Dear members:

The small working group created at the Paris meeting has come to an agreement about the voting distribution in a new GNSO Council. It remains to the ICANN Board and staff to accept and implement this proposal. The Board is expected to follow the consensus of the group, however.

 

I am reasonably happy with the solution. The new structure is bicameral and involves two distinct voting “houses,” one for contracting parties (registries and registrars) and one for noncontracting parties (i.e., users, with an even number of votes for commercial and noncommercial stakeholders). There is an even number of votes for commercial and noncommercial stakeholders.

 

This new structure eliminates an old injustice in the GNSO’s structure. Back in 1999, ICANN created 3 business user constituencies with a total of 9 votes, all three of them essentially trademark/IPR advocacy groups, and only one noncommercial user constituency. As a result public interest/noncommercial voices were constantly marginalized and the IPR/trademark interests became a dominant force in domain name policy. Later, registries and registrars were given weighted voting, which balanced the trademark groups but gave industry suppliers too much control. The new structure is a huge victory for a more fair and balanced domain name policy making apparatus. It balances all stakeholder groups evenly and requires balanced support across both houses before any proposal can go through.

 

An unfortunate but important fact about the process of reaching this agreement is that we received very little support for balanced representation from our colleagues in ALAC. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the ALAC representative on the working group, a Nomcom appointee, was exclusively concerned with retaining Nomcom appointed seats on the Council and showed little or no concern about the broader political balance on the Council. I will communicate more on that topic later, but this will make our joint discussions with ALAC in the upcoming Egypt meeting interesting. Once again, I’m afraid, we see ALAC bogged down in its own internal politics and somewhat disconnected from the larger issues. I am sure this is something we can rectify as we engage in more discussions and education of ALAC members.

 

A general description of the new structure follows:

 

General Principles of Agreement:

 

A. No single stakeholder group should have a veto for any policy vote.
B. Council recommendation of binding policy should have at least one vote of support from at least 3 of the 4 stakeholder groups.
C. Each House will determine its own composition.
D. Equal number of votes between registries and registrars.
E. Equal number of votes between commercial and non-commercial users.

 

New Structure:

  1. One GNSO Council with two voting “houses” – referred to as bicameral voting – GNSO Council will meet as one, but houses may caucus on their own as they see fit.   All voting of the Council will be counted at a house level.
  2. Composition – The GNSO Council would be comprised of two voting houses

a.    A Contracted Party House – an equal number of registry and registrar representatives and 1 Nominating Committee appointee.  The number of registry and registrar stakeholder representatives will be determined by the ICANN Board based on input from these stakeholder groups, but shall be no fewer than 3 and not exceed 4 representatives for each group.

 

b.    A Non-Contracted Party/User House – an equal number of commercial and non-commercial user representatives and 1 Nominating Committee appointee.  The number of commercial and non-commercial stakeholder representatives will be determined by the ICANN Board based on input from these stakeholder groups, but shall be no fewer than 5 and not exceed 9 representatives for each group. 

 

GNSO Council Chair. No consensus was reached on this point.  NCUC supported having the chair be a neutral party with voting status appointed by Nomcom. The business constituencies blocked consensus on this and prefer to elect the Council chair by obtaining a 60% majority of either house.

 

Voting thresholds (incomplete list):

 

    1. Create an Issues Report (currently 25% of vote of Council)– either greater than 25% vote of both houses or simple majority of one house 
    2. Initiate a PDP within Scope of the GNSO per ICANN Bylaws and advice of ICANN GC (currently >33% of vote of Council) -- greater than 33% vote of both houses or greater than 66% vote of one house
    3. Approval of a PDP without Super-Majority (currently >50% of vote of Council) -- Simple majority of both houses, but requires that at least one representative of at least 3 of the 4 stakeholder groups supports
    4. Super-Majority Approval of a PDP (currently >66% of vote of Council) – Greater than 75% majority in one house and simple majority in the other