On Wed, March 27, 2013 11:48 am, Alain Berranger wrote:
> Dan,
>
> Thank you for that moment of opportunity!
>
> The sharp line in the sand distinction in an organization between policy
> and implementation is arbitrary if you have an independant judiciary
> function or an oversight/regulatory body above the organization.This
> distinction has been "invented" at ICANN to protect GNSO's territory -
> policy - and leaving implementation to "staff"... It is a mine field, from
> what I have seen since I joined ICANN in San José and the discussion
> between policy and implementation is flawed by design.... but makes for
> passionate discussions...and will for a long time to be.
>
> I do not know who the ICANN ombudsman reports to (I have not done the
> research) but his office does not seem to have the authority or the
> resources to dictate to ICANN what to do. It should report to the Board in
> any case and maybe it does? But where is the bigger ICANN oversight? How
> do
> you move from the current situation, as described by Dan, to a truly
> international organization (some of the very first words of our CEO last
> summer)?
>
> Normally, a corporation or an NGO or a government dept has a policy dept
> which makes evidence-based policy recommendations. These go to the Board
> for decision, weighting in all the factors, internal and external, that
> impact on the mission.
>
> We need to think outside the ICANN box on this one!
>
> Alain
>
> On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 2:13 PM, Dan Krimm <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
>> Alain,
>>
>> Thanks for the discussion.
>>
>> First, I think we should file all Ombudsman complaints (and definitely
>> recruit allies), though I don't expect it would necessarily be a silver
>> bullet solution -- holding it to that standard would make it appear
>> ineffective. But it builds a track record, a case that we are trying
>> everything pro forma, jumping through the hoops as expected, playing the
>> procedural game, the bureaucracy, as specified. We climb the ladder one
>> step at a time, appealing to ever greater authorities like in the court
>> system. This is the step of establishing facts, formal basis of
>> objection, etc.
>>
>> Next, the difference between what you call closely vested interests and
>> principled interests exhibits one well-known characteristic: the
>> "collective-action problem". Vested interests tend to be narrow
>> interests, whereas principled interests tend to be broad interests.
>> Narrow interests that are well-endowed are always at a relative
>> advantage
>> compared to broadly distributed interests, because while there may be
>> enough resources distributed broadly to counteract the concentrated
>> resources of narrow interests, there is a much higher cost to
>> motivating,
>> coordinating and marshaling distributed resources. The cliche that
>> comes
>> to mind is "herding cats". Especially, since all participation in MS
>> processes at ICANN is on a volunteer basis, narrow interests can much
>> more
>> easily allocate paid resources to this volunteer activity, whereas
>> distributed interests have a much harder time making this allocation.
>>
>> This dynamic has been present at ICANN as long as I've been involved,
>> which goes back to 2006. I suspect it has been this way from the start
>> --
>> it's a structural dynamic that relates to the whole SO organizational
>> model.
>>
>> Soto your question, how does a MS organization balance this inherent
>> imbalance in the ability to participate effectively? The big-picture
>> answer is that the little guys at the bottom of the pyramid need to be
>> given ways to neutralize the resource advantage. Not to be given any
>> special advantage above narrow interests, but to play on a level playing
>> field.
>>
>> One obvious tactic is to create formal operational structures that
>> enable
>> bottom-up participation without doing anything to disadvantage those
>> with
>> the resources to participate in other ways. There has been some effort
>> to
>> do so at ICANN, but this is constantly being undermined by the narrow
>> interests -- if policy is a "war" then opponents will seek to win the
>> war
>> any way they can, and that can involve tweaking the rules of the game to
>> one's advantage, if they are being systematically set up to reduce one's
>> advantage.
>>
>> So, if there is a structure to provide equitable participation, finding
>> an
>> ad hoc alternative path to avoid that equity is again to one's
>> advantage,
>> to the extent that equity is a reduction in influence.
>>
>> Separation of power in a governance structure is imperative if equity is
>> to be maintained. One big problem with ICANN is that there is little
>> evidence of the equivalent of an "independent judiciary" in the org
>> structure. If there is no distinction between the executive and
>> judicial
>> functions, then the executive hierarchy is unchecked.
>>
>> In short, ICANN used a conventional non-profit organizational structure
>> with weak oversight from the USG (DoC/NTIA) to create a "bottle" in
>> which
>> the MSM was intended to operate. A sort of "virtual world" of
>> governance.
>>
>> But within that virtual world of governance, the staff has embedded
>> itself
>> in policy-making, rather than just being part of the bottle, which was
>> presumably what it was intended to do. AIUI, staff was supposed to
>> provide infrastructure, not to get involved in the content of MS
>> activity.
>>
>> This Chinese Wall has been breached. So one prerequisite is that staff
>> needs to be confined to acting as only the bottle, once again. In order
>> for that to happen, there needs to be some independent oversight of
>> staff
>> to prevent policy-relevant activity.
>>
>> Several folks have mentioned the policy/implementation split. This is
>> part of that problem: implementation can be considered part of the
>> bottle,
>> but policy must be seen as only "contents" of the bottle. Fudging this
>> split is a major way to break through the Chinese Wall. So I think this
>> point should be pressed firmly, front and center, not as some sort of
>> tangential point.
>>
>> Another conceptual problem is that ICANN in practice is not just an
>> "operational organization" -- the policies it makes can have profound
>> political ramifications, and thus politics gets into the picture in
>> practice, even if the terms of discourse center on operational
>> principles.
>>
>> There is frequent mention of keeping ICANN to just operational matters
>> (I'm definitely a proponent of that mission), however it should be
>> acknowledged that such a position is inherently political: it's all
>> about
>> protecting the broadly-distributed interests against narrow interests,
>> and
>> the broad-narrow contest is fundamentally political.
>>
>> I'm afraid I don't have the time to pound on ICANN's org structure from
>> a
>> detailed theoretical basis (part of that difficulty of resource
>> allocation: I don't get paid to do this, and I need to get to do
>> *something*,so that competes for my time). I wish I could. The only
>> reason I can offer this contribution right now is that I'm traveling and
>> currently waiting at the airport for a flight -- one fleeting moment of
>> opportunity (more moments on the flight, a bit later).
>>
>> These are big questions, and deserve big answers. I don't have those
>> answers in any detailed form, because that takes a lot of work to make
>> one's way through the forest at the individual-tree level.
>>
>> Suffice it to say that as the MSM at ICANN has "matured" the narrow
>> interests have found ways to twist both the bottle and the contents to
>> their systematic advantage, which the MSM was intended to neutralize
>> (since they start with the advantage naturally, without special efforts
>> to
>> privilege them).
>>
>>
>> At this point, we take the system as it stands and do everything
>> possible
>> to get it to work, but as I said earlier, I think we should be prepared
>> to
>> address everything -- the bottle and not just the contents -- to push
>> for
>> the distributed-interest agenda.
>>
>> Dan
>>
>>
>> --
>> Any opinions expressed in this message are those of the author alone and
>> do not necessarily reflect any position of the author's employer.
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, March 27, 2013 8:45 am, Alain Berranger wrote:
>> > Dear Robin, dear Colleagues:
>> >
>> > I agree that GNSO should file too... but will they (Maria's question)?
>> Two
>> > complaints (GNSO + NCSG) are better than one (Avri's statement)...
>> >
>> > 3 questions:
>> >
>> > 1) From my little experience, I find the ICANN Ombudsman process
>> > ineffective - it is time consuming (we are volunteers/the other side
>> is
>> > paid), a lot of pain for usually not much gain! Not saying we should
>> not
>> > do
>> > it, just wondering out loud if we have a chance at all of being
>> > successful?
>> > or even partially successful? or if we should invest our time in other
>> > ways?
>> >
>> > 2) Robin, I fully understand your TM arguments and they make sense to
>> me
>> > as
>> > a non-specialist. Can you please elaborate a bit on who the
>> "*powerful
>> > political interests"* you refer to are? This may help me and others at
>> the
>> > base of the NCSG pyramid understand the context and the issue
>> better...
>> >
>> > 3) Did Maria fill a complaint to the Ombudsman? and where is it at
>> now?
>> >
>> > 4) I also have a point of view or perhaps an hypothesis to share, from
>> > many
>> > years of applied MS practice funding developmental and applied policy
>> > research in developing countries - may not be relevant but here it is
>> > anyway for feedback and reflexion...
>> >
>> > I see the MS process as one of fundamental inclusion and
>> participation...
>> > It is more relevant than ever because of the internet and the networks
>> > that
>> > spring from it...
>> >
>> > ...the more you are at the bottom of the pyramid ($, knowledge, assets
>> > like
>> > land ownership, cash, access to resources, etc...) the more you seek
>> > participation as a way of climbing up the pyramid (getting yourself
>> out
>> of
>> > poverty). The higher you are in the pyramid, the less you welcome
>> > participation because it is disruptive at the very least.
>> >
>> > Inherent to this "MS model" is the power struggle between closely
>> vested
>> > interests (in our case the CHP and part of the NCHP) and higher level
>> or
>> > principled interests (in our case the rest of NCHP). Not that there
>> are
>> > not closely vested interests as well as principled interests
>> everywhere
>> in
>> > an MS organization, including ICANN.
>> >
>> > Closely vested interests are very time sensitive (profits, status and
>> > privileges are lessened by indecision and ambiguity - the rules of the
>> > game
>> > are not clear driving the the "powerful political interests" crazy!)
>> while
>> > principled interests are less time sensitive (although short term
>> costs
>> > are
>> > usually huge too) because they are universal.
>> >
>> > So here comes a question: How does an *operational organization* like
>> > ICANN
>> > wishing to become better at MS behavior (we can assume that anyway for
>> the
>> > eternal optimist) resolves the issue of closely vested vs. principled
>> > interests?
>> >
>> > They are by nature in tension and should be... What is essential is to
>> > keep
>> > a balance... For instance, taking just one of the financial
>> dimensions,
>> it
>> > is the DNS supply side that keeps feeding extra cash into ICANN and
>> the
>> > DNS
>> > demand side does not have the means to bring this in balance, although
>> it
>> > is the market.... it is a bit of a class struggle (or concentration of
>> > power differentials on the supply and demand sides) in the sense that
>> if
>> > you do not keep this delicate balance the system will eventually fail.
>> It
>> > is a matter of time!
>> >
>> > I for one would like to see ICANN survive as an MS organization, being
>> > able
>> > to keep the "rapport de forces" in equilibrium.
>> >
>> > I would love to hear a criticism of this model's assumption and also
>> > perhaps if it can help in bringing back balance... or is it simply a
>> > theoretical treatment?
>> >
>> > Best, Alain
>> >
>> > On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 5:51 AM, Horacio T. Cadiz <
[log in to unmask]>
>> wrote:
>> >
>> >> I support filing a case.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> --
>> >> Bombim Cadiz
>> >> *******************************************
>> >> * Free/Open Source Software (FOSS) -- *
>> >> * No windows. No gates. It is open. *
>> >> * No Bill. It is Free. *
>> >> *******************************************
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > --
>> > Alain Berranger, B.Eng, MBA
>> > Member, Board of Directors, CECI,
>> >
http://www.ceci.ca<
>>
http://www.ceci.ca/en/about-ceci/team/board-of-directors/>
>> > Executive-in-residence, Schulich School of Business,
>>
www.schulich.yorku.ca
>> > Treasurer, Global Knowledge Partnership Foundation,
>>
www.gkpfoundation.org
>> > NA representative, Chasquinet Foundation,
www.chasquinet.org
>> > Chair, NPOC, NCSG, ICANN,
http://npoc.org/
>> > O:
+1 514 484 7824; M:
+1 514 704 7824
>> > Skype: alain.berranger
>> >
>> >
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>
>
> --
> Alain Berranger, B.Eng, MBA
> Member, Board of Directors, CECI,
>
http://www.ceci.ca<
http://www.ceci.ca/en/about-ceci/team/board-of-directors/>
> Executive-in-residence, Schulich School of Business,
www.schulich.yorku.ca
> Treasurer, Global Knowledge Partnership Foundation,
www.gkpfoundation.org
> NA representative, Chasquinet Foundation,
www.chasquinet.org
> Chair, NPOC, NCSG, ICANN,
http://npoc.org/
> O:
+1 514 484 7824; M:
+1 514 704 7824
> Skype: alain.berranger
>
>
> AVIS DE CONFIDENTIALITÉ
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