN structure from all regions is a key issue in the process of a successful globalization.
As our past analysis has shown, the IANA transition process and the
discussions on the mailing lists that shaped it [were neither global nor
multistakeholder]. The DNS industry represented in ICANN is largely
US-based. 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America,
whereas less than 1% of ICANN-registered registrars are from Africa.
Two-thirds of the Business Constituency in ICANN is from the USA. While
ICANN-the-corporation has sought to become more global, the ICANN
community has remained insular, and this will not change until the
commercial interests involved in ICANN can become more diverse,
reflecting the diversity of users of the Internet, and a TLD like .COM
can be owned by a non-American corporation and the PTI can be a
non-American entity.
What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience
---------------------------------------
It is no one’s case that the United States is less fit than any other
country as a base for ICANN, PTI, or the Root Zone Maintainer, or even
as the headquarters for 9 of the world’s 12 root zone operators
(Verisign runs both the A and J root servers). However, just as having
multiplicity of root servers is important for ensuring technical
resilience of the DNS system (and this is shown in the uptake of Anycast
by root server operators), it is equally important to have immunity of
core DNS functioning from political pressures of the country or
countries where core DNS infrastructure is legally situated and to
ensure that we have diversity in terms of legal jurisdiction.
Towards this end, we at CIS have pushed for the concept of
“jurisdictional resilience”, encompassing three crucial points:
- Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions
(as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from
the state in which they are legally situated.
- Division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions
- Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical
implementation functions
Of these, the most important is the limited legal immunity (akin to a
greatly limited form of the immunity that UN organizations get from the
laws of their host countries). This kind of immunity could be provided
through a variety of different means: a host-country agreement; a law
passed by the legislature; a U.N. General Assembly Resolution; a
U.N.-backed treaty; and other such options exist. We are currently
investigating which of these options would be the best option.
And apart from limited legal immunity, distribution of jurisdictional
control is also valuable. As we noted in our submission to the ICG in
September 2015:
> Following the above precepts would, for instance, mean that the entity that performs the role of the Root Zone Maintainer should not be situated in the same legal jurisdiction as the entity that functions as the policymaking venue. This would in turn mean that either the Root Zone Maintainer function be taken up Netnod (Sweden-headquartered) or the WIDE Project (Japan-headquartered) \[or RIPE-NCC, headquartered in the Netherlands\], or that if the IANA Functions Operator(s) is to be merged with the RZM, then the IFO be relocated to a jurisdiction other than those of ISOC and ICANN. This, as has been stated earlier, has been a demand of the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus. Further, it would also mean that root zone servers operators be spread across multiple jurisdictions (which the creation of mirror servers in multiple jurisdictions will not address).
However, the issue of jurisdiction seems to be dead-on-arrival, having
been killed by the United States government.
Unfortunately, despite the primary motivation for demands for the IANA
transition being those of removing the power the U.S. government
exercises over the core of the Internet’s operations in the form of the
DNS, what has ended up happening through the IANA transition is that
these powers have not only not been removed, but in some ways they have
been entrenched further! While earlier, the U.S. had to specify that the
IANA functions operator had to be located in the U.S., now ICANN’s
by-laws themselves will state that the post-transition IANA will be a
California corporation. Notably, while the Montevideo Declaration speaks
of “globalization” of ICANN and of the IANA functions, as does the
NETmundial statement, the NTIA announcement on their acceptance of the
transition proposals speaks of “privatization” of ICANN, and not
“globalization”.
All in all, the “independence” that IANA is gaining from the U.S. is
akin to the “independence” that Brazil gained from Portugal in 1822. Dom
Pedro of Brazil was then ruling Brazil as the Prince Regent since his
father Dom João VI, the King of United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and
the Algarves had returned to Portugal. In 1822, Brazil declared
independence from Portugal (which was formally recognized through a
treaty in 1825). Even after this “independence”, Dom Pedro continued to
rule Portugal just as he had before indepedence, and Dom João VI was
provided the title of “Emperor of Brazil”, aside from being King of the
United Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves. The “indepedence” didn’t
make a whit of a difference to the self-sufficiency of Brazil: Portugal
continued to be its largest trading partner. The “independence” didn’t
change anything for the nearly 1 million slaves in Brazil, or to the lot
of the indigenous peoples of Brazil, none of whom were recognized as
“free”. It had very little consequence not just in terms of ground
conditions of day-to-day living, but even in political terms.
Such is the case with the IANA Transition: U.S. power over the core
functioning of the Domain Name System do not stand diminished after the
transition, and they can even arguably be said to have become even more
entrenched. Meet the new boss: same as the old boss.
[^1]: It is an allied but logically distinct issue that U.S. businesses
— registries and registrars — dominate the global DNS industry, and as a
result hold the reins at ICANN.
[^2]: As Goldsmith & Wu note in their book *Who Controls the Internet*:
“Back in 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce promised to relinquish
root authority by the fall of 2006, but in June 2005, the United States
reversed course. “The United States Government intends to preserve the
security and stability of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing
System (DNS),” announced Michael D. Gallagher, a Department of Commerce
official. “The United States” he announced, will “maintain its historic
role in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative root
zone file.”
[^3]: Mr. Fadi Chehadé revealed in an interaction with Indian
participants at ICANN 54 that he had a meeting “at the White House”
about the U.S. plans for transition of the IANA contract before he spoke
about that when [he visited India in October 2013] making the timing of
his White House visit around the time of the Montevideo Statement.
[^4]: As an example, [NSD], software that is used on multiple root
servers, is funded by a Dutch foundation and a Dutch corporation, and
written mostly by European coders.
[US government announced]:
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions
[Internet Assigned Numbers Authority]: https://www.iana.org/
[in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at
WSIS, in 2005]:
https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/sca/hbf-29.doc
[not technical]:
[White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses]:
https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/white-paper-2012-02-25-en
[asserted it’s control over the root]:
http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/mueller_icann_and_internet_governance.pdf
[no serious push for states assuming control of ICANN]:
http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/05/24/threat-analysis-of-itus-wcit-part-1-historical-context/
[clueless commentators]:
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303563304579447362610955656
[American IP lawyers]:
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20140316_if_the_stakeholders_already_control_the_internet_netmundial_iana/
[American ‘homeland’ security hawks]:
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/who-controls-the-internet-address-book-icann-ntia-and-iana/
[jingoists]:
http://homepages.wmich.edu/~cooneys/poems/cummings.nextto.html
[international]:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4529516c-c713-11e3-889e-00144feabdc0.html
[criticism]:
https://www.rt.com/usa/nsa-fallout-relinquish-internet-oversight-002/
[with which]:
https://twitter.com/carolinegreer/status/454253411576598528
[civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the
Internet]:
https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf
[Diego Canabarro]: https://icannwiki.com/Diego_Canabarro
[I\* organizations]: https://www.apnic.net/community/ecosystem/i*orgs
[‘Statement on the Future of Internet Governance’]:
https://www.apnic.net/publications/news/2013/montevideo-statement-on-future-of-internet-cooperation
[Milton Mueller notes]:
http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96
[testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and
Technology]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v-yWye5I0w&feature=youtu.be
[NETmundial Multistakeholder Document]:
http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf
[were neither global nor multistakeholder]:
cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder
[he visited India in October 2013]:
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-22/news/43288531_1_icann-internet-corporation-us-centric-internet
[NSD]: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/nsd/
--
Pranesh Prakash
Policy Director, Centre for Internet and Society
http://cis-india.org | tel:+91 80 40926283
sip:[log in to unmask] | xmpp:[log in to unmask]
https://twitter.com/pranesh
|
