>>> karen banks <[log in to unmask]> 2/18/2007 10:58 AM >>> >i'm interested in this now when thinking about the nomcom process.. >how one would describe the nature of GSNO policy development to >potential candidates who aren't necessarily ICANN insiders.. but who >may bring useful skills, expertise and perspectives to the process.. One must start with a political analysis, not a process analysis. Who has power over which decisions? Start with the Board and CEO/staff. They make the basic decisions and are basically agents of the USG., operating with some slack. The slack tightens around the time the IANA contract or MoU (JPA) is renegotiated, and loosens as those dates become farther away. Any major interest (IPR, VeriSign, registrars) can also threaten to litigate or make noise before the US Congress, thereby swaying or influencing the Board/staff to some degree. Since WSIS, GAC has also become more important, its so-called "principles" or communiques act as guides or constraints. For people on the Board, GNSO Task Forces are perceived as tiny little peeps in the cacophony oflobbying surrounding them. ICANN Board is partly self-perpetuating with NomComm always more or less under the control of a group of ISOC-linked old timers. How is the GNSO and its PDP related to the Board? GNSO Council is supposed to formulate policy on anything having to do with domain names. Board can ask GNSO for policy on something, or GNSO can initiate. Whatever the GNSO can decide on becomes "policy advice" that is fed up to the Board and is supposed to guide its decisions. It usually does to some degree, but Board always feels free to make its own modifications and interpretations, and God is always in the details of staff implementations. Chair of the GNSO engages in constant liaison with staff and Board and serves a very important gatekeeping role wrt to what is acted on and how it is acted on. To understand the GNSO Council, one must look at its constituencies and members, and do the basic political arithmetic. There are 6 constituencies. Each constituency elects 3 Council members, plus 3 additional members are put on by the Nomcom. Three of the constituencies -- Business, Trademark and ISPs -- consistently support a restrictive and regulatory approach to DNS policy in order to protect trademark and copyright. ISPs are in that category because they are all owned by big telecom companies. Two constituencies -- registrars and registries -- represent the domain name industry and have double votes on the Council. Registries, with only about 9 members, are a tightly knit group that always votes the same; registrars are a diverse, competitive lot and have trouble reaching consensus. Then there is NCUC, the only non-business group. To achieve what is rather cynically called "consensus" the Council must get a 2/3 plus vote. So, do the math: Total votes: 27. Axis: 9 votes. Registries and registrars: 12 votes. NCUC: 3 votes. Nomcom appointees: 3 votes A coalition of NCUC, registrars, registries, and Nomcoms can push something through. A coallition of Axis, registries and registrars can too. etc., etc. -- do your own permutations. On many if not most issues this group will be deadlocked, reaching sub-consensus levels. This serves the interest of the status quo. If any proposal for serious policy change, a lack of complete consensus at the GNSO level leaves the door open for conservative forces on the board to modify or ignore GNSO initiatives. To formulate policy, GNSO Council decides to create a "Task Force" (TF) along the lines suggested by the formal policy development process PDP. The Task Force mus tbe guided by a "Terms of Reference" (ToR) describing what it is supposed to do. Agreeing to create a TF and drafting its ToR is very time consuming and difficult. Basically it's impossible without the support of the GNSO Chair. TFs are chaired by some Council member. The chairs are often amateurs in terms of moderating the people and process. TFs often turn into mush because they have no clear voting procedures or procedural guidelines for what is in or out of order, so they can be and are gamed; e.g., huge delaying tactics, introducing dilatory proposals, endless telephone discussions. As the Whois process shows, controversial issues can remain in the TF stage for years. Recently, ICANN staff members have taken a more active role in managing TFs. Their basic interest is to show that ICANN can actually accomplish something. Some staff are more aggressive than others. Years ago it used to be the case that staff reports reflected shadowy internal ICANN/USG politics but this is no longer the case they have become much more professional and autonomous. Probably staff should supplant Council or TF members as the de facto administrative chairs of the TFs, so that the trains run on time. TFs don't really make policy they make reports that are put up for public comment and then voted on by the GNSO Council. After passing the Council they go to the Board. See the section on Board politics.... aren't you glad you asked? Dr. Milton Mueller Syracuse University School of Information Studies http://www.digital-convergence.org http://www.internetgovernance.org