Hi Milton,

Thanks for this share, I am not sure what was posted on the IANA-plan list
by the IAB chair implied that ICANN is refusing IETF from moving it's
function if required.
I understood his message to imply ICANN is refusing to sign and  agreement
of such ability because they already have a commitment on such with the
NTIA.
I am not a lawyer, but I think it makes a lot of sense to activate such
agreement at the termination of the other.

A question to ask is whether ICANN is committed to signing the SLA once
NTIA relinquishes it's current agreement.

Regards

sent from Google nexus 4
kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 30 Apr 2015 14:27, "Milton L Mueller" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

>
>
> Dear NCSG:
>
> It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice
> of its IANA functions operator.
>
>
>
> Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the
> numbers community
> <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-monopoly-and-its-willing-to-wreck-the-transition-process-to-get-it/>
> will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the
> numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its
> IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to
> second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN.
> Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF
> Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community
> <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html>
> noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level
> agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change
> in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
>
>
>
> These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is
> telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not
> accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as
> part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both
> cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected
> communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the
> NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process,
> setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an
> acceptable transition proposal.
>
>
>
> The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will
> have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether
> each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols – will have
> the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability
> is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a
> principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by
> the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them
> separability since 2000 (RFC 2860 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>).
> Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a
> monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
>
>
>
> Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most
> effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are
> locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA
> responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these
> actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will
> forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event
> already.
>
>
>
> Milton L Mueller
>
> Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
>
> Syracuse University School of Information Studies
>
> http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
>
> Internet Governance Project
>
> http://internetgovernance.org
>
>
>