Milton and colleagues,

Given that this is a discussion that seeks to find consensus, I want to share an observation.  As I said before, I was not inclined to agree to more government members in the CG.  In the other hand, I would hate to see the CG weakened in status for the reasons expressed by Bill.  And I add, there are somewhat of a parallel here to the WGIG.  The WGIG was at a crossroads in search for new solutions in uncharted waters.  Although organized differently, the CG has a similar mandate.  Because of that, I am now more inclined to say that Bill and Avri have a unique perspective in this case, and that consensus should follow their views.  In any case, as it has been suggested, the rules of the process are not clear as of this moment.

Roy Balleste

Law Library Director &

Professor of Law

St. Thomas University Law Library

16401 NW 37th Avenue

Miami Gardens, FL 33054

305-623-2341

From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of William Drake
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2014 12:38 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [NCSG-Discuss] IANA transition coordination group: some requests for feedback

Hi Milton

On Jul 15, 2014, at 5:10 PM, Milton L Mueller <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Let me address the “buy-in” comment that has been made by both Bill and Adam.

Both are arguing that acceding to GAC’s wishes may make them more supportive of the final outcome.

More that it reduces their ability to be unsupportive of the outcome on the grounds that they were not fully able to participate and make their views known and discharge their responsibilities etc.

This seems like a reasonable point, and may even be correct – though we won’t really know until it is all over. I will note that the 5 designated by GAC are not the 5 eyes but include Egypt and Iran. That may indeed provide some support for the outcome

This to me would be all the more reason to have them in.

There are other reasons, however, not to accede to the GAC on this point. Those reasons are:

1. It reinforces the GAC’s sense that governments are exceptional and privileged stakeholders, which has bad long term consequences and may affect the CG’s solution set

A priori, being 5 out of @ 30 sounds like neither to me, but presumably the ground rules could be established to keep things clear.

2. Efforts to give GAC what they want in the TLD policy process has made things worse, not better

Depends what we’re talking about, and anyway they’re hardly alone in that :-)

3. Making their representation on the committee region-based and “representative” rather than primarily a liaison role could actually encourage differences and fragmentation among the GAC

Have they said this is how they’d see the role?

4. It seems to encourage a view of the coordination group (CG) as a decisional body. (get used to this new acronym, CG)

This too could be clarified up front, no?

Best,

Bill

Perhaps that can provide the basis for further discussion. From what I’ve seen so far, there is no basis for me to go into this meeting either adamantly opposing or actively supporting additional seats for GAC. If you want me to be less wishy-washy, try to move to a consensus.

--MM

From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Adam Peake
Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2014 4:40 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [NCSG-Discuss] IANA transition coordination group: some requests for feedback

Five. 

Multistakeholder: five from 20 plus. Obvious, no?

And if that doesn't make sense, then it's also politically expedient, two not workable for govt. We want this process to work give them what they ask.  (Less than 20%, so really doesn't matter.) 

Adam

On Sunday, July 13, 2014, Amr Elsadr <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Hi Dan, Milton and all,

On Jul 12, 2014, at 8:52 PM, Dan Krimm <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

[SNIP]

> If GAC is really trying to gain proportionally greater influence on the CG,
> then I think that should be forcefully resisted.

+1.

>  If GAC just wants to have accurate expression of its varied views (and thinks that requires all
> "viewers" being explicitly present), then that should be extended equally
> to other SGs at the same time.  All or nothing.

As per my understanding, GAC communiques are drafted using consensus amongst their members (in the absence of any formal objection). In the case of an inability to reach the required level of decision-making, the GAC Chair is required to convey the full range of views expressed by the membership. It has always been their modus operandi to use this decision making mechanism. I don’t understand why it is suddenly becoming an issue with this coordination group, unless of course, it is an attempt to (as Milton puts it) make the group into a voting body rather than a representative one liaising with its own AC within the ICANN community. This kind of representation doesn’t apply to a collective of the four SGs within the GNSO, so I would (IMHO) avoid conflating the two issues. Four (or more) representatives from the GNSO shouldn’t equate to more reps from the GAC.

One representative should be enough to liaise with the GAC. A second one serves as backup, which may very well be needed. Five (one for each world region) sounds a bit over-the-top to me.

For more on GAC operating procedures in this context, please check Principle 47 and the footnote at the bottom of the page found here: https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/GAC+Operating+Principles

Thanks.

Amr

***********************************************
William J. Drake
International Fellow & Lecturer
  Media Change & Innovation Division, IPMZ
  University of Zurich, Switzerland
Chair, Noncommercial Users Constituency, 
  ICANN, www.ncuc.org
[log in to unmask] (direct), [log in to unmask] (lists),
www.williamdrake.org
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