At 12:20 PM -0800 12/21/06, Robin Gross wrote: >Hi there, > >I've updated and revised Milton's previous draft >of these comments on the LSE report. Below is >the text of the proposed revised comments. > >Please let me know what revisions you'd like in >the next day because we this is due on 22 >December. > >I don't think we necessarily have to comment on >every LSE recommendation - many are just to >vague to be for or against. I'd prefer that we >only comment on the recommendations that we have >definite opinions about. Agree. And I'm in agreement with the drafts MIlton's been circulating. But... Recommendation 2 and 5 seem obvious to me. Saying "NCUC Supports" for both would be in-line with support for increased transparency generally. Recommendation 2 might just mean that all constituency lists where constituency policy is deliberated should have a public archive. However, not a big deal to give no response. My opinion on 13 has changed recently. I am strongly in favor of term limits. But I think 4 years total is too short. Experience with NomCom suggests it takes a year to start coming up to speed on the Council. GNSO work is about has hard as it gets in ICANN. And for a constituency like NCUC it seems a shame to have to drop good people after such a short time. My preferred option would be 2 3 year terms, but 3 2 year terms near equally good. Apologies to be late with this, only just started thinking about it generally. Ignore if too late. Adam >Thank you! >Robin > >==================== > >v.0.5 >Comments of the Non-Commercial Users Constituency (NCUC) on the >GNSO Review: LSE Report and Recommendations >December 2006 > > >ICANN¹s Non-Commercial User Constituency (NCUC) >welcomes the London School of Economics (LSE) >report on the GNSO and urges the Board to >implement many, but not all, of its >recommendations. > >Recommendation 1 >³A centralized register of all GNSO stakeholders >should be established, which is up-to-date and >publicly accessible. It should include members >of Constituencies and others involved in the >GNSO task forces.² > >[no opinion developed] > >Recommendation 2 >³GNSO Constituencies should be required to show >how many members have participated in the policy >positions they adopt.² > >[no opinion developed] > >Recommendation 3 >³There needs to be greater coherence and >standardization across constituency operations. >For this to work effectively, more ICANN staff >support would be needed for constituencies.² > >* NCUC does not support recommendation 3. >Constituencies should be funded by ICANN so they >can provide their own staff support for these >roles. It does not have to be an ICANN staff >member that fulfills this function and role, >which NCUC agrees needs to be filled. > >Recommendation 4 >³A GNSO Constituency support officer should be >appointed to help Constituencies develop their >operations, websites and outreach activity.² > >* NCUC supports recommendation 4 as it would >enable constituencies, particularly the >less-funded constituencies to carry out the work >of the organization in a more consistent fashion. > >Recommendation 5 >³Constituencies should focus on growing balanced >representation and active participation broadly >proportional to wider global distributions for >relevant indicators.² > >[no opinion developed] > > >Recommendation 6 >³The basis for participation in GNSO activities >needs to be revised, from Constituency based >membership to one deriving from direct ICANN >stakeholder participation.² > >* NCUC supports recommendation 6 since many >people or entities do not fit neatly into any >ICANN constituency and it is important the ICANN >hear from all viewpoints. Also, because hardly >anyone in the public has heard of the GNSO, >participation in ICANN via the GNSO will not >garner much interest and remain at a low level. > >Recommendation 7 >³The GNSO should improve the design and >organization of the current website, develop a >website strategy for continual improvement and >growth over the next three years, and review >usage statistics on a regular basis to check >that traffic to the website is growing over time >and understand more fully what external >audiences are interested in.² > >* NCUC supports recommendation 7. Since the >website is the main tool through which GNSO >policy discussions are made available to the >world, it is extremely important the information >be accessible and easy to find. Most agree that >ICANN should continue to upgrade its website, >including the GNSO website. > >Recommendation 8 >³Document management within the GNSO needs to be >improved and the presentation of policy >development work made much more accessible.² > >* NCUC supports recommendation 8. Closely tied >to recommendation 7, an online document >management system to better provide the public >with GNSO policymaking discussions and reports >would be an important improvement. > >Recommendation 9 >³The GNSO should develop and publish annually a >Policy Development Plan for the next two years, >to act both as a strategy document for current >and upcoming policy work, and as a >communications and marketing tool for general >consumption outside of the ICANN community. It >should dovetail with ICANN¹s budget and strategy >documents.² > >* NCUC supports recommendation 9. Developing >policy development plans at the GNSO will >encourage long-term thinking and prioritization >of issues. > >Recommendation 10 >³The GNSO and ICANN should work pro actively to >provide information-based incentives for >stakeholder organizations to monitor and >participate in GNSO issues.² > >[no opinion developed] > >Recommendation 11 >³The position of the GNSO Council Chair needs to >become much more visible within ICANN and to >carry more institutional weight.² > >* NCUC supports recommendation 11. In general >the GNSO needs to be more widely recognized as >the appropriate forum for public policymaking at >ICANN. > >Recommendation 12 >³The policy on GNSO Councilors declaring >interests should be strengthened. Provision for >a vote of Œno confidence¹ leading to resignation >should be introduced for noncompliance.² > >* NCUC supports recommendation 12. Transparency >and accountability regarding the various >interests of GNSO Councilors is always an >appropriate objective for good public policy >making. > >Recommendation 13 >³Fixed term limits should be introduced for GNSO >Councilors either of two two-year terms (as >applied in some Constituencies already) or >perhaps of a single three-year term.² > >* NCUC strongly supports recommendation 13. In >order for there to be an even playing field >across all constituencies, they should all have >term limits. Otherwise the constituencies who do >have limits have an advantage over those that do >not in directing GNSO policy work over time. >Being a GNSO councilor should not be a ³career², >but rather a public service done only for a few >years. The GNSO election structures should >discourage career GNSO councilors and encourage >the widest range of participation and a >diversity of viewpoints. NCUC supports a >standard two or three term limit of two-year >terms for each constituency. > >Recommendation 14 >³The GNSO Council and related policy staff >should work more closely together to grow the >use of project-management methodologies in >policy development work, particularly focusing >on how targeted issue analysis can drive data >collection from stakeholders (rather than vice >versa) .² > >* NCUC does not support recommendation 14. The >GNSO policy decisions and recommendations should >be made by the various constituencies, not by >ICANN policy staff as the text supporting this >recommendation suggested. ICANN policy staff >officers best serve in the role of facilitators >of the discussion, not arbiters of competing >policy issues. > >Recommendation 15 >³The GNSO Council should rely on face-to-face >meetings supplemented by online collaborative >methods of working. The Chair should seek to >reduce the use of whole-Council >teleconferencing.² > >* NCUC does not support recommendation 15. Even >if ICANN were able to pay for the travel costs >of the meeting participants, it is unlikely NCUC >members (or members of other constituencies) can >donate a number of days of their time to attend >more face-to-face meetings. Most NCUC members >(as with other constituencies) have full-time >jobs that do not allow for frequent face-to-face >meetings at different corners of the globe for >ICANN policy work. NCUC supports getting as much >work done via telephone and email as possible, >and to rely upon holding face-to-face meetings, >only when absolutely necessary. > >Recommendation 16 >³The GNSO Councilors should have access to a >fund for reasonable travel and accommodation >expenses to attend designated Council meetings, >instead of having to meet such costs from their >own resources as at present.² > >* NCUC strongly supports recommendation 16. The >lack of funding available to constituencies is >one of the biggest impediments to participation >at ICANN meetings. ICANN should be serious about >its attempt to engage in policymaking by >providing for the travel of the councilors doing >the work of the organization. ICANN should >automatically fund the reasonable travel costs >of all GNSO council members and an executive >member of each constituency to ICANN Board >members. ICANN should also provide for the >reasonable travel costs of task force members >who are carrying out the work of the >organization. > >Recommendation 17 >³The GNSO Council should make more uses of Task >Forces. Task Force participants should be more >diverse and should be drawn from a wider range >of people in the Internet community, and >national and international policy-making >communities.² > >* NCUC supports recommendation 17. Better use of >task forces would help the GNSO to carryout its >work much for effectively and through a wider >range of stakeholders. > >Recommendation 18 >³An ICANN Associate stakeholder category of >participation should be created, so as to create >a pool of readily available external expertise, >which can be drawn upon to populate Task Forces >where relevant.² > >* NCUC supports recommendation 18. A new means >of obtaining more diversity of viewpoints and a >broader range of expertise would be a useful >input into GNSO policy making discussions. > >Recommendation 19 >³The current GNSO Constituency structure should >be radically simplified so as to be more capable >of responding to rapid changes in the Internet. >The Constituency structure should be clear, >comprehensive (covering all potential >stakeholders) and flexible, allowing the GNSO to >respond easily to rapid changes in the makeup of >Internet stakeholders. We suggest a set of three >larger Constituencies to represent respectively >Registration interests, Business and Civil >Society.² > >* NCUC strongly supports recommendation 19. The >LSE report suggests that GNSO be restructured >into three basic groupings: the registration >supply industry, business interests, and civil >society. NCUC agrees that this is a cleaner and >more workable constituency structure than now >exists. There are important details to be worked >out, however. > >The existing structure gives business, >particularly entertainment companies or other >intellectual property interests, too much power >in GNSO policy making and an unfair advantage. >Non-commercial interests should be given equal >weight to commercial interests in GNSO policy >making as a matter of principle. > >Recommendation 20 >³A reorganization of the GNSO Constituencies >would also allow the Council to be made somewhat >smaller (we suggest 16 members) and hence easier >to manage.² > >* NCUC strongly disagrees with recommendation >20. While the Council should be made smaller, >the details for implementing that vague goal are >unsupportable. > >We disagree with the report's proposal that >registration suppliers and business users be >given 5 votes on the policy making Council, >while civil society be given only 3. This kind >of discrimination against a particular sector of >societal interests is unjustified. Nothing in >the factual findings of the report supports this >discrimination. The report >does not even mount an argument for it. We >suggest that the supply industry be given 5 >members, and business and civil society each >given 4, with the remaining 3 appointed by the >NomCom. > >We note that the existence of three "at large" >GNSO Council members appointed by the Nominating >Committee does not compensate for this >inequality. The NomCom-appointed Council members >can come from any constituency; the NomCom >contains diverse interests and is not guaranteed >to appoint members sympathetic to civil society. > >How the civil society representatives on the >Council are selected is very important condition >upon our support. We note that the concept of a >"civil society" category leaves unresolved >issues about the relationship between NCUC and >ALAC. While we strongly favor a more unified >structure for civil society participation in >ICANN, NCUC representatives are elected under a >formal and legitimate membership structure, >whereas the process of selecting ALAC Board >members is complicated and non-transparent. As >long as ALAC and GNSO are structurally separate, >and ALAC's structures are incomplete, civil >society representation within the GNSO will have >to be mediated by NCUC. > >Recommendation 21 >³The definition of achieving consensus should be >raised to 75 per cent. Weighted voting should be >abolished. Both measures could be used to create >more incentives for different constituencies to >engage constructively with each other, rather >than simply reiterating a Œbloc¹ position in >hopes of picking up enough uncommitted votes so >as to win.² > >* NCUC does not support recommendation 21. The >LSE Report proposes to raise the threshold for a >"consensus policy" to 75% of the vote. We do not >support this recommendation and would prefer to >retain a 2/3 super majority as the threshold for >"consensus." Under the LSE proposal, supplier >interests and business interests could, if only >4 of their representatives agreed, prevent a 75% >majority from forming and thus block any policy. >The public interest advocates in civil society, >even if they were completely unified, could not >exercise such a veto. This is not a correct >balance of policy influence. Moreover the very >high 75% requirement would basically freeze the >status quo in place. If the status quo were a >very good state of affairs, this might be an >acceptable approach. The LSE¹s recommendation >would give commercial interests an automatic >veto over the public-interest without any >explanation or justification. > >If representation on the council is to be >weighted, it is reasonable that the registration >industry, whose survival depends entirely on >ICANN contracts and policies, have some kind of >special status in the outcome of policies. They >need to be protected against various forms of >crippling regulation or expropriation at the >hands of GNSO Council >legislators who do not have to directly bear the >costs of their policies. But there is no >legitimate reason why commercial interests >should be given the same veto power while >non-commercial ordinary Internet users denied >it. We also think that registrars and registries >often have conflicting interests and therefore >it is better for there to be wider >representation for them in order to accommodate >this structural difference. > >Recommendation 22 >³The way in which the GNSO Council votes to >elect two directors to the ICANN Board should be >changed to use the Supplementary Vote system.² > >[no opinion developed] > >Recommendation 23 >³The amount of detailed prescriptive provision >in the ICANN Bylaws relating to the operations >of the GNSO should be reduced. ICANN Bylaws >should outline broad principles and objectives >for the GNSO but the detailed operational >provision (including the section on the PDP) >should be transferred to the GNSO Rules of >Procedure. This would allow the GNSO to agree >amendments and to introduce new innovations in >its working methods and time lines in a more >realistic and flexible way, while operating >within ICANN¹s guiding principles.² > >*NCUC supports recommendation 23. The current >structure in the ICANN Bylaws is far too >micro-managing of the GNSO work to be useful. >Much of the detailed prescriptive provisions in >the ICANN Bylaws for GNSO work should be >removed. The GNSO is the best position to manage >its internal operations and objectives. > > >Recommendation 24 >³Both ICANN and the GNSO Council should >periodically (say once every five years) compile >or commission a formal quantitative and >qualitative assessment of the influence of the >GNSO's work on developing policy for generic >names. This should include an analysis of how >the GNSO's influence with national governments, >international bodies and the commercial sector >might be extended.² > >[no opinion developed]