Good questions, Ron

> -----Original Message-----
> A comment on point # 8 which i hope is helpful:
> 
>        8. Could there be unforeseen impacts relative to
>           selecting a new operator for the IANA functions vs the ICANN
>           policy role (should ICANN determine that there will be another
>           round of new gTLDs, how could it ensure that the new operator
>           would accept this)?
> 
>           No, a new operator could be contractually bound to accept
>           changes from ICANN that were the product of legitimate policy
>           making processes.
> 
> I'm a bit uneasy about having the new operator determining just what
> changes are "the product of legitimate policy making processes", and which
> changes are not legitimate.
> 
> Some IANA functions, such as SNMP Enterprise number assignments, have
> nothing to do with DNS, so will there be a governing
> board of the new IANA to "oversee" non-DNS areas?   Or will
> Internet users be expected to go through ICANN processes to settle
> grievances on non-DNS items?

The CWG proposal is only for the names-related IANA functions. The others are handled by the IETF, which already has a severable contract/MoU with ICANN to supply those functions. 

> In additon who is the contract with the new operator with ICANN?  So in the
> end, it's the ICANN board who determines if the performance of the IANA
> operator is doing "the right things" and if not to sue the operator, but in
> what court?

Right, the ICANN policy making community, acting through the board, would contract with the names-related IANA operator. in various proposals and models, there would be supplementary committees, such as a IANA "Customer Standing Committee" to advise or play a role in this decision. 

> In the end, how is this "independent" from ICANN compared to just being
> another department within ICANN?

By being separable, more transparent and by preventing the policy maker from implementing policy unilaterally without proper process.