hi milton please don't mind if i skip right to the end of your piece.. and say 'yes - i'm glad i asked' ;) - this is useful.. i realise of course that most of this is about the political process - so now, i feel like i have a goodly amount of both.. politics and process would anyone else like to comment on milton's lively description of the GNSO/PDP process? ( read your comments mawaki, thanks..) karen At 17:24 18/02/2007, Milton Mueller wrote: > >>> karen banks <[log in to unmask]> 2/18/2007 10:58 AM >>> > > >i'm interested in this now when thinking about the nomcom process.. > >how one would describe the nature of GSNO policy development to > >potential candidates who aren't necessarily ICANN insiders.. but who > >may bring useful skills, expertise and perspectives to the process.. > >One must start with a political analysis, not a process analysis. Who >has power over which decisions? > >Start with the Board and CEO/staff. They make the basic decisions and >are basically agents of the USG., operating with some slack. The slack >tightens around the time the IANA contract or MoU (JPA) is renegotiated, >and loosens as those dates become farther away. Any major interest (IPR, >VeriSign, registrars) can also threaten to litigate or make noise before >the US Congress, thereby swaying or influencing the Board/staff to some >degree. Since WSIS, GAC has also become more important, its so-called >"principles" or communiques act as guides or constraints. For people on >the Board, GNSO Task Forces are perceived as tiny little peeps in the >cacophony oflobbying surrounding them. ICANN Board is partly >self-perpetuating with NomComm always more or less under the control of >a group of ISOC-linked old timers. > >How is the GNSO and its PDP related to the Board? > >GNSO Council is supposed to formulate policy on anything having to do >with domain names. Board can ask GNSO for policy on something, or GNSO >can initiate. Whatever the GNSO can decide on becomes "policy advice" >that is fed up to the Board and is supposed to guide its decisions. It >usually does to some degree, but Board always feels free to make its own >modifications and interpretations, and God is always in the details of >staff implementations. Chair of the GNSO engages in constant liaison >with staff and Board and serves a very important gatekeeping role wrt to >what is acted on and how it is acted on. > >To understand the GNSO Council, one must look at its constituencies and >members, and do the basic political arithmetic. There are 6 >constituencies. Each constituency elects 3 Council members, plus 3 >additional members are put on by the Nomcom. Three of the constituencies >-- Business, Trademark and ISPs -- consistently support a restrictive >and regulatory approach to DNS policy in order to protect trademark and >copyright. ISPs are in that category because they are all owned by big >telecom companies. Two constituencies -- registrars and registries -- >represent the domain name industry and have double votes on the Council. >Registries, with only about 9 members, are a tightly knit group that >always votes the same; registrars are a diverse, competitive lot and >have trouble reaching consensus. Then there is NCUC, the only >non-business group. To achieve what is rather cynically called >"consensus" the Council must get a 2/3 plus vote. So, do the math: >Total votes: 27. Axis: 9 votes. Registries and registrars: 12 votes. >NCUC: 3 votes. Nomcom appointees: 3 votes > >A coalition of NCUC, registrars, registries, and Nomcoms can push >something through. >A coallition of Axis, registries and registrars can too. etc., etc. -- >do your own permutations. >On many if not most issues this group will be deadlocked, reaching >sub-consensus levels. This serves the interest of the status quo. If any >proposal for serious policy change, a lack of complete consensus at the >GNSO level leaves the door open for conservative forces on the board to >modify or ignore GNSO initiatives. > >To formulate policy, GNSO Council decides to create a "Task Force" (TF) >along the lines suggested by the formal policy development process PDP. >The Task Force mus tbe guided by a "Terms of Reference" (ToR) describing >what it is supposed to do. Agreeing to create a TF and drafting its ToR >is very time consuming and difficult. Basically it's impossible without >the support of the GNSO Chair. > >TFs are chaired by some Council member. The chairs are often amateurs >in terms of moderating the people and process. TFs often turn into mush >because they have no clear voting procedures or procedural guidelines >for what is in or out of order, so they can be and are gamed; e.g., huge >delaying tactics, introducing dilatory proposals, endless telephone >discussions. As the Whois process shows, controversial issues can remain >in the TF stage for years. > >Recently, ICANN staff members have taken a more active role in managing >TFs. Their basic interest is to show that ICANN can actually accomplish >something. Some staff are more aggressive than others. Years ago it used >to be the case that staff reports reflected shadowy internal ICANN/USG >politics but this is no longer the case they have become much more >professional and autonomous. Probably staff should supplant Council or >TF members as the de facto administrative chairs of the TFs, so that the >trains run on time. > >TFs don't really make policy they make reports that are put up for >public comment and then voted on by the GNSO Council. After passing the >Council they go to the Board. See the section on Board politics.... > >aren't you glad you asked? > > > >Dr. Milton Mueller >Syracuse University School of Information Studies >http://www.digital-convergence.org >http://www.internetgovernance.org