People have been talking about this for over a decade to my knowledge.
Have had all sorts of committees &c. study it.
avri
On 04-Jul-16 11:45, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
>
> Yes, Aysen isn't it amazing how so many people see to be taking about
> this "taboo" topic?
> Perhaps Pranesh's posturing as breaker of taboos is a bit exaggerated.
>
> Milton L Mueller
> Professor, School of Public Policy
> Georgia Institute of Technology
>
> On Jul 3, 2016, at 11:09, Ayden Férdeline <[log in to unmask]
> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
>
>> Hi Pranesh,
>>
>> I have read your piece and while on the surface I am sympathetic to
>> the concerns raised, I am also pragmatic. What is the alternative
>> that you seek?
>>
>> Also, there has been a similar discussion on the CCWG-Accountability
>> list over the past few days. I'm not sure if you have seen it, but I
>> found this reply from Phillip Corwin
>> <https://links6.mixmaxusercontent.com/aMjjKHWxnLSD3SEwj/l/FaTd64xD613pNHuMy?messageId=xcpJPtDY2aoAQekbU&rn=gIMBibvRHbp1EIsIXZsxWZ11kI&re=gI1RWZug2YlRXYnBkbvRHbp1mI>,
>> which I have pasted below, to be very compelling. I do not recall
>> reading any disagreements with his remarks - but if you do object to
>> it, I would be happy to read your rebuttal.
>>
>> Best wishes,
>>
>> Ayden
>>
>> ====
>>
>> With all respect, the reason that many of us regard this discussion
>> as nonproductive is that no compelling case has been made for
>> embarking on the path proposed, and no proper recognition has been
>> made by the proponent of the costs and difficulties involved.
>>
>> For example:
>> “There is accordingly no reason why we cannot have international law
>> that protects individual and business rights vis a vis a
>> international body (that ICANN should become under international law).
>> To repeat, there is absolutely no problem with developing an
>> international treaty that writes international law, which will make
>> ICANN an international body, but with exactly the same governance and
>> other processes (multistakeholder) as exist at present, and also
>> provide means to ensure that individuals/ businesses interests and
>> rights vis a vis ICANN are protected through a special court system
>> that is set up by the same treaty.
>>
>> So you are proposing, just for this one ICANN organization and its
>> very limited remit, spending an enormous amount of time and money
>> (for legal expertise, plus the value of the time of all those
>> involved stakeholders) to hammer out a new international treaty to
>> implemented, as well as the development of “international law” that
>> is relevant to all concerns that may arise for disputes within and
>> involving ICANN. Contract law, employment law, competition/antitrust
>> law, etc., ad infinitum. How long will all this take? Years, I would
>> submit. And from what more important issues will the ICANN community
>> be distracted while embarking on this herculean effort?
>>
>> And what would that law be? For example, for competition/antitrust as
>> it relates to domain industry pricing within the framework of
>> ICANN policies and contractual practices, shall it be the US
>> approach, the EU's, some other nation's, or some amalgamation of
>> them? And how long and at what expense shall that effort take? And
>> from what source is the authority of the authors of these “laws”
>> derived; in democratic nations legislators derive their authority by
>> gathering majority support of voters, but ICANN is not a nation-state.
>>
>> And, oh yes, we are also supposed to create “a special court system
>> that is set up by the same treaty” to decide disputes under this new
>> body of law created just for ICANN. How many jurists? What
>> substantive requirements, and evidentiary standards, and procedural
>> rules? What mechanism of appeal and to what body?
>>
>> I would submit that this whole proposed project is quite absurd,
>> especially given the lack of any convincing rationale to so many of
>> us that such a project is even required to address
>> any foreseeable dispute.
>>
>>
>> Philip S. Corwin, Founding Principal
>> Virtualaw LLC
>> 1155 F Street, NW
>> Suite 1050
>> Washington, DC 20004
>> 202-559-8597/Direct
>> 202-559-8750/Fax
>> 202-255-6172/cell
>>
>> “Luck is the residue of design” -- Branch Rickey
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jul 1, 2016 4:42 PM, Mueller, Milton L [log in to unmask]
>> <mailto:[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>> Pranesh:
>>
>> I've read your piece. I note that neither it, nor your response
>> to my message below, justifies your argument that the transition
>> is “meaningless” unless it changes U.S. jurisdiction.
>>
>> The transition as proposed would eliminate direct USG authority
>> over all root zone changes, and end the IANA contract which has
>> provided direct political leverage of the US government over
>> ICANN. These changes eliminate the two most direct forms of USG
>> authority over ICANN and DNS. We would also create important new
>> accountability improvements in ICANN's corporate governance.
>>
>> Please respond: are you telling me you prefer the status quo to
>> the transition plan? Or do you think the transition plan is an
>> improvement?
>>
>> Dr. Milton L. Mueller
>>
>> Professor, School of Public Policy
>>
>> Georgia Institute of Technology
>>
>> > -----Original Message-----
>>
>> > From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On
>> Behalf Of
>>
>> > Pranesh Prakash
>>
>> > Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2016 11:56 AM
>>
>> > To: [log in to unmask]
>> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
>>
>> > Subject: Re: Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Dear Milton and Matthew,
>>
>> > If you read my piece, I am clear that change of jurisdiction
>> was *not* the
>>
>> > NTIA's goal. In fact, they opposed change of jurisdiction of
>> incorporation of
>>
>> > ICANN or PTI.
>>
>> >
>>
>> > So while that might possibly be key point that is forgotten,
>> overlooked, or
>>
>> > ignored, quite clearly I haven't done so.
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Regards,
>>
>> > Pranesh
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Matthew Shears <[log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>>
>> [2016-06-30 10:07:16 +0300]:
>>
>> > > + 1
>>
>> > >
>>
>> > > Milton highlights a key point that is often forgotten,
>> overlooked or
>>
>> > > ignored: “The purpose of the transition was to eliminate U.S.
>>
>> > > governments contractual control of ICANN and the US government's
>>
>> > > authority over all root zone changes. That - and not a change of
>>
>> > > jurisdiction per se - was the goal.”
>>
>> > >
>>
>> > > Matthew
>>
>> > >
>>
>> > >
>>
>> > > On 6/29/2016 6:51 PM, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
>>
>> > >> Pranesh
>>
>> > >> I am very willing to discuss jurisdiction and have
>> volunteered for
>>
>> > >> the
>>
>> > >> WS2 group that will discuss it. However, you are completely
>> out of
>>
>> > >> touch with reality if you think any major change is going to
>> happen
>>
>> > >> “before the transition.”
>>
>> > >> The proposal before the NTIA retains ICANN's status as a
>> California
>>
>> > >> Corporation and indeed creates a new California Corp. to
>> handle PTI.
>>
>> > >> I disagree with your assertion that the transition is
>> “meaningless”
>>
>> > >> unless the legal jurisdiction of ICANN's incorporation is
>> changed. I
>>
>> > >> don't think you can justify that statement but for dialogue
>> purposes
>>
>> > >> I encourage you to try.
>>
>> > >>
>>
>> > >> The purpose of the transition was to eliminate U.S. governments
>>
>> > >> contractual control of ICANN and the US government's
>> authority over
>>
>> > >> all root zone changes.
>>
>> > >> That - and not a change of jurisdiction per se - was the
>> goal. Those
>>
>> > >> are important objectives, and the current proposal before us
>> achieves
>>
>> > >> them. If you do think it is meaningless then you are,
>> objectively,
>>
>> > >> taking the side of Senator Cruz and other U.S. nationalist
>>
>> > >> Republicans who want to stop the transition and you will not
>> get a
>>
>> > >> movement away from U.S. jurisdiction you will get the status
>> quo, which is
>>
>> > worse.
>>
>> > >>
>>
>> > >> The Montevideo statement did not call for a change of
>> jurisdiction,
>>
>> > >> either, but rather “called for accelerating the
>> globalization of
>>
>> > >> ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all
>>
>> > >> stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an
>> equal footing.”
>>
>> > >>
>>
>> > >> --MM
>>
>> > >>
>>
>> > >>> -----Original Message-----
>>
>> > >>> From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On
>>
>> > Behalf
>>
>> > >>> Of Pranesh Prakash
>>
>> > >>> Sent: Wednesday, June 29, 2016 5:18 AM
>>
>> > >>> To: [log in to unmask]
>> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
>>
>> > >>> Subject: Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Dear all,
>>
>> > >>> In CIS's submissions to the WSIS process, to the ICG, to the
>>
>> > >>> CCWG-Acct, we have raised the multi-faceted issue of
>> jurisdiction,
>>
>> > >>> and why dealing with that now (before the transition) is
>> important.
>>
>> > >>> Given that it hasn't been dealt with as part of WS1, I
>> believe the
>>
>> > >>> “IANA transition”
>>
>> > >>> ends up being meaningless in terms of what it set out to
>> achieve,
>>
>> > >>> and what were the goals laid down in the Montevideo
>> Statement and in
>>
>> > >>> the NETmundial Statement.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> I believe civil society actors ought to discuss our
>> positions on the
>>
>> > >>> topic of jurisdiction, which frankly hasn't really happened
>> on this
>>
>> > >>> list.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> To instigate debate, I've written a long-ish piece on the
>> topic:
>>
>> > >>>
>> http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo
>>
>> > >>> -topic-
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> at-icann
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Regards,
>>
>> > >>> Pranesh
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN
>>
>> > >>> ======================================
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> In March 2014, the [US government announced] that they were
>> going to
>>
>> > >>> end the contract they have with ICANN to run the [Internet
>> Assigned
>>
>> > >>> Numbers Authority] (IANA), and hand over control to the
>> “global
>>
>> > >>> multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for
>>
>> > >>> transition had to come through a multistakeholder process
>> and have
>>
>> > >>> stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract?
>>
>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> The main reason for the U.S. government’s action is that it
>> will get
>>
>> > >>> rid of a political thorn in the U.S. government’s side:
>> keeping the
>>
>> > >>> contract allows them to be called out as having a special
>> role in
>>
>> > >>> Internet governance (with the Affirmation of Commitments
>> between the
>>
>> > >>> U.S.
>>
>> > >>> Department of Commerce and ICANN, the IANA contract, and the
>>
>> > >>> cooperative agreement with Verisign), and engaging in
>> unilateralism
>>
>> > >>> with regard to the operation of the root servers of the
>> Internet
>>
>> > >>> naming system, while repeatedly declaring that they support a
>>
>> > >>> multistakeholder model of Internet governance.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> This contradiction is what they are hoping to address.
>> Doing away
>>
>> > >>> with the NTIA contract will also increase — ever so
>> marginally —
>>
>> > >>> ICANN’s global
>>
>> > >>> legitimacy: this is something that world governments, civil
>> society
>>
>> > >>> organizations, and some American academics have been asking
>> for
>>
>> > >>> nearly since ICANN’s inception in 1998. For instance, here
>> are some
>>
>> > >>> demands made [in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet
>>
>> > >>> Governance Caucus at WSIS, in
>>
>> > >>> 2005]:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>> “ICANN will negotiate an appropriate host country
>> agreement to
>>
>> > >>>> replace its
>>
>> > >>> California Incorporation, being careful to retain those
>> aspects of
>>
>> > >>> its California Incorporation that enhance its
>> accountability to the
>>
>> > >>> global Internet user community.”ICANN’s decisions, and any
>> host
>>
>> > >>> country agreement, must be required to comply with public
>> policy
>>
>> > >>> requirements negotiated through international treaties in
>> regard to,
>>
>> > >>> inter alia, human rights treaties, privacy rights, gender
>> agreements
>>
>> > >>> and trade rules. … “It is also expected that the
>> multi-stakeholder
>>
>> > >>> community will observe and comment on the progress made in
>> this
>>
>> > >>> process through the proposed \[Internet Governance\] Forum.”
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> In short: the objective of the transition is political,
>> [not technical].
>>
>> > >>> In an ideal world, we *should* aim at reducing U.S. state
>> control
>>
>> > >>> over the core of the Internet’s domain name system.[^1]
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> It is our contention that **U.S. state control over the
>> core of the
>>
>> > >>> Internet’s domain name system is *not* being removed** by the
>>
>> > >>> transition that is currently underway.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Why is the Transition Happening Now?
>>
>> > >>> ------------------------------------
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Despite the U.S. government having given commitments in the
>> past
>>
>> > >>> that were going to finish the IANA transition by “September
>> 30,
>>
>> > >>> 2000”, (the [White Paper on Management of Internet Names and
>>
>> > Addresses] states:
>>
>> > >>> “The U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be
>> complete
>>
>> > >>> before the year 2000. To the extent that the new
>> corporation is
>>
>> > >>> established and operationally stable, September 30, 2000 is
>> intended
>>
>> > >>> to be, and remains, an ‘outside’ date.”) and later by “fall of
>>
>> > >>> 2006”,[^2] those turned out to be empty promises. However,
>> this
>>
>> > >>> time, the transition seems to be going through, unless the
>> U.S.
>>
>> > >>> Congress manages to halt it.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> However, in order to answer the question of “why now?”
>> fully, one
>>
>> > >>> has to look a bit at the past.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> In 1998, through the [White Paper on Management of Internet
>> Names
>>
>> > >>> and Addresses] the U.S. government [asserted it’s control
>> over the
>>
>> > >>> root], and asserted — some would say arrogated to itself —
>> the power
>>
>> > >>> to put out contracts for both the IANA functions as well as
>> the ‘A’
>>
>> > >>> Root (i.e., the Root Zone Maintainer function that Network
>> Solutions
>>
>> > >>> Inc. then performed, and continues to perform to date in
>> its current
>>
>> > >>> avatar as Verisign). The IANA functions contract — a
>> periodically
>>
>> > >>> renewable contract — was awarded to ICANN, a California-based
>>
>> > >>> non-profit corporation that was set up exclusively for this
>> purpose,
>>
>> > >>> but which evolved around the existing IANA (to placate the
>> Internet
>>
>> > >>> Society).
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Meanwhile, of course, there were criticisms of ICANN from
>> multiple
>>
>> > >>> foreign governments and civil society organizations. Further,
>>
>> > >>> despite it being a California-based non-profit on contract
>> with the
>>
>> > >>> government, domestically within the U.S., there was
>> pushback from
>>
>> > >>> constituencies that felt that more direct U.S. control of
>> the DNS
>>
>> > >>> was important.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> As Goldsmith and Wu summarize:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>> “Milton Mueller and others have shown that ICANN’s spirit of
>>
>> > >>>> “self-regulation” was an appealing label for a process
>> that could
>>
>> > >>>> be more accurately described as the U.S. government
>> brokering a
>>
>> > >>>> behind-the-scenes deal that best suited its policy
>> preferences …
>>
>> > >>>> the United States wanted to ensure the stability of the
>> Internet,
>>
>> > >>>> to fend off the regulatory efforts of foreign governments and
>>
>> > >>>> international organizations, and to maintain ultimate
>> control. The
>>
>> > >>>> easiest way to do that was to maintain formal control
>> while turning
>>
>> > >>>> over day-to-day control of the root to ICANN and the Internet
>>
>> > >>>> Society, which had close ties to the regulation-shy American
>>
>> > >>>> technology industry.” \[footnotes omitted\]
>>
>> > >>> And that brings us to the first reason that the NTIA
>> announced the
>>
>> > >>> transition in 2014, rather than earlier.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> ### ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> The NTIA now sees ICANN as being mature enough: the final
>> transition
>>
>> > >>> was announced 16 years after ICANN’s creation, and
>> complaints about
>>
>> > >>> ICANN and its legitimacy had largely died down in the
>> international
>>
>> > >>> arena in that while.
>>
>> > >>> Nowadays, governments across the world send their
>> representatives to
>>
>> > >>> ICANN, thus legitimizing ICANN. States have largely been
>> satisfied
>>
>> > >>> by participating in the Government Advisory Council, which,
>> as its
>>
>> > >>> name suggests, only has advisory powers. Further, unlike in
>> the
>>
>> > >>> early days, there is [no serious push for states assuming
>> control of
>>
>> > >>> ICANN]. Of course they grumble about the ICANN Board not
>> following
>>
>> > >>> their advice, but no government, as far as I am aware, has
>> walked
>>
>> > >>> out or refused to participate.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> ### L’affaire Snowden
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Many within the United States, and some without, believe
>> that the
>>
>> > >>> United States not only plays an exceptional role to play in
>> the
>>
>> > >>> running of the Internet — by dint of historical development
>> and
>>
>> > >>> dominance of American companies — but that *it ought to*
>> have an
>>
>> > >>> exceptional role because it is the best country to exercise
>>
>> > >>> ‘oversight’ over ‘the Internet’ (often coming from [clueless
>>
>> > >>> commentators]), and from dinosaurs of the Internet era, like
>>
>> > >>> [American IP lawyers] and [American ‘homeland’ security
>> hawks],
>>
>> > >>> Jones Day, who are ICANN’s lawyers, and other [jingoists]
>> and those
>>
>> > >>> policymakers who are controlled by these narrow-minded
>> interests.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> The Snowden revelations were, in that way, a godsend for
>> the NTIA,
>>
>> > >>> as it allowed them a fig-leaf of [international][]
>> [criticism][]
>>
>> > >>> [with which] to counter these domestic critics and carry on
>> with a
>>
>> > >>> transition that they have been seeking to put into motion
>> for a
>>
>> > >>> while. The Snowden revelations led Dilma Rousseff,
>> President of
>>
>> > >>> Brazil, to state in September 2013, at the 68th U.N. General
>>
>> > >>> Assembly, that Brazil would “present proposals for the
>> establishment
>>
>> > >>> of a [civilian multilateral framework for the governance
>> and use of
>>
>> > >>> the Internet]”, and as [Diego Canabarro] points out this
>> catalysed
>>
>> > >>> the U.S. government and the technical community into taking
>> action.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Given this context, a few months after the Snowden
>> revelations, the
>>
>> > >>> so- called [I\* organizations] met — seemingly with the
>> blessing of the
>>
>> > U.S.
>>
>> > >>> government[^3] — in Montevideo, and put out a [‘Statement
>> on the
>>
>> > >>> Future of Internet Governance’] that sought to link the
>> Snowden
>>
>> > >>> revelations on pervasive surveillance with the need to
>> urgently
>>
>> > >>> transition the IANA stewardship role away from the U.S.
>> government.
>>
>> > >>> Of course, the signatories to that statement knew fully
>> well, as did
>>
>> > >>> most of the readers of that statement, that there is no
>> linkage
>>
>> > >>> between the Snowden revelations about pervasive
>> surveillance and the
>>
>> > >>> operations of the DNS root, but still they, and others,
>> linked them
>>
>> > >>> together.
>>
>> > >>> Specifically, the I\* organizations called for
>> “accelerating the
>>
>> > >>> globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an
>> environment in
>>
>> > >>> which all stakeholders, including all governments,
>> participate on an
>>
>> > >>> equal footing.”
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> One could posit the existence of two other contributing
>> factors as well.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Given political realities in the United States, a
>> transition of this
>>
>> > >>> sort is probably best done before an ultra-jingoistic
>> President
>>
>> > >>> steps into office.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Lastly, the ten-yearly review of the World Summit on
>> Information
>>
>> > >>> Society was currently underway. At the original WSIS (as
>> seen from
>>
>> > >>> the civil society quoted above) the issue of US control
>> over the
>>
>> > >>> root was a major issue of contention. At that point (and
>> during
>>
>> > >>> where the 2006 date for globalization of ICANN was
>> emphasized by the
>>
>> > >>> US government).
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Why Jurisdiction is Important
>>
>> > >>> -----------------------------
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Jurisdiction has a great many aspects. *Inter alia*, these
>> are:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> - Legal sanctions applicable to changes in the root zone (for
>>
>> > >>> instance, what happens if a country under US sanctions
>> requests a
>>
>> > >>> change to the root zone file?)
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to resolution of contractual disputes with
>>
>> > >>> registries, registrars, etc.
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to labour disputes.
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to competition / antitrust law that
>> applies to ICANN
>>
>> > >>> policies and regulations.
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to disputes regarding ICANN decisions,
>> such as
>>
>> > >>> allocation of gTLDs, or non-renewal of a contract.
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to consumer protection concerns.
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to financial transparency of the
>> organization.
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to corporate condition of the
>> organization, including
>>
>> > >>> membership rights.
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to data protection-related policies &
>> regulations.
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to trademark and other speech-related
>> policies &
>>
>> > >>> regulations.
>>
>> > >>> - Law applicable to legal sanctions imposed by a country
>> against
>>
>> > >>> another.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Some of these, but not all, depend on where bodies like
>> ICANN (the
>>
>> > >>> policy-
>>
>> > >>> making body), the IANA functions operator (the proposed
>>
>> > >>> “Post-Transition IANA”, insofar as the names function is
>> concerned),
>>
>> > >>> and the root zone maintainer are incorporated or maintain
>> their
>>
>> > >>> primary office, while others depend on the location of the
>> office
>>
>> > >>> \[for instance, Turkish labour law applies for the ICANN
>> office in
>>
>> > >>> Istanbul\], while yet others depend on what’s decided by
>> ICANN in
>>
>> > >>> contracts (for instance, the resolution of contractual
>> disputes with
>>
>> > >>> ICANN, filing of suits with regard to disputes over new
>> generic
>>
>> > >>> TLDs, etc.).
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> However, an issue like sanctions, for instance, depends on
>> where
>>
>> > >>> ICANN/PTI/RMZ are incorporated and maintain their primary
>> office.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> As [Milton Mueller notes], the current IANA contract
>> “requires ICANN
>>
>> > >>> to be incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and
>> perform
>>
>> > >>> the IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to
>> U.S. law
>>
>> > >>> and provides America with greater political influence over
>> ICANN.”
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> He further notes that:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>> While it is common to assert that the U.S. has never
>> abused its
>>
>> > >>>> authority
>>
>> > >>> and has always taken the role of a neutral steward, this is
>> not
>>
>> > >>> quite true.
>>
>> > >>> During the controversy over the .xxx domain, the Bush
>> administration
>>
>> > >>> caved in to domestic political pressure and threatened to
>> block
>>
>> > >>> entry of the domain into the root if ICANN approved it
>> (Declaration
>>
>> > >>> of the Independent Review Panel, 2010). It took five years, an
>>
>> > >>> independent review challenge and the threat of litigation
>> from a
>>
>> > >>> businessman willing to spend millions to get the .xxx
>> domain into
>>
>> > >>> the root.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Thus it is clear that even if the NTIA’s role in the IANA
>> contract
>>
>> > >>> goes away, jurisdiction remains an important issue.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction
>>
>> > >>> --------------------------------
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> In March 2014, when NTIA finally announced that they would
>> hand over
>>
>> > >>> the reins to “the global multistakeholder community”.
>> They’ve laid
>>
>> > >>> down two procedural condition: that it be developed by
>> stakeholders
>>
>> > >>> across the global Internet community and have broad community
>>
>> > >>> consensus, and they have proposed 5 substantive conditions
>> that any
>>
>> > >>> proposal must meet:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> - Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
>>
>> > >>> - Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the
>> Internet
>>
>> > >>> DNS;
>>
>> > >>> - Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers
>> and partners
>>
>> > >>> of the IANA services; and,
>>
>> > >>> - Maintain the openness of the Internet.
>>
>> > >>> - Must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is
>>
>> > >>> government-led or an inter-governmental organization.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> In that announcement there is no explicit restriction on the
>>
>> > >>> jurisdiction of ICANN (whether it relate to its
>> incorporation, the
>>
>> > >>> resolution of contractual disputes, resolution of labour
>> disputes,
>>
>> > >>> antitrust/competition law, tort law, consumer protection law,
>>
>> > >>> privacy law, or speech law, and more, all of which impact
>> ICANN and
>>
>> > >>> many, but not all, of which are predicated on the
>> jurisdiction of
>>
>> > >>> ICANN’s incorporation), the jurisdiction(s) of the IANA
>> Functions
>>
>> > >>> Operator(s) (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s
>> orders
>>
>> > >>> would it need to obey), and the jurisdiction of the Root Zone
>>
>> > >>> Maintainer (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s
>> orders
>>
>> > >>> would it need to obey).
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> However, Mr. Larry Strickling, the head of the NTIA, in his
>>
>> > >>> [testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on
>> Communications and
>>
>> > >>> Technology], made it clear that,
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>> “Frankly, if \[shifting ICANN or IANA jurisdiction\] were
>> being
>>
>> > >>>> proposed, I
>>
>> > >>> don’t think that such a proposal would satisfy our criteria,
>>
>> > >>> specifically the one that requires that security and
>> stability be
>>
>> > >>> maintained.”
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Possibly, that argument made sense in 1998, due to the
>> significant
>>
>> > >>> concentration of DNS expertise in the United States.
>> However, in
>>
>> > >>> 2015, that argument is hardly convincing, and is frankly
>>
>> > >>> laughable.[^4]
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Targetting that remark, in ICANN 54 at Dublin, we asked Mr.
>> Strickling:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>> “So as we understand it, the technical stability of the
>> DNS doesn’t
>>
>> > >>> necessarily depend on ICANN’s jurisdiction being in the United
>>
>> > >>> States. So I wanted to ask would the US Congress support a
>>
>> > >>> multistakeholder and continuing in the event that it’s
>> shifting
>>
>> > >>> jurisdiction.”
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Mr. Strickling’s response was:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>> “No. I think Congress has made it very clear and at every
>> hearing
>>
>> > >>>> they have
>>
>> > >>> extracted from Fadi a commitment that ICANN will remain
>> incorporated
>>
>> > >>> in the United States. Now the jurisdictional question
>> though, as I
>>
>> > >>> understand it having been raised from some other countries,
>> is not
>>
>> > >>> so much jurisdiction in terms of where ICANN is located.
>> It’s much
>>
>> > >>> more jurisdiction over the resolution of disputes.
>>
>> > >>>> “And that I think is an open issue, and that’s an
>> appropriate one
>>
>> > >>>> to be
>>
>> > >>> discussed. And it’s one I think where ICANN has made some
>> movement
>>
>> > >>> over time anyway.
>>
>> > >>>> “So I think you have to … when people use the word
>> jurisdiction, we
>>
>> > >>>> need
>>
>> > >>> to be very precise about over what issues because where
>> disputes are
>>
>> > >>> resolved and under what law they’re resolved, those are
>> separate
>>
>> > >>> questions from where the corporation may have a physical
>>
>> > >>> headquarters.”
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> As we have shown above, jurisdiction is not only about the
>>
>> > >>> jurisdiction of “resolution of disputes”, but also, as Mueller
>>
>> > >>> reminds us, about the requirement that ICANN (and now, the
>> PTI) be
>>
>> > >>> “incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and
>> perform the
>>
>> > >>> IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S.
>> law and
>>
>> > >>> provides America with greater political influence over ICANN.”
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> In essence, the U.S. government has essentially said that
>> they would
>>
>> > >>> veto the transition if the jurisdiction of ICANN or PTI’s
>>
>> > >>> incorporation were to move out of the U.S., and they can
>> prevent
>>
>> > >>> that from happening
>>
>> > >>> *after* the transition, since as things stand ICANN and PTI
>> will
>>
>> > >>> still come within the U.S. Congress’s jurisdiction.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction?
>>
>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Will the ICG proposal or the proposed new ICANN by-laws reduce
>>
>> > >>> existing U.S. control? No, they won’t. (In fact, as we will
>> argue
>>
>> > >>> below, the proposed new ICANN by-laws make this problem
>> even worse.)
>>
>> > >>> The proposal by the names community (“the CWG proposal”)
>> still has a
>>
>> > >>> requirement (in Annex S) that the Post-Transition IANA
>> (PTI) be
>>
>> > >>> incorporated in the United States, and a similar suggestion
>> hidden
>>
>> > >>> away as a footnote.
>>
>> > >>> Further, the proposed by-laws for ICANN include the
>> requirement that
>>
>> > >>> PTI be a California corporation. There was no discussion
>>
>> > >>> specifically on this issue, nor any documented community
>> agreement
>>
>> > >>> on the specific issue of jurisdiction of PTI’s incorporation.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Why wasn’t there greater discussion and consideration of
>> this issue?
>>
>> > >>> Because of two reasons: First, there were many that argued
>> that the
>>
>> > >>> transition would be vetoed by the U.S. government and the U.S.
>>
>> > >>> Congress if
>>
>> > >>> ICANN and PTI were not to remain in the U.S. Secondly, the
>>
>> > >>> ICANN-formed ICG saw the US government’s actions very
>> narrowly, as
>>
>> > >>> though the government were acting in isolation, ignoring
>> the rich
>>
>> > >>> dialogue and debate that’s gone on earlier about the
>> transition
>>
>> > >>> since the incorporation of ICANN itself.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> While it would be no one’s case that political
>> considerations should
>>
>> > >>> be given greater weightage than technical considerations
>> such as
>>
>> > >>> security, stability, and resilience of the domain name
>> system, it is
>>
>> > >>> shocking that political considerations have been completely
>> absent
>>
>> > >>> in the discussions in the number and protocol parameters
>>
>> > >>> communities, and have been extremely limited in the
>> discussions in
>>
>> > >>> the names community. This is even more shocking considering
>> that the
>>
>> > >>> main reason for this transition is, as has been argued above,
>>
>> > >>> political.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> It can be also argued that the certain IANA functions such
>> as Root
>>
>> > >>> Zone Management function have a considerable political
>> implication.
>>
>> > >>> It is imperative that the political nature of the function
>> is duly
>>
>> > >>> acknowledged and dealt with, in accordance with the wishes
>> of the
>>
>> > >>> global community. In the current process the political
>> aspects of
>>
>> > >>> the IANA function has been completely overlooked and
>> sidelined. It
>>
>> > >>> is important to note that this transition has not been a
>>
>> > >>> necessitated by any technical considerations. It is primarily
>>
>> > >>> motivated by political and legal considerations. However, the
>>
>> > >>> questions that the ICG asked the customer communities to
>> consider
>>
>> > >>> were solely technical. Indeed, the communities could have
>> chosen to
>>
>> > >>> overlook that, but they did not choose to do so. For
>> instance, while
>>
>> > >>> the IANA customer community proposals reflected on existing
>>
>> > >>> jurisdictional arrangements, they did not reflect on how the
>>
>> > >>> jurisdictional arrangements should be post- transition ,
>> while this
>>
>> > >>> is one of the questions at the heart of the entire transition.
>>
>> > >>> There were no discussions and decisions as to the
>> jurisdiction of
>>
>> > >>> the
>>
>> > >>> Post-
>>
>> > >>> Transition IANA: the Accountability CCWG’s lawyers, Sidley
>> Austin,
>>
>> > >>> recommended that the PTI ought to be a California non-profit
>>
>> > >>> corporation, and this finds mention in a footnote without even
>>
>> > >>> having been debated by the “global multistakeholder
>> community”, and
>>
>> > >>> subsequently in the proposed new by-laws for ICANN.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why “Work Stream 2” Can’t
>>
>> > >>> Address Most Jurisdiction Issues
>>
>> > >>>
>> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> > >>> --------------------------
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> The by-laws could have chosen to simply stayed silent on
>> the matter
>>
>> > >>> of what law PTI would be incorporated under, but instead
>> the by-law
>>
>> > >>> make the requirement of PTI being a California non-profit
>> public
>>
>> > >>> benefit corporation part of the *fundamental by-laws*,
>> which are
>>
>> > >>> close to impossible to amend.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> While “Work Stream 2” (the post-transition work related to
>> improving
>>
>> > >>> ICANN’s accountability) has jurisdiction as a topic of
>>
>> > >>> consideration, the scope of that must necessarily discount any
>>
>> > >>> consideration of shifting the jurisdiction of incorporation of
>>
>> > >>> ICANN, since all of the work done as part of CCWG
>> Accountability’s
>>
>> > >>> “Work Stream 1”, which are now reflected in the proposed new
>>
>> > >>> by-laws, assume Californian jurisdiction (including the
>> legal model
>>
>> > >>> of the “Empowered Community”).
>>
>> > >>> Is ICANN prepared to re-do all the work done in WS1 in WS2
>> as well?
>>
>> > >>> If the
>>
>> > >>> answer is yes, then the issue of jurisdiction can actually be
>>
>> > >>> addressed in WS2.
>>
>> > >>> If the answer is no — and realistically it is — then, the
>> issue of
>>
>> > >>> jurisdiction can only be very partially addressed in WS2.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Keeping this in mind, we recommended specific changes in the
>>
>> > >>> by-laws, all of which were rejected by CCWG’s lawyers.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement
>>
>> > >>> --------------------------------------------------
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> The [NETmundial Multistakeholder Document], which was an
>> outcome of
>>
>> > >>> the NETmundial process, states:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>> In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement
>> of US
>>
>> > >>>> Government with regard to its intent to transition the
>> stewardship
>>
>> > >>>> of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for
>> guaranteeing
>>
>> > >>>> the transparency and accountability of those functions
>> after the US
>>
>> > >>>> Government role ends, has to take place through an open
>> process
>>
>> > >>>> with the participation of all stakeholders extending
>> beyond the
>>
>> > >>>> ICANN community
>>
>> > >>>>
>>
>> > >>>> \[…\]
>>
>> > >>>>
>>
>> > >>>> It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN
>> speeds up
>>
>> > >>>> leading
>>
>> > >>> to a truly international and global organization serving
>> the public
>>
>> > >>> interest with clearly implementable and verifiable
>> accountability
>>
>> > >>> and transparency mechanisms that satisfy requirements from
>> both
>>
>> > >>> internal stakeholders and the global community.
>>
>> > >>>> The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN
>>
>> > >>>> structure
>>
>> > >>> from all regions is a key issue in the process of a successful
>>
>> > >>> globalization.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> As our past analysis has shown, the IANA transition process
>> and the
>>
>> > >>> discussions on the mailing lists that shaped it [were
>> neither global
>>
>> > >>> nor multistakeholder]. The DNS industry represented in
>> ICANN is
>>
>> > >>> largely US- based. 3 in 5 registrars are from the United
>> States of
>>
>> > >>> America, whereas less than 1% of ICANN-registered
>> registrars are
>>
>> > >>> from Africa.
>>
>> > >>> Two-thirds of the Business Constituency in ICANN is from
>> the USA.
>>
>> > >>> While ICANN-the-corporation has sought to become more
>> global, the
>>
>> > >>> ICANN community has remained insular, and this will not
>> change until
>>
>> > >>> the commercial interests involved in ICANN can become more
>> diverse,
>>
>> > >>> reflecting the diversity of users of the Internet, and a
>> TLD like
>>
>> > >>> .COM can be owned by a non-American corporation and the PTI
>> can be a
>>
>> > >>> non-American entity.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience
>>
>> > >>> ---------------------------------------
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> It is no one’s case that the United States is less fit than
>> any
>>
>> > >>> other country as a base for ICANN, PTI, or the Root Zone
>> Maintainer,
>>
>> > >>> or even as the headquarters for 9 of the world’s 12 root zone
>>
>> > >>> operators (Verisign runs both the A and J root servers).
>> However,
>>
>> > >>> just as having multiplicity of root servers is important for
>>
>> > >>> ensuring technical resilience of the DNS system (and this
>> is shown
>>
>> > >>> in the uptake of Anycast by root server operators), it is
>> equally
>>
>> > >>> important to have immunity of core DNS functioning from
>> political
>>
>> > >>> pressures of the country or countries where core DNS
>> infrastructure
>>
>> > >>> is legally situated and to ensure that we have diversity in
>> terms of
>>
>> > >>> legal jurisdiction.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Towards this end, we at CIS have pushed for the concept of
>>
>> > >>> “jurisdictional resilience”, encompassing three crucial
>> points:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> - Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet
>> functions
>>
>> > >>> (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or
>> orders
>>
>> > >>> from the state in which they are legally situated.
>>
>> > >>> - Division of core Internet operators among multiple
>> jurisdictions
>>
>> > >>> - Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from
>> technical
>>
>> > >>> implementation functions
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Of these, the most important is the limited legal immunity
>> (akin to
>>
>> > >>> a greatly limited form of the immunity that UN
>> organizations get
>>
>> > >>> from the laws of their host countries). This kind of
>> immunity could
>>
>> > >>> be provided through a variety of different means: a
>> host-country
>>
>> > >>> agreement; a law passed by the legislature; a U.N. General
>> Assembly
>>
>> > >>> Resolution; a U.N.-backed treaty; and other such options
>> exist. We
>>
>> > >>> are currently investigating which of these options would be
>> the best
>>
>> > >>> option.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> And apart from limited legal immunity, distribution of
>>
>> > >>> jurisdictional control is also valuable. As we noted in our
>>
>> > >>> submission to the ICG in September
>>
>> > >>> 2015:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>> Following the above precepts would, for instance, mean
>> that the
>>
>> > >>>> entity
>>
>> > >>> that performs the role of the Root Zone Maintainer should
>> not be
>>
>> > >>> situated in the same legal jurisdiction as the entity that
>> functions
>>
>> > >>> as the policymaking venue. This would in turn mean that
>> either the
>>
>> > >>> Root Zone Maintainer function be taken up Netnod
>>
>> > >>> (Sweden-headquartered) or the WIDE Project
>>
>> > >>> (Japan-headquartered) \[or RIPE-NCC, headquartered in the
>>
>> > >>> Netherlands\], or that if the IANA Functions Operator(s) is
>> to be
>>
>> > >>> merged with the RZM, then the IFO be relocated to a
>> jurisdiction
>>
>> > >>> other than those of ISOC and ICANN.
>>
>> > >>> This, as has been stated earlier, has been a demand of the
>> Civil
>>
>> > >>> Society Internet Governance Caucus. Further, it would also
>> mean that
>>
>> > >>> root zone servers operators be spread across multiple
>> jurisdictions
>>
>> > >>> (which the creation of mirror servers in multiple
>> jurisdictions will
>>
>> > >>> not address).
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> However, the issue of jurisdiction seems to be
>> dead-on-arrival,
>>
>> > >>> having been killed by the United States government.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Unfortunately, despite the primary motivation for demands
>> for the
>>
>> > >>> IANA transition being those of removing the power the U.S.
>>
>> > >>> government exercises over the core of the Internet’s
>> operations in
>>
>> > >>> the form of the DNS, what has ended up happening through
>> the IANA
>>
>> > >>> transition is that these powers have not only not been
>> removed, but
>>
>> > >>> in some ways they have been entrenched further! While
>> earlier, the
>>
>> > >>> U.S. had to specify that the IANA functions operator had to be
>>
>> > >>> located in the U.S., now ICANN’s by-laws themselves will
>> state that
>>
>> > >>> the post-transition IANA will be a California corporation.
>>
>> > >>> Notably,
>>
>> > >>> while the Montevideo Declaration speaks of “globalization”
>> of ICANN
>>
>> > >>> and of the IANA functions, as does the NETmundial
>> statement, the
>>
>> > >>> NTIA announcement on their acceptance of the transition
>> proposals
>>
>> > >>> speaks of “privatization” of ICANN, and not “globalization”.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> All in all, the “independence” that IANA is gaining from
>> the U.S. is
>>
>> > >>> akin to the “independence” that Brazil gained from Portugal
>> in 1822.
>>
>> > >>> Dom Pedro of Brazil was then ruling Brazil as the Prince
>> Regent
>>
>> > >>> since his father Dom João VI, the King of United Kingdom of
>>
>> > >>> Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves had returned to Portugal.
>> In 1822,
>>
>> > >>> Brazil declared independence from Portugal (which was formally
>>
>> > >>> recognized through a treaty in 1825). Even after this
>>
>> > >>> “independence”, Dom Pedro continued to rule Portugal just
>> as he had
>>
>> > >>> before indepedence, and Dom João VI was provided the title of
>>
>> > >>> “Emperor of Brazil”, aside from being King of the United
>> Kingdom of
>>
>> > >>> Portugal and the Algarves. The “indepedence” didn’t make a
>> whit of a
>>
>> > >>> difference to the
>>
>> > >>> self-
>>
>> > >>> sufficiency of Brazil: Portugal continued to be its largest
>> trading
>>
>> > >>> partner. The “independence” didn’t change anything for the
>> nearly 1
>>
>> > >>> million slaves in Brazil, or to the lot of the indigenous
>> peoples of
>>
>> > >>> Brazil, none of whom were recognized as “free”. It had very
>> little
>>
>> > >>> consequence not just in terms of ground conditions of
>> day-to-day
>>
>> > >>> living, but even in political terms.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> Such is the case with the IANA Transition: U.S. power over
>> the core
>>
>> > >>> functioning of the Domain Name System do not stand
>> diminished after
>>
>> > >>> the transition, and they can even arguably be said to have
>> become
>>
>> > >>> even more entrenched. Meet the new boss: same as the old boss.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> [^1]: It is an allied but logically distinct issue that U.S.
>>
>> > >>> businesses — registries
>>
>> > >>> and registrars — dominate the global DNS industry, and as a
>> result
>>
>> > >>> hold the reins at ICANN.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> [^2]: As Goldsmith & Wu note in their book *Who Controls
>> the Internet*:
>>
>> > >>> “Back in 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce promised to
>> relinquish
>>
>> > >>> root authority by the fall of 2006, but in June 2005, the
>> United
>>
>> > >>> States reversed course. “The United States Government
>> intends to
>>
>> > >>> preserve the security and stability of the Internet’s
>> Domain Name
>>
>> > >>> and Addressing System (DNS),”
>>
>> > >>> announced Michael D. Gallagher, a Department of Commerce
>> official.
>>
>> > >>> “The United States” he announced, will “maintain its
>> historic role
>>
>> > >>> in authorizing changes or modifications to the
>> authoritative root
>>
>> > >>> zone file.”
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> [^3]: Mr. Fadi Chehadé revealed in an interaction with Indian
>>
>> > >>> participants at ICANN 54 that he had a meeting “at the
>> White House”
>>
>> > >>> about the U.S. plans for transition of the IANA contract
>> before he
>>
>> > >>> spoke about that when [he visited India in October 2013]
>> making the
>>
>> > >>> timing of his White House visit around the time of the
>> Montevideo
>>
>> > >>> Statement.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> [^4]: As an example, [NSD], software that is used on
>> multiple root
>>
>> > >>> servers, is funded by a Dutch foundation and a Dutch
>> corporation,
>>
>> > >>> and written mostly by European coders.
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> [US government announced]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-
>>
>> > >>> transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions
>>
>> > >>> [Internet Assigned Numbers Authority]: https://www.iana.org/
>>
>> > >>> [in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance
>>
>> > >>> Caucus at WSIS, in
>>
>> > >>> 2005]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/sca/hbf-29.doc
>>
>> > >>> [not technical]:
>>
>> > >>> [White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/white-paper-2012-02-
>>
>> > >>> 25-en
>>
>> > >>> [asserted it’s control over the root]:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> >
>> http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/mueller_icann_and_internet_governa
>>
>> > >>> n
>>
>> > >>> ce.pdf
>>
>> > >>> [no serious push for states assuming control of ICANN]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/05/24/threat-analysis-of-itus
>>
>> > >>> -
>>
>> > >>> wcit-part-1-historical-context/
>>
>> > >>> [clueless commentators]:
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023035633045794473626109
>>
>> > 55
>>
>> > >>> 656
>>
>> > >>> [American IP lawyers]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> http://www.circleid.com/posts/20140316_if_the_stakeholders_already_c
>>
>> > >>> on
>>
>> > >>> trol_the_internet_netmundial_iana/
>>
>> > >>> [American ‘homeland’ security hawks]:
>>
>> > >>> http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/who-controls-the-internet-
>>
>> > address
>>
>> > >>> -
>>
>> > >>> book-icann-ntia-and-iana/
>>
>> > >>> [jingoists]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> http://homepages.wmich.edu/~cooneys/poems/cummings.nextto.html
>> <http://homepages.wmich.edu/%7Ecooneys/poems/cummings.nextto.html>
>>
>> > >>> [international]:
>>
>> > >>> http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4529516c-c713-11e3-889e-
>>
>> > 00144feabdc0.html
>>
>> > >>> [criticism]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> https://www.rt.com/usa/nsa-fallout-relinquish-internet-oversight-002/
>>
>>
>> > >>> [with which]:
>>
>> > >>> https://twitter.com/carolinegreer/status/454253411576598528
>>
>> > >>> [civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of
>>
>> > >>> the
>>
>> > >>> Internet]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf
>>
>>
>> > >>> [Diego Canabarro]: https://icannwiki.com/Diego_Canabarro
>>
>> > >>> [I\* organizations]:
>>
>> > >>> https://www.apnic.net/community/ecosystem/i*orgs
>>
>> > >>> [‘Statement on the Future of Internet Governance’]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> https://www.apnic.net/publications/news/2013/montevideo-statement-
>>
>> > on
>>
>> > >>> -
>>
>> > >>> future-of-internet-cooperation
>>
>> > >>> [Milton Mueller notes]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-ia
>>
>> > >>> na-
>>
>> > >>>
>> four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global
>>
>> > >>> -
>>
>> > >>>
>> multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96
>>
>> > >>> [testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on
>> Communications
>>
>> > >>> and
>>
>> > >>> Technology]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v-
>>
>> > >>> yWye5I0w&feature=youtu.be <http://youtu.be>
>>
>> > >>> [NETmundial Multistakeholder Document]:
>>
>> > >>> http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-
>>
>> > >>> Multistakeholder-Document.pdf
>>
>> > >>> [were neither global nor multistakeholder]:
>>
>> > >>>
>> cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-commu
>> <http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-commu>
>>
>>
>> > >>> nity-
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> neither-global-nor-multistakeholder
>>
>> > >>> [he visited India in October 2013]:
>>
>> > >>> http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-
>>
>> > >>>
>> 22/news/43288531_1_icann-internet-corporation-us-centric-internet
>>
>> > >>> [NSD]: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/nsd/
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>> --
>>
>> > >>> Pranesh Prakash
>>
>> > >>> Policy Director, Centre for Internet and Society
>>
>> > >>> http://cis-india.org
>>
>> > >>> | tel:+91
>>
>> > >>> 80 40926283 sip:[log in to unmask] <http://ostel.co> |
>> xmpp:[log in to unmask] <http://cis-india.org>
>>
>> > >>> https://twitter.com/pranesh
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >>>
>>
>> > >
>>
>> >
>>
>> > --
>>
>> > Pranesh Prakash
>>
>> > Policy Director, Centre for Internet and Society
>> http://cis-india.org <http://cis-india.org> | tel:+91
>>
>> > 80 40926283 sip:[log in to unmask] <http://ostel.co> |
>> xmpp:[log in to unmask] <http://cis-india.org>
>>
>> > https://twitter.com/pranesh
>>
>>
>>
>> Ayden Férdeline
>> Statement of Interest
>> <https://community.icann.org/display/gnsosoi/Ayden+F%E9rdeline+SOI>
>>
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