Thanks all - interesting perspectives, cheers. Another naïve question: would the fact that some governments may have applied for new gTLDs in the new round have implications for their future relationship with the GNSO? Joy -----Original Message----- From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Milton L Mueller Sent: Monday, 14 May 2012 6:21 a.m. To: [log in to unmask] Subject: Re: FW: [council] Prague - please read! > -----Original Message----- > > We've talked about this with the GAC before, and it mostly ended up > with them telling us about all the reasons why they can't really > engage much in joint working relationships with GNSO and prefer to > deal with the board. Yes, Bill is right. I am wondering how long it is going to take everyone involved to understand what I have been saying for years now: the GAC is a major structural flaw in ICANN's governance model. When the GAC says that they can't engage in joint working relationships with the GNSO, what they are really doing is creating a parallel, competing policy development entity that contends with GNSO in the offering of policy advice to the board. This is probably not deliberately destructive on the part of its members; it stems from their belief that it is inappropriate for governmental representatives to work in the bottom up, WG method used by the GNSO. It is also a reflection of their inability to work bottom up, as GAC members usually lack expertise on the issues and do not have the freedom to commit themselves to any compromises or positions without passing it up and down bureaucratic hierarchies. Whatever the motives, these contending policy advisors shatter the legitimacy and accountability of both GAC and GNSO, and undermine board accountability as well. There really is no defined policy making process, where balanced representation and "consensus" holds sway. There is, rather, a bunch of different entities tugging and pulling on the board's sleeves, trying to get its attention and sway their decision.