Hi, Robin I would like to join the call if possible. My preference would be for meeting on Friday, as I'll be traveling to MC on Saturday. But either way I can setup an Elluminate session, so those who can't be there can listen to the recording. Best, Brenden Kuerbis Internet Governance Project http://internetgovernance.org On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 2:08 PM, Robin Gross <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > Thanks, Milton. This sounds like a good approach and should address some > of those concerns from staff. > > How about a call on either this Fri., or Sat. to try to hammer this out > further? > > I'm less optimistic that it will pacify those who are fixated on > controlling counsel seats, but is an inclusive approach that will empower > minority voices within the constituency. > > Thanks, > Robin > > > > On Feb 23, 2009, at 6:33 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote: > > Robin > I will try to have a draft that incorporates the reasonable staff comments > and some new ideas (thresholds for working group formation) that came out of > our discussions with ALAC/NARALO people by the middle of this week. If we > could schedule a call sometime late evening EST this week I could squeeze it > into my schedule. > > Let me explain this new idea. Brenden Kuerbis actually came up with it, and > it solves many problems related to minority representation under an > integrated structure. It should appeal to "dissenters" within NCUC such as > Cheryl Preston. > > The idea is that when a certain threshold of the membership or the policy > committee wants to form a GNSO Working Group on a policy issue dear to them, > then ALL NCSG Council representatives must vote to support the formation of > that WG. > > Example: A constituency or faction within the NCUC wants to promote policy > X. The first step is to get the GNSO Council to create a WG on X. Once a WG > is formed, any supporters of X can join that WG and work on the issue, it > doesn't matter whether they have a Council seat or not. So we have a vote in > the SG or the Policy Committee on whether to form the WG and if a certain > low threshold is met - say, 20% - then ALL of the NCSG Councillors are > obliged to vote for the formation of that WG, whether they like the idea or > not. > > Of course, forming the WG does not mean that the supporters of X will get > exactly the policy they want. But NCSG cannot guarantee that in any event -- > all the other factions, constituencies and SGs will be involved in any WG. > It does, however, guarantee that minorities within the NCSG have a chance to > get their ideas past the Council and into the WG phase. > > Milton Mueller > Professor, Syracuse University School of Information Studies > XS4All Professor, Delft University of Technology > ------------------------------ > Internet Governance Project: > http://internetgovernance.org > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Robin Gross [mailto:[log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>] > *Sent:* Sunday, February 22, 2009 7:27 PM > *To:* Milton L Mueller; [log in to unmask] > *Subject:* Re: [NCUC-DISCUSS] FW: Follow-Up to NCSG Charter-Structure > Questions > > Thanks, Milton. > You are right that we have to continue to remind the ICANN staff and board > that the constituency model that the staff is proposing encourages > stake-holder groups to be in a perpetual power struggle within themselves > (and between constituencies) to hold on to counsel seats. The way staff is > trying to organize the GNSO it appears they are trying to disempower the > GNSO even further by requiring all energies to be consumed in un-ending > administrative tasks and political battles. Too bad. This "GNSO reform" > was a real opportunity for ICANN to reform some of its more nasty tendencies > (like staff dominating the board, the GNSO, etc.) > > We should revise our draft SG proposal for submission by 1 March (taking > into account the feedback we've received so more). > > Should we schedule a call this week to discuss the submission further? Any > suggestions? > > Thanks, > Robin > > > > On Feb 21, 2009, at 9:46 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote: > > Hello, all > You will remember that I sent questions to the staff questioning the > practicality of certain aspects of their favored model for a NCSG. The good > news is that they have taken the inquiry seriously and responded. The bad > news is that, as I feared, the only way to make their favored model work > requires enormous amounts of organizational overhead – an additional > bureaucratic overlay that creates not only complexity but the possibility of > top-down manipulation of constituency election results. Interestingly, the > more workable approaches start to look a lot like the integrated election > process we already proposed. Read for yourself. > ------------------------------ > *From:* Robert Hoggarth [mailto:[log in to unmask]<[log in to unmask]> > ] > > Milton: > > Thank you for your recent email (below) in which you posed a couple of > questions for the Staff concerning the new Stakeholder Group model. The > questions are challenging and we have done our best to provide what we think > are reasonable recommendations as to how they might be addressed. > > *Q1: How does a constituency-based model produced balanced geographic > representation in Council seats? > * > We envision geographic diversity as a representational responsibility of > each Stakeholder Group (SG) in fulfilling its role of allocating GNSO > Council seats to member Constituencies. We are currently working with the > General Counsel to draft Bylaw amendments consistent with that approach. > > Using your example, if the SG has six seats and three Constituencies, it > may choose to allocate seats evenly although it would not be required to do > so. In the simplest case, if there are two seats assigned to each > Constituency, the SG would alert its members that it needs to have all five > geographic regions represented with no more than two Councilors coming from > the same one. In order to accomplish that goal, the SG might ask certain > Constituencies to produce its candidates from a limited set of geographic > regions. > Another option might be to solicit a larger candidate pool, e.g. three from > each Constituency or nine total (voted from within), and choose those six > that best satisfy the SG's geographic diversity needs. In a situation where > the number of Council seats to be allocated is not evenly divisible, the SG > might decide to designate certain seats to specific geographic regions and > candidates from various Constituencies could campaign for those available > slots. > MM commentary: note the last line: "designating certain seats to specific > geographic regions" and allowing "candidates from various Constituencies > [to] campaign for those available slots" sounds suspiciously close to an > integrated, Stakeholder Group-wide election, which is what we proposed! In > other words, Council candidates would have to appeal for votes from across > the entire SG, not just inside their constituency > We believe that the SG, working collaboratively with its member > Constituencies, can continue to ensure that its GNSO Councilors reflect a > profile consistent with the organization's geographic diversity goals. > > *Q2: How does a constituency-based model apportion Council seats among > Constituencies when they are of different size? > * > While the decisions may be challenging, we think that one principal role of > the SG's leadership team[ 1] <see footnote below> is to establish the very > criteria (and methodology) that would allow such apportionment > determinations to be made. A SG could utilize factors other than size, for > example, geographic diversity and possibly others. To take a concrete > example, if there were six seats and four constituencies, the SG could end > up with a 2-2-1-1 or 3-1-1-1 configuration utilizing whatever > decision-making criteria it adopted (and had approved, via its Charter, by > the Board). You raise the possibility of gaming the system and, of course, > such behavior is theoretically possible in any proposed model including your > own. In that circumstance, the SG leadership should reexamine its > methodology and adjust, as necessary, to minimize any undesirable outcomes. > Once the seats are allocated, if a new constituency is subsequently > admitted to the SG by the Board, we recommend that, at its next annual > cycle, the SG reallocate seats taking into consideration five members vs. > four. The most likely Council member configuration, given the limited > combinations, would be 2-1-1-1. We do make the tacit assumption that any > Constituency approved by the Board would have satisfied ICANN's fundamental > stakeholder representational requirements and, thus, would be entitled to at > least one seat on the Council. > > In terms of oversight, we believe that the Board's role will be not only to > ensure that each of the SG Charters is structured in a fair, open, and > transparent manner; but, it will also likely monitor SG activities, > especially in the period immediately after initial implementation. > > We would be happy to continue discussing this matter with you and, of > course, we would welcome another set of questions if there are still > unresolved issues in your mind. > > Regards, > Denise Michel > > [1] <#_ftnref> *We would envision an Execeutive Committee comprised of one > delegate from each recognized Constituency. > * > MM comment: This proposal creates a potential nightmare. It requires a > group of delegates from each constituency to fight among themselves, with no > pre-set criteria, to decide who gets how many Council seats. Unacceptable, > and unnecessary. In our proposal, size differences among constituencies are > automatically reflected in voting totals for Council seats. There is no need > for top-down, negotiated allocations. Those negotiations create all the > rigidities that the Board Governance Committee was trying to get rid of, and > present all kinds of opportunities for abuse. Even when they are not abused, > they will consume enormous amounts of time. It is apparent that ICANN's > professional staff – which gets paid to do this work – still does not > appreciate the way in which imposing additional layers of bureaucracy and a > constant need to contend and negotiation for power inside a SG saps the > energy of noncommercial groups and prevents them from doing the real work of > policy development. I ask for your support to tell the staff that this is > not an acceptable option. > > ** > *MM's Original Email of 6 February, 2009: > * > Robert, Denise and Ken > > Thanks a lot for your valuable feedback on our draft Charter (v4.0). It is > clear that we are making progress, although there is a long way to go. > > In respect to some of your questions or requests for explanation, let me > turn the tables on you a bit. The presumption in many of these exchanges is > that there's something complicated or "different" about what we are > proposing, and that the "constituency-based SG model" is straightforward and > poses no problems. In many ways, however, an integrated SG structure is far > simpler, and we have no idea how a constituency model would work even if we > thought it desirable to implement it. > > Let me give you two examples. I will pose them in the form of questions > because it genuinely would like to have answers from you or any other > defender of the constituency-based SG model. > > *Q1: How does a constituency-based model produced balanced geographic > representation in Council seats? > * > Think about this. Let's say there are 3 independent constituencies in a SG, > and each of them elects 2 Council seats without reference to the other. So > Constituency A elects (in accord with its own geog. representation rules) a > person from North American and a person from Latin America; Constituency B > elects a person from North America and a person from Latin America; and > Constituency C elects a person from North America and another from Latin > America. End result: each constituency has, on its own, produced as much > geographic diversity as it possibly could, and yet the end result could be > that only two world regions are represented on the Council. > > I would be very interested to see how you propose to avoid this problem > while staying in the constituency model. > > An integrated SG model, by contrast, can impose proportions on the six > seats as a whole, thereby ensuring that most if not all regions are > represented. > > *Q2: How does a constituency-based model apportion Council seats among > Constituencies when they are of different size? > * > Let's suppose there is an "old constituency" that has 50 members, and a > "new" constituency that starts and gets recognized by the Board, and has > only 10 initial members (or even less). How many Council seats does each > constituency get? Do they inherently get the same number of seats simply by > virtue of the fact that they are constituencies? Or does their > representation on the Council reflect their relative size? If the latter, > who decides what allocation principle is used, when there is no > pre-established SG decision-making method? And once Council seats depend on > membership size, what is to stop one constituency from extending membership > in an overly easy way, regardless of appropriate criteria, to inflate its > relative size? Will the Board monitor this? > > These questions are not impossible to answer, but they obviously impose a > very complex layer of organization, monitoring and procedure that an > integrated SG model does not have to worry about. > Frankly, Bob and Denise, I could produce about a dozen more questions like > this. But let's see how you do with these two first. > > My point is to put this discussion of SG models on a more solid footing > with an equal burden of proof. If you can convince us that a > constituency-based model handles such basic and obvious issues as well as an > integrated model,we'd be more inclined to change our view. > --MM > ------------------------------ > [1] <#_ftnref> *We would envision an Execeutive Committee comprised of > one delegate from each recognized Constituency.* > > > > > > IP JUSTICE > Robin Gross, Executive Director > 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA 94117 USA > p: +1-415-553-6261 f: +1-415-462-6451 > w: http://www.ipjustice.org e: [log in to unmask] > > > > > > > > IP JUSTICE > Robin Gross, Executive Director > 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA 94117 USA > p: +1-415-553-6261 f: +1-415-462-6451 > w: http://www.ipjustice.org e: [log in to unmask] > > > >