Hi,

On 25-Apr-15 10:52, David Post wrote:

But this arrangement worries me, because in the ordinary sense, a wholly-owned subsidiary is most definitely not independent of its parent - in fact, the very opposite is usually true - and I'm just not aware of a lot of models where something like this actually works to counter that inherent dependence.  Maybe there are such things out there and I'm just not aware of them, and maybe the right combination of ICANN and PTI by-law provisions, and contract language, and procedures for selecting the PTI Board can be devised to give the PTI Board real independence, and I just haven't seen them yet.

While the parent non-for-profit of the affiliate (the legal structure for 'subsidiaries' in CA, I am told) retains a degree of control, especially for budget and the like, a large degree of independence can be guaranteed  in the foundational documents of the Affiliate (again speaking as a non lawyer, based on what I understand we have been told).

While the Contract Co, model would have given greater certainty of an RFP, that was not an acceptable solution to much of the community.   This hybrid method affords the community the abilty to call for an RFP, and the legal separation makes it possible to actually replace the IANA Function Operators (IFO) while leaving the rest of ICANN, i.e. policy, contracting and compliance, activities unaffected.

[log in to unmask]" type="cite">But without independence from the ICANN Board, the possibility that it would ever actually exercise the "option of creating a RFP (request for proposal) and possibly finding a new IANA function operator" (even though its parent corporation and sole Member (i.e. ICANN) does not want it to do that) strikes me as pretty slim, and without the ability to do that its not really independent at all.

As an earlier reply indicated, the PTI Board focusing on the responsiblities of the PTI itself.  It is the ICANN community serving  on the IANA Function Review (IFR) that recommends the RFP. And yes, that involves the Board's acquiescence.

This is one of the reasons that the CWG IANA solution is dependent on the accountability changes.

The goal of some of those CCWG Accountability changes is to allow the ICANN Community a greater say on Board decisions.

In this case, the review that would produce the recommendation for the RFP, is one of the AOC-like reviews whose recommendation are being redefined as 'required' on the Board.  While this requirement will not be absolute, it is then subject to the other mechanisms being currently worked on in the CCWG-Accountabity, including non confidence mechanisms for removing the entire Board (which are still tbd in the CCWG but under active discussion).

Depending on how the structure of the CCWG Accountability works out,  i.e whether the SOAC based member model is recommended and accepted, it may also be possible to subject a decision of the Board against an AOC-like review recommendation to a overriding vote by the SOAC based members.  I am not sure of this, and will write a note to the CCWG Accountability right after this to check and see if that is possible.  If we have that capability, then there is a goood chance that an RFP decsions would be honoroed as long as the community really wanted.  Certainly it would be a difficult time in any case.

avri


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