It seems to me this just emphasizes the importance of the discussion we
were just having about the independence of Post-Transition IANA vis-a-vis
its "affiliate" status in the current proposal. Milton
writes:
Of course, a severable contract
for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of
accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider,
it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and
accountable.
I agree with that - severability is critical in helping to keep both
sides (ICANN and PTI) accountable, and acting reasonably.
Personally, as I said earlier, I have serious doubts that it can be
achieved if PTI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN. The fact
that ICANN is already balking at allowing/endorsing severability as a
component to these arrangements seems to heighten that concern -
As I understand things, severability works differently for numbers and
protocols, on the one hand, and names on the other, under current
proposals. For numbers and protocols, other entities which are
already independent of ICANN - the RIRs and the IETF - retain
policy-making authority, and contract with ICANN, which agrees in that
contract to operate the relevant registries in compliance with the
directives it receives from those independent entities. For names,
it's the reverse; ICANN retains policy-making authority, contracts with
another entity (PTI) for implementation in the registry. But the
ability of each of the parties to find other partners will be a very
important constraint on misbehavior and mismanagement on all sides, and,
if I were running NTIA, this would be a non-negotiable part of any
acceptable proposal for the transition.
David
At 09:27 AM 4/30/2015, Milton L Mueller wrote:
Dear NCSG:
It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice
of its IANA functions operator.
Those of you who read my
blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community will
already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the
numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its
IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to
second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with
ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF
Administrative Oversight Committee have
sent a letter to their community noting that ICANN is refusing to
renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new
provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators
should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.
These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is
telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not
accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as
part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both
cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected
communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to
the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process,
setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an
acceptable transition proposal.
The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN
will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or
whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protocols –
will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries.
Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working
group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also
listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an
agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000
(RFC 2860). Yet
despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly
and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.
Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most
effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are
locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA
responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these
actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will
forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event
already.
Milton L Mueller
Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
Syracuse University School of Information Studies
http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
Internet Governance Project
http://internetgovernance.org
*******************************
David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America
Foundation
blog (Volokh Conspiracy)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-post
book (Jefferson's Moose)
http://tinyurl.com/c327w2n
music
http://tinyurl.com/davidpostmusic publications etc.
http://www.davidpost.com
*******************************