Meeting Name: *NCUC: Follow-Up Meeting on NCSG Charter-Structure* Start Date and Time: *02/27/2009 04:30 PM EST* End Date and Time: *02/27/2009 06:30 PM EST* Attendee(s) may join this meeting up until this time. The meeting will remain in session until the last person leaves. Public Meeting: This is a *public meeting* and will be displayed on the public schedule page. Attendee(s) may join by using the following link: * http://cotelcocave.syr.edu:80/join_meeting.html?meetingId=1235657500435<http://cotelcocave.syr.edu/join_meeting.html?meetingId=1235657500435> * Attendee(s) may add this meeting to their scheduling application with the following link: *http://cotelcocave.syr.edu:80/build_calendar.event?meetingId=1235657500435<http://cotelcocave.syr.edu/build_calendar.event?meetingId=1235657500435> * Meeting Password: This is an open meeting. Attendee(s) don't require a password to join. On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 4:17 PM, Robin Gross <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > Great! How about 16:30 (EST) on Friday the 27th for the call? That is > 21:30 UTC on Friday the 27th. > > Does that time work for folks who want to join? > > Using Elluminate again would be terrific, thank you. > > All best, > Robin > > > > On Feb 23, 2009, at 12:13 PM, Brenden Kuerbis wrote: > > Hi, Robin > > I would like to join the call if possible. My preference would be for > meeting on Friday, as I'll be traveling to MC on Saturday. But either way I > can setup an Elluminate session, so those who can't be there can listen to > the recording. > > > Best, > > Brenden Kuerbis > Internet Governance Project > http://internetgovernance.org > > > On Mon, Feb 23, 2009 at 2:08 PM, Robin Gross <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > >> Thanks, Milton. This sounds like a good approach and should address >> some of those concerns from staff. >> >> How about a call on either this Fri., or Sat. to try to hammer this out >> further? >> >> I'm less optimistic that it will pacify those who are fixated on >> controlling counsel seats, but is an inclusive approach that will empower >> minority voices within the constituency. >> >> Thanks, >> Robin >> >> >> >> On Feb 23, 2009, at 6:33 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote: >> >> Robin >> I will try to have a draft that incorporates the reasonable staff comments >> and some new ideas (thresholds for working group formation) that came out of >> our discussions with ALAC/NARALO people by the middle of this week. If we >> could schedule a call sometime late evening EST this week I could squeeze it >> into my schedule. >> >> Let me explain this new idea. Brenden Kuerbis actually came up with it, >> and it solves many problems related to minority representation under an >> integrated structure. It should appeal to "dissenters" within NCUC such as >> Cheryl Preston. >> >> The idea is that when a certain threshold of the membership or the policy >> committee wants to form a GNSO Working Group on a policy issue dear to them, >> then ALL NCSG Council representatives must vote to support the formation of >> that WG. >> >> Example: A constituency or faction within the NCUC wants to promote policy >> X. The first step is to get the GNSO Council to create a WG on X. Once a WG >> is formed, any supporters of X can join that WG and work on the issue, it >> doesn't matter whether they have a Council seat or not. So we have a vote in >> the SG or the Policy Committee on whether to form the WG and if a certain >> low threshold is met - say, 20% - then ALL of the NCSG Councillors are >> obliged to vote for the formation of that WG, whether they like the idea or >> not. >> >> Of course, forming the WG does not mean that the supporters of X will get >> exactly the policy they want. But NCSG cannot guarantee that in any event -- >> all the other factions, constituencies and SGs will be involved in any WG. >> It does, however, guarantee that minorities within the NCSG have a chance to >> get their ideas past the Council and into the WG phase. >> >> Milton Mueller >> Professor, Syracuse University School of Information Studies >> XS4All Professor, Delft University of Technology >> ------------------------------ >> Internet Governance Project: >> http://internetgovernance.org >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Robin Gross [mailto:[log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>] >> *Sent:* Sunday, February 22, 2009 7:27 PM >> *To:* Milton L Mueller; [log in to unmask] >> *Subject:* Re: [NCUC-DISCUSS] FW: Follow-Up to NCSG Charter-Structure >> Questions >> >> Thanks, Milton. >> You are right that we have to continue to remind the ICANN staff and board >> that the constituency model that the staff is proposing encourages >> stake-holder groups to be in a perpetual power struggle within themselves >> (and between constituencies) to hold on to counsel seats. The way staff is >> trying to organize the GNSO it appears they are trying to disempower the >> GNSO even further by requiring all energies to be consumed in un-ending >> administrative tasks and political battles. Too bad. This "GNSO reform" >> was a real opportunity for ICANN to reform some of its more nasty tendencies >> (like staff dominating the board, the GNSO, etc.) >> >> We should revise our draft SG proposal for submission by 1 March (taking >> into account the feedback we've received so more). >> >> Should we schedule a call this week to discuss the submission further? >> Any suggestions? >> >> Thanks, >> Robin >> >> >> >> On Feb 21, 2009, at 9:46 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote: >> >> Hello, all >> You will remember that I sent questions to the staff questioning the >> practicality of certain aspects of their favored model for a NCSG. The good >> news is that they have taken the inquiry seriously and responded. The bad >> news is that, as I feared, the only way to make their favored model work >> requires enormous amounts of organizational overhead – an additional >> bureaucratic overlay that creates not only complexity but the possibility of >> top-down manipulation of constituency election results. Interestingly, the >> more workable approaches start to look a lot like the integrated election >> process we already proposed. Read for yourself. >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Robert Hoggarth [mailto:[log in to unmask]<[log in to unmask]> >> ] >> >> Milton: >> >> Thank you for your recent email (below) in which you posed a couple of >> questions for the Staff concerning the new Stakeholder Group model. The >> questions are challenging and we have done our best to provide what we think >> are reasonable recommendations as to how they might be addressed. >> >> *Q1: How does a constituency-based model produced balanced geographic >> representation in Council seats? >> * >> We envision geographic diversity as a representational responsibility of >> each Stakeholder Group (SG) in fulfilling its role of allocating GNSO >> Council seats to member Constituencies. We are currently working with the >> General Counsel to draft Bylaw amendments consistent with that approach. >> >> Using your example, if the SG has six seats and three Constituencies, it >> may choose to allocate seats evenly although it would not be required to do >> so. In the simplest case, if there are two seats assigned to each >> Constituency, the SG would alert its members that it needs to have all five >> geographic regions represented with no more than two Councilors coming from >> the same one. In order to accomplish that goal, the SG might ask certain >> Constituencies to produce its candidates from a limited set of geographic >> regions. >> Another option might be to solicit a larger candidate pool, e.g. three >> from each Constituency or nine total (voted from within), and choose those >> six that best satisfy the SG's geographic diversity needs. In a situation >> where the number of Council seats to be allocated is not evenly divisible, >> the SG might decide to designate certain seats to specific geographic >> regions and candidates from various Constituencies could campaign for those >> available slots. >> MM commentary: note the last line: "designating certain seats to specific >> geographic regions" and allowing "candidates from various Constituencies >> [to] campaign for those available slots" sounds suspiciously close to an >> integrated, Stakeholder Group-wide election, which is what we proposed! In >> other words, Council candidates would have to appeal for votes from across >> the entire SG, not just inside their constituency >> We believe that the SG, working collaboratively with its member >> Constituencies, can continue to ensure that its GNSO Councilors reflect a >> profile consistent with the organization's geographic diversity goals. >> >> *Q2: How does a constituency-based model apportion Council seats among >> Constituencies when they are of different size? >> * >> While the decisions may be challenging, we think that one principal role >> of the SG's leadership team[ 1] <see footnote below> is to establish the >> very criteria (and methodology) that would allow such apportionment >> determinations to be made. A SG could utilize factors other than size, for >> example, geographic diversity and possibly others. To take a concrete >> example, if there were six seats and four constituencies, the SG could end >> up with a 2-2-1-1 or 3-1-1-1 configuration utilizing whatever >> decision-making criteria it adopted (and had approved, via its Charter, by >> the Board). You raise the possibility of gaming the system and, of course, >> such behavior is theoretically possible in any proposed model including your >> own. In that circumstance, the SG leadership should reexamine its >> methodology and adjust, as necessary, to minimize any undesirable outcomes. >> Once the seats are allocated, if a new constituency is subsequently >> admitted to the SG by the Board, we recommend that, at its next annual >> cycle, the SG reallocate seats taking into consideration five members vs. >> four. The most likely Council member configuration, given the limited >> combinations, would be 2-1-1-1. We do make the tacit assumption that any >> Constituency approved by the Board would have satisfied ICANN's fundamental >> stakeholder representational requirements and, thus, would be entitled to at >> least one seat on the Council. >> >> In terms of oversight, we believe that the Board's role will be not only >> to ensure that each of the SG Charters is structured in a fair, open, and >> transparent manner; but, it will also likely monitor SG activities, >> especially in the period immediately after initial implementation. >> >> We would be happy to continue discussing this matter with you and, of >> course, we would welcome another set of questions if there are still >> unresolved issues in your mind. >> >> Regards, >> Denise Michel >> >> [1] <#_ftnref> *We would envision an Execeutive Committee comprised of >> one delegate from each recognized Constituency. >> * >> MM comment: This proposal creates a potential nightmare. It requires a >> group of delegates from each constituency to fight among themselves, with no >> pre-set criteria, to decide who gets how many Council seats. Unacceptable, >> and unnecessary. In our proposal, size differences among constituencies are >> automatically reflected in voting totals for Council seats. There is no need >> for top-down, negotiated allocations. Those negotiations create all the >> rigidities that the Board Governance Committee was trying to get rid of, and >> present all kinds of opportunities for abuse. Even when they are not abused, >> they will consume enormous amounts of time. It is apparent that ICANN's >> professional staff – which gets paid to do this work – still does not >> appreciate the way in which imposing additional layers of bureaucracy and a >> constant need to contend and negotiation for power inside a SG saps the >> energy of noncommercial groups and prevents them from doing the real work of >> policy development. I ask for your support to tell the staff that this is >> not an acceptable option. >> >> ** >> *MM's Original Email of 6 February, 2009: >> * >> Robert, Denise and Ken >> >> Thanks a lot for your valuable feedback on our draft Charter (v4.0). It is >> clear that we are making progress, although there is a long way to go. >> >> In respect to some of your questions or requests for explanation, let me >> turn the tables on you a bit. The presumption in many of these exchanges is >> that there's something complicated or "different" about what we are >> proposing, and that the "constituency-based SG model" is straightforward and >> poses no problems. In many ways, however, an integrated SG structure is far >> simpler, and we have no idea how a constituency model would work even if we >> thought it desirable to implement it. >> >> Let me give you two examples. I will pose them in the form of questions >> because it genuinely would like to have answers from you or any other >> defender of the constituency-based SG model. >> >> *Q1: How does a constituency-based model produced balanced geographic >> representation in Council seats? >> * >> Think about this. Let's say there are 3 independent constituencies in a >> SG, and each of them elects 2 Council seats without reference to the other. >> So Constituency A elects (in accord with its own geog. representation rules) >> a person from North American and a person from Latin America; Constituency B >> elects a person from North America and a person from Latin America; and >> Constituency C elects a person from North America and another from Latin >> America. End result: each constituency has, on its own, produced as much >> geographic diversity as it possibly could, and yet the end result could be >> that only two world regions are represented on the Council. >> >> I would be very interested to see how you propose to avoid this problem >> while staying in the constituency model. >> >> An integrated SG model, by contrast, can impose proportions on the six >> seats as a whole, thereby ensuring that most if not all regions are >> represented. >> >> *Q2: How does a constituency-based model apportion Council seats among >> Constituencies when they are of different size? >> * >> Let's suppose there is an "old constituency" that has 50 members, and a >> "new" constituency that starts and gets recognized by the Board, and has >> only 10 initial members (or even less). How many Council seats does each >> constituency get? Do they inherently get the same number of seats simply by >> virtue of the fact that they are constituencies? Or does their >> representation on the Council reflect their relative size? If the latter, >> who decides what allocation principle is used, when there is no >> pre-established SG decision-making method? And once Council seats depend on >> membership size, what is to stop one constituency from extending membership >> in an overly easy way, regardless of appropriate criteria, to inflate its >> relative size? Will the Board monitor this? >> >> These questions are not impossible to answer, but they obviously impose a >> very complex layer of organization, monitoring and procedure that an >> integrated SG model does not have to worry about. >> Frankly, Bob and Denise, I could produce about a dozen more questions like >> this. But let's see how you do with these two first. >> >> My point is to put this discussion of SG models on a more solid footing >> with an equal burden of proof. If you can convince us that a >> constituency-based model handles such basic and obvious issues as well as an >> integrated model,we'd be more inclined to change our view. >> --MM >> ------------------------------ >> [1] <#_ftnref> *We would envision an Execeutive Committee comprised of >> one delegate from each recognized Constituency.* >> >> >> >> >> >> IP JUSTICE >> Robin Gross, Executive Director >> 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA 94117 USA >> p: +1-415-553-6261 f: +1-415-462-6451 >> w: http://www.ipjustice.org e: [log in to unmask] >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> IP JUSTICE >> Robin Gross, Executive Director >> 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA 94117 USA >> p: +1-415-553-6261 f: +1-415-462-6451 >> w: http://www.ipjustice.org e: [log in to unmask] >> >> >> >> > > > > > IP JUSTICE > Robin Gross, Executive Director > 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA 94117 USA > p: +1-415-553-6261 f: +1-415-462-6451 > w: http://www.ipjustice.org e: [log in to unmask] > > > >