Hi Tapani,
As per the EC meeting yesterday does this constitute the instructions to be sent to the list and if so has this been approved by the EC as the formal communication?
-James
On 25/08/2016, 07:42, "NCSG-Discuss on behalf of Tapani Tarvainen" <[log in to unmask] on behalf of [log in to unmask]> wrote:
>Dear all,
>
>While the voting rules confirmed by NCSG EC yesterday may be familiar
>and clear to oldtimers and mathematically-minded people like myself,
>they may not be obvious to all. I try to clarify them a little.
>
>In particular the actual effect of None-of-the-Above vote to
>candidates' chances of getting elected (that is, beating NotA) in the
>councillor election is not quite intuitive. Chair election is clear
>enough so I won't discuss it now, and I'm ignoring any symbolic
>meanings as well.
>
>Key point: in the present situation, the only thing that matters in
>deciding if a candidate gets elected is whether or not their vote
>count is less than NotA's.
>
>With that in mind:
>
>In the councillor section of the ballot there are four boxes
>one can tick: one for each candidate, let's call them X, Y and Z,
>and one for None of the Above.
>
>This gives in effect eight different ways of filling the ballot:
>
>(1) Leave it empty - tick no boxes.
>
>This has no effect on the outcome, but will be counted as a valid
>vote.
>
>(2) Select only NotA, none of the candidates.
>
>This will decrease all candidates' chances of getting elected equally.
>
>(3) Select one candidate, say X (but not NotA).
>
>This will improve candidate X's chances of getting elected
>and has no impact on the chances of candidates Y and Z.
>
>(4) Select two candidates, say Y and Z (but not NotA).
>
>This will improve both Y's and Z's chances of getting elected
>and has no impact on the chances of X.
>
>(5) Select one candidate, X, and NotA.
>
>This will have no effect at all on X's chances but will
>reduce Y's and Z's chances of being elected.
>
>In effect the NotA vote will cancel the positive vote to X,
>leaving only negative vote against Y and Z.
>
>(6) Select two candidates, Y and Z, and NotA.
>
>This will have no effect on Y's and Z's chances but
>will reduce X's chances.
>
>Again, the effect of NotA is canceling out the positive vote
>to Y and Z, leaving only the negative effect on X.
>
>(7) Select all three candidates (but not NotA).
>
>This will improve all candidates' chances of getting elected.
>
>(8) Select all three candidates and NotA.
>
>This will invalidate the ballot and it will have no effect on the
>outcome. Invalid ballots will be separately counted, however.
>
>
>The most counterintuitive cases are (5) and (6): if voting
>for one or two candidates, adding NotA will actually
>reduce the chances of your chosen candidate(s) being elected
>(just as much as those of the other candidates').
>
>If everybody votes that way, that is, selects one or two candidates
>plus NotA, no candidate can ever be elected.
>
>A simplified hypothetical example to illustrate this:
>
>Assume we have 400 voters with one vote each.
>
>The assume 100 people vote for X+NotA and 300 vote for Y+Z+NotA.
>
>Result: X gets 100 votes, Y and Z 300 each, NotA gets 400,
>and nobody gets elected.
>
>
>I find this system so bizarre that it actually never occurred to
>me that it really was the intent in previous elections.
>Indeed I failed to believe it even when people kept yelling at me that
>yes, that was the intent. Well, I was wrong. Not for the first time.
>
>Good reminder that what someone thinks is obvious may not be so at all
>to another. And in things like elections that can be dangerous, so all
>such assumptions should be made explicit and written down.
>
>
>Anyway, this is the system we have, longstanding practice,
>and we are not going to change it for this election.
>
>
>So, vote - but take care that you understand the real effect of your
>vote, especially when thinking about voting for None of the Above.
>
>
>******
>
>For the future, however, I recommend reconsidering this and looking
>for better methods, even changing the charter if need be. Perhaps some
>type of approval voting, separate NotA for each candidate, or a vote
>threshold would work. All such systems have their own pitfalls though,
>it takes care to do them well. I will not go deeper into that now, but
>I suggest it would be best to define the rules at a time sufficiently
>far from any actual elections that thoughts of current candidates and
>strategies will not cloud people's thinking. Of course election-time
>discussions such as the present brouhaha should be very useful
>material to review then, so by all means let the debate continue if
>people aren't tired of it yet. It may prove worthwhile in the end.
>
>--
>Tapani Tarvainen
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