Hello Milton,

Good to read you are having a possible change of mind. As to the options, I
don't think I would be so worried if option1 happens (even though I would
as well prefer just their involvement in the community mechanism).

The issue at the moment "literally speaking" is that board's decision on
GAC's advice does not have redress means by the community. This is what is
expected to be handled by the proposed ccwg report.

Overall I believe every ICANN community structure can/is in a position to
advice board (even though I understand GAC is specially privileged in the
bylaw), but the fact is that it remains an advice until board's action on
it. I expect that board's approach to how it handles/acts on such advises
would change post-transition.

Regards

Sent from my Asus Zenfone2
Kindly excuse brevity and typos.
On 30 Aug 2015 20:12, "Mueller, Milton L" <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> I’ve been reviewing the transcripts of the ICANN 53 (Buenos Aires) meeting
> in an attempt to understand better the way the GAC will handle the dilemma
> it has been put into by the community empowerment mechanism. You can see
> the preliminary results of my ruminations here:
> http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/08/29/gac-as-first-among-equals-the-danger-in-the-accountability-plan/
>
>
>
> So much for “equal footing.” The GAC repeatedly refers to itself as “first
> among equals” and they revel in this privileged status.
>
>
>
> But these facts need to be reflected in our comments on the CCWG proposal.
> Ironically, these readings, when considered in connection with an
> assessment of the impact of GAC “advice” on ICANN’s policy process, might
> change my prior opposition to including governments in the community
> mechanism. If we give GAC equal status in the community mechanism and TAKE
> AWAY their special advice status, we are closer to “equal footing” than we
> are now. Indeed, it may be that the privileged advisory power is more
> dangerous and distortive of ‘equal footing’ than their participation in the
> community mechanism would be. While many of us assume that GAC’s “Advisory”
> status limits its power, in fact its privileged channel to the board
> elevates governments above all other stakeholders in the policy making
> process. If one reviews the history of the new TLD program, for example,
> one can see how GAC advice was repeatedly used to delay, hijack and change
> the policy developed by the GNSO. So maybe Heritage Foundation was right:
> force them to choose between privileged advice or participation in the
> community mechanism. Or, maybe we should actually PREFER their inclusion in
> the community mechanism to continued special status of advice.
>
>
>
> Two things to avoid like the plague:
>
> 1)      Giving GAC BOTH privileged advisory status AND participation in
> the community mechanism
>
> 2)      Giving GAC a similar privileged advisory status over the
> community mechanism (e.g., GAC would not participate directly but would
> “advise” the empowered community, which would translate into an effective
> veto, delay or dilution of the community’s powers).
>
>
>
> Well, it seems unlikely that the special advisory power would be taken
> away. So if we don’t oppose their inclusion in the community mechanism,
> there is a risk that they will get both. Indeed, it seems highly likely to
> me that many members of GAC will respond to the CCWG dilemma by demanding
> option 1) or 2).  Still not sure how to play this.
>
>
>
> Your thoughts?
>
>
>
> Dr. Milton L. Mueller
>
> Professor, School of Public Policy
>
> Georgia Institute of Technology
>
>
>
>
>