+1 On Tue, 15 Jul 2014 10:04:32 -0400, Stephanie Perrin <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > I have hesitated to comment on this, professing no particular expertise > in this area of govt. However, it seems to me that: > > * IANA transition is inherently political, possibly more so than other > GAC issues where chances of agreement are always slim > * I see three obvious blocs in the GAC and potentially more (Europe, 5 > Eyes, BRICS, then the others) > * Forcing the GAC to pick (or even enunciate) who the reps would be if > there were only two would actually cause more harm than the benefit > of having limited representation, by forcing matters and alignments. > * The important thing here as Sam has recently pointed out is to keep > the scope limited for this committee (they are not sorting out the > policy) > > For those reasons, I would let them have 5, with caveats that this is a > one time deal, don't be looking for it in all future cross-constituency > working groups (good luck with that one, I nominate Milton to police > that). Note that I am aware that the IANA transition should not be as > political as it is, (given the technical nature of the matter) but > that's life I think. > > I could be all wrong in this, (note caveat in first line) but here is my > 2cents. > Stephanie > > On 2014-07-15, 7:41, Amr Elsadr wrote: >> Hi, >> >> Yeah…, 5 out of 30 wouldn’t make GAC a super power, but what regional >> organisational structure are you referring to? Is there a regional >> organisational structure within the GAC (similar to the RALOs of the >> At-Large community for example)? I am not aware of one. There is a >> chair and there are vice chairs. The vice chairs are meant to (to the >> extent possible) represent the geographic diversity of the GAC members. >> This, as far as I can tell, excludes nation states that are not members >> of the GAC. >> >> So although 5 out of 30 won’t necessarily be detrimental to the outcome >> of the group, I see no practical reason why they need 3 additional >> reps. They obviously feel this need exists. The reason they provided >> doesn’t seem to make sense (to me at least), and has nothing to do with >> the ration of govt. to non-govt. members of the group. >> >> Before rushing to comply with their request, I would suggest that >> further clarification of their reasoning be provided. >> >> Thanks. >> >> Amr >> >> On Jul 14, 2014, at 5:13 AM, Adam <[log in to unmask]> wrote: >> >>> On Jul 14, 2014, at 7:20 AM, Robin Gross wrote: >>> >>>> I agree that we should resist GAC demands to obtain preferential >>>> treatment or disproportionate make-up of this coordination group. >>> >>> Disagree very strongly. 5 members from what would become a 30 strong >>> group is not disproportionate. If "multi-stakeholder" is to have any >>> meaning then for one of the core representative groups to only have 2 >>> members from 27 is ridiculous. >>> >>> <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-06-06-en#annex-one> >>> >>> 5 of 30 would not in anyway cause government to be come some super >>> power, but it would allow them to select representatives to reflect >>> their regional organizational structure. >>> >>> If we want this process to work, then preparing for the first meeting >>> by welcoming five members from GAC would be a good start. >>> >>> Adam >>> >>> >>> >>>> I'd leave it at 2 members from GAC in the coordination group (unless >>>> GNSO and especially noncommercial users) are provided additional >>>> positions in the group). >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> Robin >>>> >>>> On Jul 12, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Amr Elsadr wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Dan, Milton and all, >>>>> >>>>> On Jul 12, 2014, at 8:52 PM, Dan Krimm <[log in to unmask]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> [SNIP] >>>>> >>>>>> If GAC is really trying to gain proportionally greater influence on >>>>>> the CG, >>>>>> then I think that should be forcefully resisted. >>>>> +1. >>>>> >>>>>> If GAC just wants to have accurate expression of its varied views >>>>>> (and thinks that requires all >>>>>> "viewers" being explicitly present), then that should be extended >>>>>> equally >>>>>> to other SGs at the same time. All or nothing. >>>>> As per my understanding, GAC communiques are drafted using consensus >>>>> amongst their members (in the absence of any formal objection). In >>>>> the case of an inability to reach the required level of >>>>> decision-making, the GAC Chair is required to convey the full range >>>>> of views expressed by the membership. It has always been their modus >>>>> operandi to use this decision making mechanism. I don’t understand >>>>> why it is suddenly becoming an issue with this coordination group, >>>>> unless of course, it is an attempt to (as Milton puts it) make the >>>>> group into a voting body rather than a representative one liaising >>>>> with its own AC within the ICANN community. This kind of >>>>> representation doesn’t apply to a collective of the four SGs within >>>>> the GNSO, so I would (IMHO) avoid conflating the two issues. Four >>>>> (or more) representatives from the GNSO shouldn’t equate to more >>>>> reps from the GAC. >>>>> >>>>> One representative should be enough to liaise with the GAC. A second >>>>> one serves as backup, which may very well be needed. Five (one for >>>>> each world region) sounds a bit over-the-top to me. >>>>> >>>>> For more on GAC operating procedures in this context, please check >>>>> Principle 47 and the footnote at the bottom of the page found here: >>>>> https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/GAC+Operating+Principles >>>>> >>>>> Thanks. >>>>> >>>>> Amr > -- Using Opera's revolutionary email client: http://www.opera.com/mail/