Joly
I think you're confused about the same thing I was confused about
earlier. There seems to be provision for ICANN, with community
input, to "fire" IANA and find someone else to perform the
functions that IANA will be performing - but there doesn't seem to be
provision for the reverse (i.e. for IANA to find a different partner to
perform the policy-making functions ICANN will be performing). Not
quite sure why that is, as in my view the ability to change partners
should be symmetrical -
David
At 03:19 PM 5/8/2015, Joly MacFie wrote:
On Thu, May 7, 2015 at 6:26 PM,
Milton L Mueller
<[log in to unmask]> wrote:
- If there is separability, then the moment IANA stops doing what it is
supposed to do one can fire the operator and find someone who will
conform to the contract and implement the community-based
policies.
​You mean ICANN? Or am I missing something?
​
​CW's point is that, if separate, what's to stop anyone with a billion
dollars ​hijacking it for their own agenda? Presumably the ICANN
board is assumed to be harder to hijack because of established
accountability checks and balances. Why duplicate all that? Just
asking.
Also, why is the IAB not a good candidate?
j
--
---------------------------------------------------------------
Joly MacFie 218 565 9365 Skype:punkcast
WWWhatsup NYC -
http://wwwhatsup.com
 http://pinstand.com
- http://punkcast.com
 VP (Admin) - ISOC-NY -
http://isoc-ny.org
--------------------------------------------------------------
-
*******************************
David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America
Foundation
blog (Volokh Conspiracy)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-post
book (Jefferson's Moose)
http://tinyurl.com/c327w2n
music
http://tinyurl.com/davidpostmusic publications etc.
http://www.davidpost.com
*******************************