I find the equation of GAC Advice with SO policy unjustified. Policy takes months, and goes through multiple processes of public review - the board can have reasonable confidence that it represents something close to community consensus. 

I note that GAC advice already has by laws that give it more weight than other ACs.

I note both that:
- GAC advice may be the result of extended considered policy discussion, certainly, it can also be the result of very little plenary discussion, allowed through because a small minority requests it and others see no strong reason to oppose it. I firmly believe, for example, that the ill considered GAC advice on ICRC names from the London meeting, much of which shows basic misunderstanding of ICANN by-laws and procedures, to be an example of this. The GAC processes absolutely can result in poorly considered advice slipping through, that would probably not even get GAC support had they known the reaction it might get. We should keep it relatively easy for the board to reject bad GAC advice. 
- the GAC can easily have a strong influence on SO developed policy - such policies are put out for public comment, among many other processes. The GAC-GNSO Coordination Group has been trying hard to demonstrate to the GAC the many ways they can be a part of the GNSO policy development process. There is no such mechanism for anyone else to have input into GAC processes. There is absolutely no guarantee that anyone outside the GAC will have any influence at all - sure, a major policy decision will be discussed for some time, and you might be able to informally lobby your GAC rep. But there is no guarantee at all - GAC advice can be proposed virtually direct from the floor, and be in the GAC communique shortly afterward, with no opportunity for anyone outside the GAC to even know what it is. 
Given the GAC system is absolutely set up so that it can allow some bad ideas to get through the system with no opportunity for public feedback at all, which shouldn't we give the board some ability to provide that feedback in the case of the occasional bit of absolutely terrible policy getting through?

I firmly oppose any increase in the threshold for rejection of GAC advice. 
Regards

David

On 29 Aug 2014, at 9:15 pm, Robin Gross <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

Actually it doesn't say "all govts in GAC are non-democratic" as you allege.  It says that some are and some aren't.  By empowering the GAC as a whole, we would *also* be empowering those govts who are not democratic in the power structures at ICANN simply by virtue of their GAC membership.  My own conscious cannot promote a re-formulation of the ICANN board that accepts as legitimate govts who arrest women drivers or imprison/execute citizens simply for speaking against the government.  Because the authoritarian govts are a subset of GAC, they get empowered when GAC as a whole gets empowered.  Our GNSO representatives on the board had to stand for an election in a bottom-up process.  What bottom-up process will justify the inclusion of the Chinese GAC member on the board?

On the issue of the power of a 2/3 super-majority, this is what the National conference of State Legislatures had to say about what a 2/3 vote actually means:

The US Mason's Manual notes, "A deliberative body cannot by its own act or rule require a two-thirds vote to take any action where the constitution or controlling authority requires only a majority vote. To require a two-thirds vote, for example, to take any action would be to give to any number more than one-third of the members the power to defeat the action and amount to a delegation of the powers of the body to a minority."[1]
  -- From National Conference of State Legislatures (2000). Mason's Manual of Legislative Procedure, 2000 ed., p. 353

My two cents anyway,
Robin


On Aug 28, 2014, at 9:19 PM, Avri Doria wrote:

Signed PGP part
Hi,

Not all governments in the GAC are non-democratic.  Again you
exaggerate and lump all into the same tyrannical mode.  Seems a bit
off to me.

And calling all the other SOAC processes, including those in the GNSO
process properly demcratic is another exaggeration.

I see equal footing as an important goal, not a catchy slogan.  And it
is not to rule, it is to participate fully and equally - an important
part of the multistakeholder model.

avri

On 29-Aug-14 01:52, Robin Gross wrote:
> I see no reason why authoritarian non-democratic governments
> deserve "equal footing" with legitimate democratic bottom-up
> processes.  Many in GAC are exactly this: non-democratic and
> authoritarian governments where the people are not allowed to
> govern themselves through free and fair elections.  These govt's
> have no legitimate right to claim they deserve "equal footing" to
> rule over anyone, let alone the DNS.
>
>
> "Equal footing" might be a catchy slogan that sounds nice on its
> surface to those who care about equality.  But giving tyrannical
> govts "equal footing" to rule the root is a bad idea when you
> think it through.
>
> Robin
>
>
> On Aug 28, 2014, at 3:08 PM, Avri Doria wrote:
>
>> Signed PGP part Hi,
>>
>> I think this is way overstated.
>>
>> In no way does raising the bar from majority to supermajority
>> give them a veto.
>>
>> I can accept being against it, even though I am not, but i see no
>>  reason to call it something it is not.  It puts them on a par
>> with the GNSO.  You may not want this, but it is not a veto.
>>
>> I personally don't see the big deal, but then again I believe in
>>  parity and equal footing.  And since it is something I demand
>> for us, I have trouble arguing against it for others.  I can't
>> get into the notion that equal treatment is good for us but not
>> for others, especially in a multistakeholder environment.
>>
>> Let me repeat, supermajority is _not_ a veto.
>>
>> And furthermore, it is not a veto by non democratic countries
>> since, believe it or not some of the democratic countries in the
>> GAC would have to participate in coming to consensus on the
>> advice.
>>
>> Argue against it if you must, but don't blow it out of all
>> proportion. If nothing else if makes your comment easier to put
>> aside.  So even if I agreed with you I would argue against
>> calling it something it is not for a tactical reason.
>>
>> avri
>>
>>
>> On 28-Aug-14 07:10, Robin Gross wrote:
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> Below are my comments on the extreme proposal to amend ICANN's
>>>  bylaws to impose GAC "advice" on the Internet unless 2/3 of
>>> the non-conflicted members of ICANN's board (would there ever
>>> be such a number given the many board conflicts?) are able to
>>> oppose the GAC "advice" (why are we still calling it
>>> "advice"?)
>>>
>>> I've also made a blog post to encourage others to post
>>> comments to the public forum here: http://bit.ly/1rBtbKl
>>>
>>> I hope you all will consider weighing-in and standing-up for
>>> freedom on the Internet by encouraging the board to reject this
>>>  proposal that give non-democratic governments power over the
>>> Internet via ICANN's board.  It is a very important issue -
>>> perhaps one of the most important that ICANN has faced since
>>> its inception, so it is a major change and worth paying
>>> attention to.
>>>
>>> Thank you, Robin
>>>
>>> PS:  You can submit comments by sending an email to
>>> [log in to unmask] Comment
>>> Deadline: 14 Sept. 2014 Reply Deadline: 6 Oct. 2014
>>>
>>> Begin forwarded message:
>>>
>>>> From: Robin Gross <[log in to unmask]> Subject: Do Not
>>>> Empower Non-Democratic Governments' Control Over the Internet
>>>> with this Draconian "GAC Veto" on ICANN Board Decisions Date:
>>>> August 27, 2014 3:50:13 PM PDT To:
>>>> [log in to unmask] Bcc: Robin
>>>>  Gross <[log in to unmask]>
>>>>
>>>> Dear ICANN,
>>>>
>>>> This draconian proposal to change ICANN's bylaws would
>>>> fundamentally transform ICANN away from being a "bottom-up"
>>>> and "private-sector-led" organization and into a governmental
>>>>  regulatory agency by changing the GAC's role from "advisory"
>>>>  into "primary decision maker" by essentially creating a
>>>> "governmental veto" on all key organizational decisions.
>>>> This would mark a truly significant change in the overall
>>>> power structure at ICANN that would dramatically empower
>>>> national governments (some democratic, some authoritarian)
>>>> over the management of critical Internet resources at the
>>>> expense of those who participate in the bottom-up policy
>>>> development process.
>>>>
>>>> This extreme proposal undermines any hope of a bottom-up
>>>> process for policy development at ICANN and kills the
>>>> incentive for volunteers to participate in ICANN since
>>>> governments will be empowered to veto the bottom-up policy
>>>> that was developed by years of hard work and painful
>>>> compromises on the part of all stakeholders.
>>>>
>>>> Ironically, it is often ICANN's own board and staff who do
>>>> the most to undermine the "multi-stakeholder model for
>>>> Internet governance", and this proposal, if passed, would be
>>>> a prime illustration of that fact.  By making additional
>>>> concessions to GAC that give governments more power at ICANN,
>>>> the board would be relinquishing its responsibility to
>>>> provide oversight of the organization's operations.  And
>>>> since so many non-GAC board members are "conflicted" on
>>>> issues that are of greatest significance to the org's work,
>>>> in reality it will take far more than 2/3 of the board to
>>>> resist the mandatory imposition of GAC "advice" by ICANN.
>>>> There is nothing to prevent GAC from becoming a voting body
>>>> that imposes its majority will on the entire Internet via the
>>>> ICANN board; and this bylaws change would certainly
>>>> incentivize such a reaction from GAC.  Since ICANN claimed in
>>>> its recent determination of the BGC Reconsideration Request
>>>> 14-35 (which refused to release any information about GAC
>>>> policy deliberations) that GAC is not a part of ICANN, it is
>>>> inexplicable why ICANN would choose to give what it claimed
>>>> in its determination is NOT a part of ICANN the predominate
>>>> decision making position on the ICANN Board of Directors.
>>>> That is quite a quiet transfer of power and resources "away
>>>> from ICANN" to a non-accountable, non-transparent,
>>>> non-bottom-up, non-private-sector-led organization over the
>>>> management of critical Internet resources.
>>>>
>>>> It should not be forgotten that many of the governments who
>>>> participate within the GAC are not democratically elected;
>>>> meaning citizens in those countries do not have free and fair
>>>>  elections in which people govern themselves; meaning those
>>>> governments are not bottom-up; meaning those non-democratic
>>>> governments are illegitimate in their authority and have no
>>>> right to demand a decision making role over anyone, let
>>>> alone the entire world via the ICANN board.
>>>>
>>>> Why ICANN would voluntarily choose to empower non-democratic
>>>>  governments with an even greater say over global Internet
>>>> policies as this bylaws change would do is anyone's guess.
>>>>
>>>> One of the most precious aspects of the Internet is the
>>>> ability of activists and the disenfranchised to communicate
>>>> with the world outside from an authoritarian government''
>>>> control by using the Internet.  This bylaws proposal, if
>>>> passed, will ultimately stifle use of the Internet for both
>>>> disenfranchised people and those who live in democracies but
>>>> will still be governed by the GAC via this ICANN Board
>>>> "veto". Unfortunately many governments view the Internet
>>>> either as a threat to their control of their citizens, or as
>>>> a powerful tool that enables their control of their citizens
>>>> - this is true in both democracies and non-democracies, and
>>>> that stifling view will be recklessly empowered by the
>>>> adoption of this bylaws change.
>>>>
>>>> This is a truly dangerous proposal that would send the
>>>> Internet back towards the dark ages when the Crown controlled
>>>> access to printing presses and what information was allowed
>>>> to spread. For the ICANN Board to empower non-democratic
>>>> governments by approving this bylaws change would be among
>>>> the worst damage done to the health and growth of the free
>>>> and open Internet since it was created.  The ICANN Board
>>>> should recognize its obligation to promote democracy and
>>>> protect everyone's use of the Internet, but especially the
>>>> disenfranchised by not empowering authoritarian governments'
>>>> control of the Internet with the adoption of this draconian
>>>> bylaws change.
>>>>
>>>> Thank you, Robin Gross
>>>>
>>>> Note:  I am a member of the Executive Committee of ICANN's
>>>> Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG), but submit this
>>>> comment solely in my personal capacity.
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
>