As Milton said, these are not actions taken in the rootzone, but in .com On Sat, Mar 10, 2012 at 6:39 AM, Nicolas Adam <[log in to unmask]> wrote: <snip> > Nicolas > > take a look at from ICANN's blog post "thought paper", see page 9, section > on "chang[ing] authority for DNS. I know that dns zone files have to be > globally accessible, so the justification for ICANN's authority assertion is > straightforward: stability of the root. I do not think we can wiggle our way > out by allowing zone file action that have effects constrained only in some > jurisdiction, unless i'm mistaken. or is the .com zone file the one you mean? > > > > > On 3/10/2012 12:15 AM, Nicolas Adam wrote: >> >> Come to think of it, I guess that the gTLD expansion plan can be >> considered somewhat of an ICANN answer to this ... >> >> Nicolas >> >> On 3/10/2012 12:06 AM, Nicolas Adam wrote: >>> >>> Disregarding the thorny issue that it must be done sometimes for botnet >>> and such, and just concentrating on the >>> political/jurisdictional/authority/flow-down-contract issue: >>> >>> IANA/Icann can *assert* *its* authority on the root file and say to VS >>> something like: don't disrupt DNS connectivity in other parts of the world >>> via changes in the root. You may safely respond to local querries within >>> your technical capability, but this is off limit. >>> >>> I'm not arguing now that this would necessarily be sound policy (it would >>> clearly be regarding IPR, less clearly with spambots), but it's got >>> everything to do with authority assertion (or lack thereof) on the root. >>> >>> I will be happy to learn be being contradicted in 7 different ways. >>> >>> Nicolas >>> >>> On 3/9/2012 9:50 PM, Milton L Mueller wrote: >>>> >>>> I am no fan of the domain name seizures but there is an unfortunate >>>> level of confusion about what is really at issue here. >>>> The domain seizures imposed on VeriSign actually have nothing to do with >>>> the fact that the US controls the authoritative root zone file. Rather, they >>>> are allowed by the fact that the domains are registered under .com, and the >>>> .com registry falls under US jurisdiction. We could delegate root zone >>>> authority to the ITU, the United Nations, the IGF, Russia, China or the IGP >>>> and it wouldn't make one bit of difference to the ability of the FBI, ICE, >>>> or any other US authority to order Verisign to disable a second level domain >>>> registered under .com. Only Verisign, the operator of the .com registry, can >>>> without the consent of the registrant redirect a dns query from the >>>> nameserver for foo.com to ice.gov. >>>> >>>> IANA cannot do this. ICANN cannot do this. >>>> -- Cheers, McTim "A name indicates what we seek. An address indicates where it is. A route indicates how we get there." Jon Postel