It seems to me this just emphasizes the importance of the discussion we were just having about the independence of Post-Transition IANA vis-a-vis its "affiliate" status in the current proposal. Milton writes: >Of course, a severable contract for the IANA >functions is the most effective and important >form of accountability. If the users of IANA are >locked in to a single provider, it is more >difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient and accountable. I agree with that - severability is critical in helping to keep both sides (ICANN and PTI) accountable, and acting reasonably. Personally, as I said earlier, I have serious doubts that it can be achieved if PTI is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ICANN. The fact that ICANN is already balking at allowing/endorsing severability as a component to these arrangements seems to heighten that concern - As I understand things, severability works differently for numbers and protocols, on the one hand, and names on the other, under current proposals. For numbers and protocols, other entities which are already independent of ICANN - the RIRs and the IETF - retain policy-making authority, and contract with ICANN, which agrees in that contract to operate the relevant registries in compliance with the directives it receives from those independent entities. For names, it's the reverse; ICANN retains policy-making authority, contracts with another entity (PTI) for implementation in the registry. But the ability of each of the parties to find other partners will be a very important constraint on misbehavior and mismanagement on all sides, and, if I were running NTIA, this would be a non-negotiable part of any acceptable proposal for the transition. David At 09:27 AM 4/30/2015, Milton L Mueller wrote: > >Dear NCSG: >It’s now official: ICANN doesn’t even want to >let the IETF have a choice of its IANA functions operator. > >Those of you who read my ><http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-monopoly-and-its-willing-to-wreck-the-transition-process-to-get-it/>blog >post on ICANN’s interactions with the numbers >community will already know that ICANN is >refusing to accept the consensus of the numbers >community by recognizing its contractual right >to terminate its IANA functions operator >agreement with ICANN. In that blog, I referred >to second-hand reports that IETF was >encountering similar problems with ICANN. Those >reports are now public; the chairs of the IETF, >IAB and IETF Administrative Oversight Committee >have ><http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html>sent >a letter to their community noting that ICANN is >refusing to renew their supplemental service >level agreement because it includes new >provisions designed to facilitate change in IANA >functions operators should IETF become dissatisfied with ICANN. > >These are truly shocking moves, because in >effect ICANN’s legal staff is telling both the >numbers and the protocols communities that they >will not accept the proposals for the IANA >transition that they have developed as part of >the IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) >process. In both cases, the proposals were >consensus proposals within the affected >communities, and were approved by the ICG as >complete and conformant to the NTIA criteria. >Thus, ICANN is in effect usurping the entire >process, setting itself (rather than ICG and >NTIA) as the arbiter of what is an acceptable transition proposal. > >The key point of conflict here seems to be the >issue of whether ICANN will have a permanent >monopoly on the provision of IANA functions, or >whether each of the affected communities – >names, numbers and protocols – will have the >right to choose the operator of their global >registries. Separability is explicitly >recognized by the Cross community working group >on Names as a principle to guide the transition, >and was also listed as a requirement by the >CRISP team. And the IETF has had an agreement >with ICANN giving them separability since 2000 >(<https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2860>RFC >2860). Yet despite the wishes of the community, >ICANN seems to insist on a monopoly and seems to >be exploiting the transition process to get one. > >Of course, a severable contract for the IANA >functions is the most effective and important >form of accountability. If the users of IANA are >locked in to a single provider, it is more >difficult to keep the IANA responsive, efficient >and accountable. Given the implications of these >actions for the accountability CCWG, I hope >someone on that list will forward this message >to their list, if someone has not noted this event already. > >Milton L Mueller >Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor >Syracuse University School of Information Studies ><http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/>http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/ >Internet Governance Project ><http://internetgovernance.org/>http://internetgovernance.org > ******************************* David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America Foundation blog (Volokh Conspiracy) http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-post book (Jefferson's Moose) http://tinyurl.com/c327w2n music http://tinyurl.com/davidpostmusic publications etc. http://www.davidpost.com *******************************