For example, some bold and stupid move by NTIA could reopen the question of IANA's ultimate authority. http://domainincite.com/ntia-says-icann-does-not-meet-the-requirements-for-iana-renewal/ I believe it lies with the people, the global people, that is. Nicolas On 3/10/2012 12:14 PM, Nicolas Adam wrote: > Authority lies where people say it does. Historically, IANA could have > befell elsewhere (gTLD-MOU, BWG, not to mention competing root > alliances) and as a matter of present-day political reality, I would > argue that NTIA authority on the root, which is variously asserted, is > weak. If enough people agree that it lies elsewhere, it does. Such is > the politics of "authority". It's never an immovable reified object, > but always an intersubjectively recasted thing that needs both > assertions and recognition. The interface between assertion and > recognition, is an elastic political space which we call legitimacy. > > Nicolas > > On 3/10/2012 11:58 AM, Carlos A. Afonso wrote: >> Hmmm... "authority assertion" of the root lies with NTIA... Icann >> continues to be just a contractor, whatever the nice "affirmations of >> commitments" say. So in the last instance, domains within TLDs >> operated by US-based companies (as registries) can be seized, and >> there may be nothing that registrars can do. Disastrous, but true. >> >> --c.a. >> >> On 03/10/2012 02:06 AM, Nicolas Adam wrote: >>> Disregarding the thorny issue that it must be done sometimes for botnet >>> and such, and just concentrating on the >>> political/jurisdictional/authority/flow-down-contract issue: >>> >>> IANA/Icann can *assert* *its* authority on the root file and say to VS >>> something like: don't disrupt DNS connectivity in other parts of the >>> world via changes in the root. You may safely respond to local querries >>> within your technical capability, but this is off limit. >>> >>> I'm not arguing now that this would necessarily be sound policy (it >>> would clearly be regarding IPR, less clearly with spambots), but it's >>> got everything to do with authority assertion (or lack thereof) on the >>> root. >>> >>> I will be happy to learn be being contradicted in 7 different ways. >>> >>> Nicolas >>> >>> On 3/9/2012 9:50 PM, Milton L Mueller wrote: >>>> I am no fan of the domain name seizures but there is an unfortunate >>>> level of confusion about what is really at issue here. >>>> The domain seizures imposed on VeriSign actually have nothing to do >>>> with the fact that the US controls the authoritative root zone file. >>>> Rather, they are allowed by the fact that the domains are registered >>>> under .com, and the .com registry falls under US jurisdiction. We >>>> could delegate root zone authority to the ITU, the United Nations, the >>>> IGF, Russia, China or the IGP and it wouldn't make one bit of >>>> difference to the ability of the FBI, ICE, or any other US authority >>>> to order Verisign to disable a second level domain registered under >>>> .com. Only Verisign, the operator of the .com registry, can without >>>> the consent of the registrant redirect a dns query from the nameserver >>>> for foo.com to ice.gov. >>>> >>>> IANA cannot do this. ICANN cannot do this. >>>> >>>> Just so you know. >>>> >>>> --MM >>>> >>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>> From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On >>>>> Behalf Of >>>>> Adam Peake >>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2012 2:01 AM >>>>> To: [log in to unmask] >>>>> Subject: Re: [NCSG-Discuss] Fwd: [governance] Verisign seizes .com >>>>> domain registered via foreign Registrar on behalf of US Authorities >>>>> >>>>> Anyone know how many of the take-downs have used Verisign? >>>>> >>>>> And wonder how many of the new TLD applicants have selected US-based >>>>> technical providers. >>>>> >>>>> During WSIS civil society frequently commented on US' unilateral >>>>> control >>>>> of the root as unacceptable. Many submissions made, can only find >>>>> this >>>>> now... from 2005: >>>>> >>>>> "We would like to underscore that unilateral control of the root zone >>>>> file is a public policy issue. We agree with WGIG that in future no >>>>> single government should have a pre-eminent role in global >>>>> governance of >>>>> the logical infrastructure of the Internet." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps time to make it a public policy issue again? With the AoC and >>>>> other improvements the US has been pretty good since WSIS. These name >>>>> seizures are a nasty step back. >>>>> >>>>> Adam >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 10:58 AM, Nicolas >>>>> Adam<[log in to unmask]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> There is also this article [tech dirt] that is very interesting, >>>>>> that >>>>>> goes along the one that you referenced below [blog easyDNS] (and >>>>>> that >>>>>> is well worth highlighting a second time for this crowd). >>>>>> >>>>>> This goes straight to the heart of ICANN's legitimacy. It goes to >>>>>> who >>>>>> they cater to, who they don't oppose, to the limit of its autonomy, >>>>>> what perception of itself it conveys through its actions and >>>>> inactions, etc. >>>>>> I don't pretend to have a ready diplomatic/political fix that ICANN >>>>>> can just roll-out as a guide going forward. But it seems to me that >>>>>> its political choices, prudent and wise as they may seem to the ones >>>>>> in charge (or the ones preparing Dan's one-pagers), are >>>>>> unfortunately >>>>>> the hallmark of a lack of identity and the signs of a sure downfall. >>>>>> >>>>>> No new type of political body like ICANN can survive without making >>>>> its bed. >>>>>> Somehow, somewhere. How it manages itself now, marvelously >>>>>> noncommittally, only serves at alienating stakeholders that could >>>>>> otherwise turn out to support it. And it never gets anything to show >>>>>> for it from the ones that it punctually accommodate. >>>>>> >>>>>> I see this as a very important Board-level long term issue, that >>>>>> needs >>>>>> strong leadership and attention. The users (writ large) will not >>>>>> tolerate ICANN if it cannot provide consistency and predictability, >>>>>> that is, an identity. >>>>>> >>>>>> Nicolas >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 3/1/2012 8:17 AM, Adam Peake wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Is this new, or just more of what ICE has been doing before. I don't >>>>>> remember if Verisign's been used in this way before. Clip from the >>>>>> blog post (link below) >>>>>> >>>>>> "We all know that with some US-based Registrars (*cough* Godaddy >>>>>> *cough*), all it takes is a badge out of a box of crackerjacks >>>>>> and you >>>>>> have the authority to fax in a takedown request which has a good >>>>>> shot >>>>>> at being honoured. We also know that some non-US registrars, it >>>>>> takes >>>>>> a lot more "due process-iness" to get a domain taken down. >>>>>> >>>>>> But now, none of that matters, because in this case the State of >>>>>> Maryland simply issued a warrant to .com operator Verisign, (who is >>>>>> headquartered in California) who then duly updated the rootzone for >>>>>> .com with two new NS records for bodog.com which now redirect the >>>>>> domain to the takedown page." >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Adam >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>>>> From: michael gurstein<[log in to unmask]> >>>>>> Date: Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 9:47 PM >>>>>> Subject: [governance] Verisign seizes .com domain registered via >>>>>> foreign Registrar on behalf of US Authorities >>>>>> To: [log in to unmask] >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://blog2.easydns.org/2012/02/29/verisign-seizes-com-domain-registe >>>>>> >>>>>> red-vi a-foreign-registrar-on-behalf-of-us-authorities/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ____________________________________________________________ >>>>>> You received this message as a subscriber on the list: >>>>>> [log in to unmask] >>>>>> To be removed from the list, visit: >>>>>> http://www.igcaucus.org/unsubscribing >>>>>> >>>>>> For all other list information and functions, see: >>>>>> http://lists.igcaucus.org/info/governance >>>>>> To edit your profile and to find the IGC's charter, see: >>>>>> http://www.igcaucus.org/ >>>>>> >>>>>> Translate this email: http://translate.google.com/translate_t >>>