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Mon, 22 Apr 2013 17:18:34 -0400
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On Mon, Apr 22, 2013 at 3:37 PM, Edward Morris
<[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> Hi Kathy, Rudi, McTim,
>
>
> The danger of bringing up rather specialist complex arguments in a
> generalist forum is that things get misconstrued or misinterpreted. Let me
> attempt to clarify:
>
> I disagree with Rudi. I do not want ICANN involved in cybercrime. I also do
> not want ICANN involved in cyberespionage. I believe Paul Twomey likely went
> too far in authorizing ICANN's coordinating and advisory role in Conflicker.
> It created a dangerous precedent. Mr. Beckstrom obviously got us involved in
> operations at an unacceptable level...at least to some.
>
> Cyberwar is different.
>
> There is a body of law you are subject to whether you want to be or not.
> Most, but not all, of international humanitarian law is directed towards
> state actors. There is no opt out clause. Porting IHL to cyberspace involves
> some pretty comical situations. When members of the Estonian Cyber Defense
> League engage in operations on their computer related to their national
> security, rather than private, function they are required to put on military
> uniforms even if they are sitting in their bedroom at home. Uniforms are an
> identifier with particular significance under IHL even, apparently, if no
> one can see you wearing it.
>
> ICANN derives part of it's authority from a contract with the United States
> government. The United States government is the only government to have,
> albeit unofficially, admitted launching a cyberattack on a third country.
> The attack targeted military operations, no problem with war crime related
> IHL, although there may be problems with some other treaties concerning
> first strike doctrine. What if the Americans decide to do a more general
> attack, one that kills civilians and involves at some level playing with the
> root zone file to disrupt communication.

Here is where you depart from reality.  The US cannot unilaterally
change the zone file.

They are NOT the zone admin.


What if "not involved in cyberwar"
> ICANN knows about this, does not direct their root server away from A,


Well their rootserver "L" is no more or less authoritative than any other.


> follows directions or even assists the Americans? Thousands of civilians
> die. War crime. I have a direct line of command from the Americans to
> ICANN..

Well, what you have is a conspiracy theory that is not physically
possible, since NTIA does not have access to the rootzone apparatus,
NOR do they have the keys to the signed root.





>
> McTim asks a great question. Show me how? What? I can't. We're creating law
> for things that haven't happened.

We don't create law only policy.  We should not IMHO create policy to
potentially alleviate things that can't possibly happen under the
current system.


The Tallinn Manual is guidance for things
> that largely have not happened.  That's why it's dangerous to simply state
> 'we don't do cyberwar' and think you are free. It's not an opt in / opt out
> thing like cybercrime or cyberespionage. As I wrote, I'm happy to support
> David's statement today, but I just wanted to cover myself by stating I
> reserve the right to change my mind in the future on this one issue as
> doctrine develops.
 data center and force them to sign an amended

sure, me too.  If the jack-booted thugs kidnap all the key holders and senior
Verisign officials take them to a key signing data center and force
them to change the rootzone and then sign it, I'd be happy to change
my mind.  If it comes to that tho, we are all screwed and ICANN policy
making is rendered moot.


>
> ICANN acts a bit like a state. It grants property rights ( they are actually
> licenses). It creates law like rules (that principally benefit IP
> interests). Are there scenario's under which revoking or ceasing to grant
> domain names to certain countries could stop potential cyber conflict?

no



> Perhaps. What if hell freezes over and ICANN becomes free of the Americans,
> actually controls the root? A nation launches mass cyber attacks. In that
> scenario it could be argued that ICANN has a positive obligation to delete
> that nation from the root or at least not to grant it more domain names,


why?

More to the point, ICANN CANNOT delete nations from the root.


-- 
Cheers,

McTim
"A name indicates what we seek. An address indicates where it is. A
route indicates how we get there."  Jon Postel

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