Michael, As far as the second level goes there is the UDRP, and for new gTLDs there will be the URS. Fraud is, per se, illegal.We have seen the FBI/DHS/ICE become very active in seizing domains. What further protection are you asking for? A blanket ban on any registration including the string YMCA? Please explain. joly On Mon, Jul 23, 2012 at 5:33 PM, Michael Carson <[log in to unmask]>wrote: > Dan, > > I agree with you with regard to the content of the site being an important > component to determine fraud. However, there are fraudulent domain names > and they are troubling to brand owners such as the YMCA. Considering the > nature of our service to millions of individuals, it is very important to > us to stop third parties from using YMCA in it's domain name. For profit > entities and individuals/organizations engaged in nefarious activities > (domains I will not mention) have been guilty of and continue to do so not > only to misrepresent themselves to the public, but also to the many YMCA > organizations around the world. > > The answer should not be an "do nothing" approach, but possibly something > that protects everyone's (including nonprofit corporations) rights. > > Best, > > Michael Carson > > YMCA of the USA > > ------------------------------ > *From: *"Dan Krimm" <[log in to unmask]> > *To: *[log in to unmask] > *Sent: *Monday, July 23, 2012 3:17:17 PM > *Subject: *Re: Opinions? Fwd: [] List of possible approaches for Red > Cross/IOC names in new gTLDS > > > Is the following really a fair statement? > > > ICANN's denial of responsibility for cleaning up a problem that its > policy > > enabled (ie, creation of fraudulent domains) > > If a web site is engaged in fraudulent activity, the fraud inheres mainly > in that content and activity, not in the domain string itself. > > A domain such as "redcrosshaitirelief.com" (suggested as an example below) > could easily be used as a third party commentary site, or some other > information supplementation site -- a perfectly good-faith use of such a > domain that ought to cause no problems at all, in and of itself. So any > judgment of fraud still depends on the web site content itself, not the > domain string in isolation. > > Does the site represent itself to be operated by the RC? Not all sites > using such a domain would necessarily do so. And if a site did do so, > using some *other* domain, it would still constitute the same fraud. The > domain string in and of itself is simply not determinative in this regard. > > So can we now agree that there is no such thing as a "fraudulent domain > name" per se? > > Dan > > > -- > Any opinions expressed in this message are those of the author alone and > do not necessarily reflect any position of the author's employer. > > > > On Mon, July 23, 2012 11:52 am, Evan Leibovitch wrote: > > On 23 July 2012 13:54, David Cake <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > > > >> As far as the issue of charitable names being exploited for > >> fraudulent purposes, as discussed by Evan and Milton - it seems to me, > >> from > >> discussions with the charities, that the *real* solution that the > >> charities > >> need (and not just the ICRC, with its unique legal protections, but ANY > >> charity) is basically a takedown solution like those provided by the > >> APWG > >> etc. Fraud is fraud, we need good solutions to stop fraud - but not only > >> will special rules for the ICRC not have a large effect on fraud > >> targeted > >> against charities in general, it won't even eliminate fraud against the > >> ICRC - much fraud against the ICRC appears to use domain names that > >> don't > >> include the specific protected designations redcross etc, but just > >> variations such as just somethingrc.org. If the specific redcross term > >> and other protected designations were protected at the second level, > >> we'd > >> see fraudsters simply switch to less preferred names, such as variations > >> on > >> namerc type 2LD names, and 3LDs and such. > > > > > > Agreed 100%. > > > > The kind of issue people in ALAC were responding to were the short-term > > scam sites such as "redcrosshaitirelief.com", ones that specifically > used > > the charity's name (specifically its conventional Internet 2LD names) > > inside bogus 2LD strings. As I mentioned in the earlier email, there's > > also > > agreement that nothing is special about the Red Cross in this regard, I > > would consider "unicefhaitifelief.org" or "oxfamhaitirelief.net" to be > > just > > as bad. > > > > As such, I would remind that ALAC has never been in favour of any Red > > Cross > > or IOC or IGO restrictions on TLDs -- ever. Some of you may recall that I > > was in the room near the end of the g-council debate on the issue in San > > Jose, ready if necessary to detail ALAC's just-passed statement > supporting > > the NCSG position. There is similarly no belief in special treatment for > > IGOs, *especially* considering that most of them possess the rare > > qualifications for the exclusive .int TLD already. So our position on > > gTLDs > > is still one of no change to existing policy. > > > > Furthermore... I never, in my original comment, suggested that prior > > restriction -- at any level -- was our direction, only that a legitimate > > larger issue, buried within the RC/IOC/IGO mess, did bare consideration. > > We > > don't claim the answer yet, just ask the question (that indeed does not > > yet > > appear to have been asked -- in all these years -- from the PoV of the > end > > user rather than the registrants.) There are many possible approaches, > not > > all of which have had a proper hearing to date. We're totally aware of > the > > limitations of ICANN and domain names, and that removing obviously > > fraudulent strings won't eliminate phishing or fraud. But it is also > wrong > > to refuse to do anything because no solution can be complete. And denying > > of scammers the ability to use (clearly) fraudulent domain names impairs > > their ability to do SEO to increase traffic to their sites. > > > > ICANN's denial of responsibility for cleaning up a problem that its > policy > > enabled (ie, creation of fraudulent domains) simply offers useful > > ammunition to those who would dispense with the multi-stakeholder model > > completely, through demonstrating that one significant stakeholder -- the > > end user being scammed -- is going unheard by the MSM. > > > > > > > >> Their is a fundamental difference between the ICRC arguments based on > >> its > >> special legal status, and arguments based on the ICRCs mission and > >> specific > >> operation concerns. The arguments based on the ICRCs special legal > >> status > >> are one thing. But the arguments based on the humanitarian mission and > >> operational concerns of the iCRC could just as easily apply to > >> organisations such as the MSF or UNHCR. I wish a lot more of the effort > >> that has gone into the ICRCs arguments had gone into practical fraud > >> takedown measures that would be applicable to all charitable > >> organisations. > >> > > > > > > Agreed. IMO, ALAC is seeking to drive this forward in a useful manner, by > > steering and focusing (rather than outright rejecting) the claims in a > > manner that benefits the public interest. > > It would be nice if we could do this together with the NCSG, which is why > > I'm writing this. > > > > - Evan > > > -- --------------------------------------------------------------- Joly MacFie 218 565 9365 Skype:punkcast WWWhatsup NYC - http://wwwhatsup.com http://pinstand.com - http://punkcast.com VP (Admin) - ISOC-NY - http://isoc-ny.org -------------------------------------------------------------- -