Hi Milton, Thanks for this share, I am not sure what was posted on the IANA-plan list by the IAB chair implied that ICANN is refusing IETF from moving it's function if required. I understood his message to imply ICANN is refusing to sign and agreement of such ability because they already have a commitment on such with the NTIA. I am not a lawyer, but I think it makes a lot of sense to activate such agreement at the termination of the other. A question to ask is whether ICANN is committed to signing the SLA once NTIA relinquishes it's current agreement. Regards sent from Google nexus 4 kindly excuse brevity and typos. On 30 Apr 2015 14:27, "Milton L Mueller" <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > > > Dear NCSG: > > It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice > of its IANA functions operator. > > > > Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the > numbers community > <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-monopoly-and-its-willing-to-wreck-the-transition-process-to-get-it/> > will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the > numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its > IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to > second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. > Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF > Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community > <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> > noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level > agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change > in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. > > > > These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is > telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not > accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as > part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both > cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected > communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the > NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, > setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an > acceptable transition proposal. > > > > The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will > have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether > each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have > the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability > is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a > principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by > the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them > separability since 2000 (RFC 2860 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>). > Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a > monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one. > > > > Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most > effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are > locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA > responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these > actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will > forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event > already. > > > > Milton L Mueller > > Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor > > Syracuse University School of Information Studies > > http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ > > Internet Governance Project > > http://internetgovernance.org > > >