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Subject:
From:
Neal McBurnett <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Neal McBurnett <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Thu, 25 Aug 2016 11:39:47 -0600
Content-Type:
text/plain
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Thanks, Enrique.  That scenario seems to at least be internally consistent.  It also suggests that 90% of the electorate is voting NOTA in one form or another, which given the currently adopted procedures, I would take as a huge signal that people don't like the slate, to varying degrees.

I'd also say it is highly unlikely to reflect the current electorate, unless too many of us (myself included!) continues to help this conversation drown out the core of our work.

So, fellow voters, note this well, and don't vote NOTA lightly!  I personally think we have 4 highly worthy candidates!

I'll now try to be quiet for a while on this topic.

Neal McBurnett                 http://neal.mcburnett.org/

On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 02:12:58PM -0300, Enrique Chaparro wrote:
> Neal,
> Milton's scenario is not correct, as you pointed out, but since
> the NotA votes are a strict threshold (i.e. votes for a candidate
> must be greater than the sum of NotA), the problem persists.
> Please notice that you have 100 voters but max 300 votes (and
> some of those are "supervotes" witth ambiguous values from -1
> to -3). Let's make a twist to Milton's example:
> 10 voters vote A|B|C
> 70 voters vote A|B|N
> 10 voters vote A|N
> 10 voters vote N
> Tally:
> Voters=100
> Votes= 270 < 300 → OK
> N=90
> C = 10 < 90 → not elected
> B = 80 < 90 → not elected
> A = 90 = 90 → not elected
> 
> Let me get back into the mock example above:
> * A|B|C votes have _positive_ effect for A, B, C.
> * A|B|N votes have _negative_ effect for C and _neutral_ effect
>   for A, B (they add 1 to A's and B's count, but also add 1 to the
>   threshold)
> * A|N votes have _negative_ effect for B, C, and _neutral_ for A
> * N votes have _negative_ effect for A, B, C.
> 
> As discussed elsewhere (and I think Milton agrees with this), the
> underlying idea seems to have some kind of "trust|distrust|neutral"
> system, i.e. the voter has 3 options vis-à-vis each candidate =
> {1, -1, 0}. Only candidates with a _positive_ outcome are elected.
> However, the implementation of the idea became a fiasco. The
> simplest solution would have been to redesign the ballot.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Enrique

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