Hi, David,
[SNIP]

On this point, please see the recently released Cross Community Working Group (CCWG) Accountability Initial Draft Proposal for Public Comment, https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cwg-accountability-draft-proposal-with-annexes-04may15-en.pdf

Would you agree that the proposed update to ICANN's Mission Statement (pg 15) which limits ICANN scope, in conjunction with proposed community empowerment mechanisms address this concern adequately?

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On Mon, May 4, 2015 at 2:49 PM, David Post <[log in to unmask] > wrote:

[Apologies for cross-posting]

This really is starting to look, as Milton said, ominous - coupled with the pressure being placed upon ICANN to regulate message content, see

http://www.internetcommerce.org/senate-judiciary-to-ip-czar/

my take on this is here:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/04/internet-governance-what-if-the-sky-really-is-falling/

If the final proposal does not have real safeguards against ICANN's content-regulation powers, we're all in trouble.

On this point, please see the recently released Cross Community Working Group (CCWG) Accountability Initial Draft Proposal for Public Comment, https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cwg-accountability-draft-proposal-with-annexes-04may15-en.pdf

Would you agree that the proposed update to ICANN's Mission Statement (pg 15) which limits ICANN scope, in conjunction with proposed community empowerment mechanisms address this concern adequately?

Â

And I am starting to wonder whether the USG is interested in making sure those safeguards are in place, or, as suggested in the above, making sure that they're NOT in place. . . .

I agree there will continue to be pressure put on ICANN by IP rightsholders interests, using any available route. But if the above is adopted it seems it would go a long way toward mitigating that pressure.

-- Brenden

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David

At 09:27 AM 4/30/2015, Milton L Mueller wrote:

                            

Dear NCSG:

It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator.

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Those of you who read my blog post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers community will already know that ICANN is refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers community by recognizing its contractual right to terminate its IANA functions operator agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred to second-hand reports that IETF was encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee have sent a letter to their community noting that ICANN is refusing to renew their supplemental service level agreement because it includes new provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN.

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These are truly shocking moves, because in effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the numbers and the protocols communities that they will not accept the proposals for the IANA transition that they have developed as part of the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) process. In both cases, the proposals were consensus proposals within the affected communities, and were approved by the ICG as complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire process, setting itself (rather than ICG and NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal.

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The key point of conflict here seems to be the issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or whether each of the affected communities – names, numbers and protoocols – will have the right to choose the operator of their global registries. Separability is explicitly recognized by the Cross community working group on Names as a principle to guide the transition, and was also listed as a requirement by the CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 (RFC 2860).  Yet despite the wishes of the community, ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to be exploiting the transition process to get one.

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Of course, a severable contract for the IANA functions is the most effective and important form of accountability. If the users of IANA are locked in to a single provider, it is more difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. Given the implications of these actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope someone on that list will forward this message to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. 

Â

Milton L Mueller

Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor

Syracuse University School of Information Studies

http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/

Internet Governance Project

http://internetgovernance.org

Â

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David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America Foundation

blog (Volokh Conspiracy) http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-post

book (Jefferson's Moose)  http://tinyurl.com/c327w2n      

music http://tinyurl.com/davidpostmusic publications etc.  http://www.davidpost.com        

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