FYI: Begin forwarded message: > From: Thiru Balasubramaniam <[log in to unmask]> > Date: June 21, 2009 11:11:40 PM PDT > To: Vera Franz <[log in to unmask]>, Robin Gross > <[log in to unmask]>, James Love <[log in to unmask]>, Manon > Ress <[log in to unmask]>, Brad Biddle > <[log in to unmask]>, Nick Ashton-Hart <[log in to unmask]>, > Sachiko Muto <[log in to unmask]>, Malini Aisola > <[log in to unmask]>, Rishab Ghosh > <[log in to unmask]>, Daniel Dardailler <[log in to unmask]> > Subject: WSJ: Iran's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology > > * The Wall Street Journal > > * TECHNOLOGY > * JUNE 22, 2009 > > Iran's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology > > > > By CHRISTOPHER RHOADS in New York and LORETTA CHAO in Beijing > > The Iranian regime has developed, with the assistance of European > telecommunications companies, one of the world's most sophisticated > mechanisms for controlling and censoring the Internet, allowing it > to examine the content of individual online communications on a > massive scale. > > Interviews with technology experts in Iran and outside the country > say Iranian efforts at monitoring Internet information go well > beyond blocking access to Web sites or severing Internet connections. > > View Full Image > Iran's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology > AFP/Getty Images > > An undated screen grab from an Internet video shows a young woman > identified only as Neda, who has become an iconic image of the > violence during Iranian protests over the nation's disputed > presidential election. Because of reporting restrictions in Tehran, > the incident could not be independently verified. > Iran's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology > Iran's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology > > Instead, in confronting the political turmoil that has consumed the > country this past week, the Iranian government appears to be > engaging in a practice often called deep packet inspection, which > enables authorities to not only block communication but to monitor > it to gather information about individuals, as well as alter it for > disinformation purposes, according to these experts. > > The monitoring capability was provided, at least in part, by a > joint venture of Siemens AG, the German conglomerate, and Nokia > Corp., the Finnish cellphone company, in the second half of 2008, > Ben Roome, a spokesman for the joint venture, confirmed. > > The "monitoring center," installed within the government's telecom > monopoly, was part of a larger contract with Iran that included > mobile-phone networking technology, Mr. Roome said. > > "If you sell networks, you also, intrinsically, sell the capability > to intercept any communication that runs over them," said Mr. Roome. > > The sale of the equipment to Iran by the joint venture, called > Nokia Siemens Networks, was previously reported last year by the > editor of an Austrian information-technology Web site called > Futurezone. > > The Iranian government had experimented with the equipment for > brief periods in recent months, but it had not been used > extensively, and therefore its capabilities weren't fully displayed > -- until during the recent unrest, the Internet experts interviewed > said. > > "We didn't know they could do this much," said a network engineer > in Tehran. "Now we know they have powerful things that allow them > to do very complex tracking on the network." > [Iran's Web Spying Aided By Western Technology] > > Deep packet inspection involves inserting equipment into a flow of > online data, from emails and Internet phone calls to images and > messages on social-networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter. > Every digitized packet of online data is deconstructed, examined > for keywords and reconstructed within milliseconds. In Iran's case, > this is done for the entire country at a single choke point, > according to networking engineers familiar with the country's > system. It couldn't be determined whether the equipment from Nokia > Siemens Networks is used specifically for deep packet inspection. > > All eyes have been on the Internet amid the crisis in Iran, and > government attempts to crack down on information. The infiltration > of Iranian online traffic could explain why the government has > allowed the Internet to continue to function -- and also why it has > been running at such slow speeds in the days since the results of > the presidential vote spurred unrest. > > Users in the country report the Internet having slowed to less than > a tenth of normal speeds. Deep packet inspection delays the > transmission of online data unless it is offset by a huge increase > in processing power, according to Internet experts. > > Iran is "now drilling into what the population is trying to say," > said Bradley Anstis, director of technical strategy with Marshal8e6 > Inc., an Internet security company in Orange, Calif. He and other > experts interviewed have examined Internet traffic flows in and out > of Iran that show characteristics of content inspection, among > other measures. "This looks like a step beyond what any other > country is doing, including China." > > China's vaunted "Great Firewall," which is widely considered the > most advanced and extensive Internet censoring in the world, is > believed also to involve deep packet inspection. But China appears > to be developing this capability in a more decentralized manner, at > the level of its Internet service providers rather than through a > single hub, according to experts. That suggests its implementation > might not be as uniform as that in Iran, they said, as the > arrangement depends on the cooperation of all the service providers. > Related Video > > > Iran's government is a combination of democracy and Islamic > theocracy. Take a look at the power structure. > > View Interactive > > The difference, at least in part, has to do with scale: China has > about 300 million Internet users, the most of any country. Iran, > which has an estimated 23 million users, can track all online > communication through a single location called the > Telecommunication Infrastructure Co., part of the government's > telecom monopoly. All of the country's international links run > through the company. > > Separately, officials from the U.S. embassy in Beijing on Friday > met with Chinese officials to express concerns about a new > requirement that all PCs sold in the China starting July 1 be > installed with Web-filtering software. > > If a government wants to control the flow of information across its > borders it's no longer enough to block access to Web sites hosted > elsewhere. Now, as sharing online images and messages through > social-networking sites has become easy and popular, repressive > regimes are turning to technologies that allow them to scan such > content from their own citizens, message by message. > > Human-rights groups have criticized the selling of such equipment > to Iran and other regimes considered repressive, because it can be > used to crack down on dissent, as evidenced in the Iran crisis. > Asked about selling such equipment to a government like Iran's, Mr. > Roome of Nokia Siemens Networks said the company "does have a > choice about whether to do business in any country. We believe > providing people, wherever they are, with the ability to > communicate is preferable to leaving them without the choice to be > heard." > > Countries with repressive governments aren't the only ones > interested in such technology. Britain has a list of blocked sites, > and the German government is considering similar measures. In the > U.S., the National Security Agency has such capability, which was > employed as part of the Bush administration's "Terrorist > Surveillance Program." A White House official wouldn't comment on > if or how this is being used under the Obama administration. > > The Australian government is experimenting with Web-site filtering > to protect its youth from online pornography, an undertaking that > has triggered criticism that it amounts to government-backed > censorship. > > Content inspection and filtering technology are already common > among corporations, schools and other institutions, as part of > efforts to block spam and viruses, as well as to ensure that > employees and students comply with computer-use guidelines. > Families use filtering on their home computers to protect their > children from undesirable sites, such as pornography and gambling. > > Internet censoring in Iran was developed with the initial > justification of blocking online pornography, among other material > considered offensive by the regime, according to those who have > studied the country's censoring. > > Iran has been grappling with controlling the Internet since its use > moved beyond universities and government agencies in the late > 1990s. At times, the government has tried to limit the country's > vibrant blogosphere -- for instance, requiring bloggers to obtain > licenses from the government, a directive that has proved difficult > to enforce, according to the OpenNet Initiative, a partnership of > universities that study Internet filtering and surveillance. (The > partners are Harvard University, the University of Toronto, the > University of Cambridge and the University of Oxford.) > > Beginning in 2001, the government required Internet service > providers to install filtering systems, and also that all > international connections link to a single gateway controlled by > the country's telecom monopoly, according to an OpenNet study. > > Iran has since blocked Internet users in the country from more than > five million sites in recent years, according to estimates from the > press-freedom group Reporters Without Borders. > > View Slideshow > [SB124561206327535087] > > In the 2005 presidential election, the government shut down the > Internet for hours, blaming it on a cyberattack from abroad, a > claim that proved false, according to several Tehran engineers. > > Several years ago, research by OpenNet discovered the government > using filtering equipment from a U.S. company, Secure Computing > Corp. Due to the U.S. trade embargo on Iran, in place since the > 1979 Islamic revolution overthrew the U.S.-backed shah, that was > illegal. Secure Computing, now owned by McAfee Inc., at the time > denied any knowledge of the use of its products in Iran. McAfee > said due diligence before the acquisition revealed no contract or > support being provided in Iran. > > Building online-content inspection on a national scale and > coordinated at a single location requires hefty resources, > including manpower, processing power and technical expertise, > Internet experts said. > > Nokia Siemens Networks provided equipment to Iran last year under > the internationally recognized concept of "lawful intercept," said > Mr. Roome. That relates to intercepting data for the purposes of > combating terrorism, child pornography, drug trafficking and other > criminal activities carried out online, a capability that most if > not all telecom companies have, he said. > > The monitoring center that Nokia Siemens Networks sold to Iran was > described in a company brochure as allowing "the monitoring and > interception of all types of voice and data communication on all > networks." The joint venture exited the business that included the > monitoring equipment, what it called "intelligence solutions," at > the end of March, by selling it to Perusa Partners Fund 1 LP, a > Munich-based investment firm, Mr. Roome said. He said the company > determined it was no longer part of its core business. > —Ben Worthen in San Francisco, Mike Esterl in Atlanta and Siobhan > Gorman in Washington contributed to this article. > > Write to Christopher Rhoads at [log in to unmask] and > Loretta Chao at [log in to unmask] > > ------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Thiru Balasubramaniam > Geneva Representative > Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) > [log in to unmask] > > > Tel: +41 22 791 6727 > Mobile: +41 76 508 0997 > > > > IP JUSTICE Robin Gross, Executive Director 1192 Haight Street, San Francisco, CA 94117 USA p: +1-415-553-6261 f: +1-415-462-6451 w: http://www.ipjustice.org e: [log in to unmask]