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Subject:
From:
Carlos Afonso <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Carlos Afonso <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Tue, 10 Feb 2015 14:47:02 +0800
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This morning at the NCUC meeting I asked Strickling about the issues 
regarding internationalization of the oversight in a post-NTIA era.

My view is that in the IANA transition process there are opportunities 
for advancing an internationalization agenda. In the case of the numbers 
community, I think there are no significant difficulties on this topic, 
given the way the registries' system is organized and operating. In 
fact, I think the methods and processes conducted jointly by the RIRs 
have practically turned the number governance into almost a non-issue -- 
despite the fact that the community bears [a small] part of 
responsibility for the difficulties in transitioning to IPv6.

Mnemonics is another matter entirely, a good measure of which is shown 
by the complications in the CWG process (while the numbers community has 
already delivered its proposal). A component of this process, although 
totally ignored in the CWG, is internationalization. In any "model" 
which may win this process, whether internal or external, the issues of 
accountability, as well as of policy and compliance are at stake. One of 
these issues is jurisdiction and the international nature of the domain 
name system.

The multistakeholder approach adopted in any reorganization of the 
administration and oversight instances need to include the international 
component -- stakeholders from all sectors and all regions. Further, the 
oversight system cannot be vulnerable to challenges like the one in the 
example below, revealed today by Russia in a GAC meeting. Or the strong 
objections made by France regarding the same in ICANN51.

How could an oversight mechanism (contract co., trust etc) be protected 
as much as possible from specific national jurisdictions? To host it in 
a country which accepts international organizations without the 
precondition of being part of the UN? Uruguay, for instance? How to 
guarantee balanced international representation in this mechanism's 
board and executive structure?

If separability is adopted, e.g, with the Trust external model, could 
this Trust be constituted in such a way?

I think it is surprising that not even the word "international" is in 
the CWG reports. There is no worry about this, while we have to 
chronically confront the challenges posed by a group of States who would 
like to either move ICANN from the USA (which in my view is practically 
impossible) or turn critical resources' governance to the ITU (including 
a significant portion of organized civil society which is a militant of 
Internet governance issues). Is it worth to simply ignore this and go 
ahead with a new structure entirely based in the USA and under its laws?

My request is that NCSG seriously considers these factors in the transition.

fraternal regards

--c.a.

 >>RUSSIA: I NEED TO MAKE A STATEMENT. PLEASE BE PREPARED, BECAUSE I 
WILL SPEAK IN RUSSIAN.

WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT AND HIGHLIGHT A RECENT DECISION MADE 
BY A U.S.-BASED REGISTRAR.

THERE WAS A NOTIFICATION FOR REGISTRANTS LOCATED IN A CERTAIN 
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA, IN A CERTAIN GEOGRAPHICAL REGION ABOUT TERMINATION OF 
THE ACCOUNTS, CANCELLATION OF THE DOMAINS, AND REVOCATION OF THEIR 
DOMAIN NAMES AS OF JANUARY 31, 2015.
THIS REGISTRAR OFFERED THE EXPLANATION OF TRADE RESTRICTIONS THAT 
PREVENT THE U.S. COMPANIES FROM CONDUCTING BUSINESS WITH COMPANIES AND 
INDIVIDUALS LOCATED IN THE CRYMEA.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT RUSSIA HAS ALWAYS OPPOSED ANY SANGS 
INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE AREA OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION 
TECHNOLOGIES, IN PARTICULAR IN WHAT REFERS TO THE INTERNET. SIMILAR 
SANCTIONS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THEY ARE IMPOSED ON INTERNET USERS SHOULD BE 
CONSIDERED A RESTRICTION OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS TO RECEIVE 
INFORMATION AND IDEAS REGARDLESS OF ANY FRONTIERS. AND THIS IS IN 
VIOLATION OF THE ARTICLE 19 OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND ALSO A VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES AND THE SPIRIT OF WSIS, 
THE WORLD SUMMIT ON THE INFORMATION SOCIETY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE 
OF ICT. ALSO A VIOLATION OF THE TUNIS AGENDA FOR THE INFORMATION SOCIETY.

WE WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THIS INCIDENT HIGHLIGHTS THE ENTIRE INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE SITUATION WITH A PARTICULAR GOVERNMENT USING UNILATERAL 
MEASURES TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST INTERNET USERS IN A PARTICULAR 
GEOGRAPHIC REGION. THAT SAME GOVERNMENT HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROL 
DOMAIN NAMES -- THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM WORLDWIDE.

THESE UNILATERAL RESTRICTIONS UNDERMINE THE UNIVERSAL ACCEPTED 
MULTISTAKEHOLDER-BASED PRINCIPLES AND VALUES; THE TRUST, AND THE OPEN, 
AND THE INTERCONNECTED CYBERSPACE, AND IS DISCREDITING THE EVOLUTION OF 
EFFECTIVE INTERNET GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS, CREATING A SERIOUS THREAT OF 
ITS FRAGMENTATION.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION PROPOSES THAT ALL STAKEHOLDERS AND ALL COUNTRIES 
REFRAIN FROM ANY ATTEMPTS TO USE BLOCKING OF THE INTERNET, INCLUDING THE 
BLOCKING OF DOMAIN NAMES, WITH POLITICAL MOTIVATION AND MAKE EVERY 
POSSIBLE EFFORTS TO PROTECT THE INTERNET USERS' RIGHTS.

THIS PROBLEM, IN MY OPINION, HIGHLIGHTS A POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER 
DIFFICULTIES AND COMPLICATIONS. ONE THING WE NEED TO UNDERSTAND AT THIS 
POINT IS WHETHER THE MULTISTAKEHOLDER MODEL WILL DEMONSTRATE ITSELF AS A 
VIABLE MODEL CAPABLE OF PROTECTING THE VALUES THAT WE ARE PROCLAIMING.

SECONDLY, WE NOTE THE VACUUM THAT EXISTS IN THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE 
AREA, BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THIS TOPIC IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE. WE 
WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE IT REFLECTED IN THE GAC COMMUNIQUE.

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