Effective international court is a very nice concept but international courts and tribunals have always been a soft law mechanism with no real judicial power. so we will go back to square one! I don't understand why we would need an international oversight if we can legally hold ICANN (the rule making part of ICANN) accountable in the court of law in the US ? some may say there are accessibility issues, well accessibility issues also exist in international mechanisms! In some international courts only states can file suits against states. I find the Independent Review Panel more effective than an international court ! On 5 May 2015 at 13:28, Stephanie Perrin <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > I agree too. For an organization the size of ICANN, one ombudsman to > cover a number of accountabilities should suffice. On the other hand, I do > agree that ICANN needs an international appeal mechanism for its decisions > (ie a Court or Tribunal), I don't think that the Board should be the only > appeal mechanism, but that is another matter entirely. > Stephanie Perrin > > > On 2015-05-05 10:55, Seun Ojedeji wrote: > > I tend to agree with Sam on this one, especially the pondering questions > raised in relation to international oversight. > > Cheers! > sent from Google nexus 4 > kindly excuse brevity and typos. > On 5 May 2015 17:15, "Sam Lanfranco" <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > >> Carlos, >> >> Thanks for your comment and flagging the issues of an outside >> international oversight body, the ombudsmans (ombudspersons?) office, and >> the possibility of another office within ICANN to address “these strategic >> challenges”. Here are some quick comments from the small to the big in >> terms of challenges here. >> >> In terms of the choice between the ombudsman and some other new ICANN >> office, my personal view is to prefer the ombudsman, and not just because >> it would be less expensive in a time of serious ICANN budget constraints >> (another challenge). I find it hard to envision a new ICANN office dealing >> with DNS strategic challenges where that office would not become a >> lightening rod for a wide variety of external forces interested in issues >> that would amount to pressure for ICANN scope creep. As well, >> administrative theory and evidence suggests that a new office, in and of >> itself, would risk scope creep within its own work agenda, to bolster its >> existence, especially in times of constrained budgets. >> >> As for an international (outside) oversight body, for me the core issues >> are: (a) what principles are to be upheld; (b) keeping clear what should be >> inside the ICANN DNS system remit; and (c) what within the DNS system >> should be addressed elsewhere. The primary role of an oversight body is to >> hold an entity accountable to its remit. How does that get defined in a way >> that an oversight body: (i) doesn’t foster scope creep by asking ICANN to >> be accountable for the wrong things, and (ii) helps re-direct DNS concerns >> (especially content and intellectual property issues) to other appropriate >> venues? >> >> Sam L. >> >> >> * On 05/05/2015 11:35 AM, Carlos A. Afonso wrote: * >> >> *Dear Sam, >> >> Powerful message indeed. ICANN needs an outside international oversight >> body which would, among other tasks, decidedly help in tackling these >> strategic challenges. >> >> But we (NCSG?) seem to agree on this oversight being reduced to an >> office within ICANN. What would be the real difference between this >> office and the ombudsman? My answer: the ombudsman is much cheaper. >> >> fraternal regards >> >> --c.a.* >> >> >> > -- Farzaneh