There is a very simple flaw in Avri's argument, and it is a fatal one. 

This "equal footing" argument makes sense if we are talking about truly equal units of representation, such as the individual citizen. One person, one vote is equal footing. But the ACs and SOs are not comparable units. If there is "equal footing" between RSSAC and GNSO, for example, then the small number of people who participate in RSSAC are actually more powerful than the large and diverse groups who participate in GNSO. 

ICANN creates arbitrary and incommensurate categories of representation, such as ALAC and GNSO. GNSO is composed of 4 stakeholder groups and a bunch of different constituencies. Each GNSO constituency can have about as many participants and stakeholders as the ALAC as a whole. Furthermore, there is a lot of duplicate representation across ALAC and NCSG, and across IPCC and BC. To declare that ALAC and GNSO should be "equal" simply because ICANN has given each a label is the worst kind of political gerrymandering. If you want equality, true equality, move things down to the individual level and give us all one vote.

Or, if you believe in "equal footing," why not have all GNSO Stakeholder Groups, NCSG, RySG, RrSG and CSG, have the same number of votes in the community mechanism? Why don't SGs qualify for "equal footing?" 

The equal footing argument is just a rhetorical game unless you specify exactly what UNIT you are talking about that should be "equal" and how that equality is justified by their stakes in the policy process.

--MM

> -----Original Message-----
> From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of
> Avri Doria
> Sent: Wednesday, August 12, 2015 5:28 AM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: [NCSG-Discuss] A must-read about the CCWG accountability
> proposal
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I too think this is a good thing to discuss.  But I have a very different take on
> the issue.  Perhaps it is a little less fortress GNSO centric.
> 
> I am one of those proposing alternative 1.  Since arguments for this has
> already been deemed misleading, I probably should not waste my time
> defending it.  Though I do ntend to submit my own comment on the issue.
> 
> However, I do not care that there are 5 votes, that is a different issue.  I
> personally preferred that each of the ACSO get 3 votes to split up anyway they
> wanted. I wanted to keep it small. What I care about is that in the application
> of powers, AC s and SOs should be on an equal footing.  I know that not
> everone belives in the theory of equal footing.  I am dedicated to it.
> 
> The 5 powers have nothing to do with gTLDs.  One could ask why the GNSO
> should have a say on anything not to do with gTLDs. All things gTLD and only
> things gTLD are within their tightly defined mission.  That is not, however, my
> issue.  What I have an issue on is that in an system architecture that has a
> balance of different perspectives, these sorts of powers should be on an equal
> footing and that it is inappropriate for one group to look at another and say
> they are less important that us.
> Some argue that I carry this egalitarian ethic too far, but as far as I can tell,
> ICANN needs it in order to be able to do the right thing.
> 
> The argument that this decreases GNSO power is hard to understand.  What
> power does the GNSO have now in the area of 5 powers? The only time we
> have power is when we all work together - we have seen that several times
> this year.  The powers are about the community working together to overrule
> the board.  The community cannot work together if one group deems other
> groups as less important than themselves.
> 
> So as I say, good topic for discussion.
> 
> avri
> 
> 
> 
> On 12-Aug-15 07:50, William Drake wrote:
> > Really useful piece from Brenden, really working problem to fix.
> >
> > Bill
> >
> >> On Aug 12, 2015, at 3:25 AM, Robin Gross <[log in to unmask]
> >> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
> >>
> >> Excellent analysis from Brenden on one key flaw in the CCWG
> >> Accountability's existing proposal - how the proposed SOAC "voting
> >> weights" empowers some parts of the ICANN community (ACs) while
> >> disempowering others (including the GNSO) as compared to the existing
> >> balance of power in ICANN's structure.  So this is one gaping hole we
> >> need to fix in the draft proposal, which otherwise has recommended
> >> some significant improvements (like the Independent Review process
> >> and Reconsideration Request process).
> >>
> >> Thanks,
> >> Robin
> >>
> >> On Aug 11, 2015, at 11:20 AM, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
> >>
> >>> Dr. Brenden Kuerbis of IGP has developed a very important analysis
> >>> of the CCWG's proposed voting distribution model, which we need to
> >>> take into account when developing our comments.
> >>> Read it
> >>> here:
> >>> http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/08/11/ccwg-community-
> mechanis
> >>> m-threatens-to-upset-icann-balance/#comment-40415
> >>>
> >>> Dr. Milton L. Mueller
> >>> Professor, School of Public Policy
> >>> Georgia Institute of Technology
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >
> 
> 
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