There is an interesting side to consider — and if I were any of the
BRICS governments I would have paid close attention to it): since
DNSSEC extensions (RFCs 2535, 4033, 4034 and related ones) started
to spread, the whole name system structure became completely dependent
on a strongly hierachycal chain of authentication relying on CAx
which, if controlled by an adversary, could black out huge sectors
of the 'net. DNSSEC is also prone to government snooping (and in
this case that should be read as 'other governments' snooping).

It has been wisely pointed out that DNSSEC is weak, unsafe, incomplete,
unnecessary and expensive. From a national security standpoint, if
you do not control the CAs, it is a security nightmare. Therefore,
this move is completely rational from Russian (Chinese, etc.)
standpoint.

NB: I'm _not_ saying that the Russians are nice guys, or that they
want to do this for their citizens' sake, or that they are not going
to use this alternative for blocking access to sites or spying on
their users. I'm just saying that they have good strategic defensive
reasons to do it.

Regards from the Far South,

Enrique