At 10:46 AM 8/31/2015, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
 
From: David Post [ mailto:[log in to unmask]]
DP:  I agree with much, and maybe all, that you say.  But I am curious as to why you're as concerned as you are about the GACs's 'advisory power' when the Bylaws now state (a) that the Board's powers are limited to implementing consensus policies, and (b) that the Board has no power to act outside of that limitation,
 
MM: OMG David, those supposed limitations (consensus policies) have been in place since 1998, they mean absolutely nothing. ICANN board just passes whatever policies they want, based on whatever constellation of political pressures they are feeling at the moment (often via GAC), and call it “consensus.” Do you think there was consensus on the new RAA, or do you think USG and law enforcement, via GAC, pressured ICANN staff/board to make those changes and they were then imposed on businesses desperate to start implementing the new TLDs?

DP:  Of course I completely agree:  the limitation regarding consensus policies has done absolutely nothing to curb Board power.  But that's not because it "means absolutely nothing" - I have a pretty good idea what it means, I think you have a pretty good idea what it means, and I think most people in the community have a pretty good idea what it means.   The consensus limitation has done nothing, not because it doesn't mean anything, but because it was completely unenforceable by anyone other than the Board itself. I THOUGHT THE POINT OF THE RECONSTITUTED IRP WAS TO CURE THIS PROBLEM.  AM I WRONG?  

that's why I had part c in what I initially wrote:  My understanding is that the CCWG proposal calls for the Bylaws to be modified to make it clear that:

(a) the Board's powers are limited to implementing consensus policies,
(b) the Board has no power to act outside of that limitation,  AND
(c) the IRP is empowered to declare Board actions outside of these limits invalid

So why would I be so worried about inappropriate GAC pressure?  You write

MM: Keep in mind that if GAC is included in the SMCM, any attempt to use the Community Mechanism to overturn GAC advice will automatically have 5 votes against it. ALAC has repeatedly shown that it doesn’t care about mission limitations, so there could go another 5 votes. And if GAC (as often happens) is acting as the agent of some other special interest group (say, Intellectual Property interests just to pick a random example) other votes could easily be picked up.
 

DP:  But surely the primary vehicle for "overturning GAC advice" should be the IRP - that is, if the Board adopts a policy on the basis of GAC advice, or GAC + ALAC advice, why wouldn't the (newly constituted) IRP - if it's really doing its job - say:  "you can't do that, because you're only empowered to implement consensus policy, and you don't have a consensus here?"  You seem to have given up on that, and I don't understand why.


MM:  I’d advise you to review the statements of many governments, Portugal in particular, regarding their claimed right to dictate public policy “without any limits,” their superior status when it comes to public policy, etc.


DP:  I get it that there are lots of governments out there that want to dictate policy here, and that we're trying to make sure that doesn't happen.  I think an ENFORCEABLE requirement that the Board can only implement consensus policies relating to the security/stability of the DNS is going to be the only real protection against it happening, regardless of the voting allocation formulas and/or the provisions regarding GAC advice.

David

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David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America Foundation
blog (Volokh Conspiracy) http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-post
book (Jefferson's Moose)  http://tinyurl.com/c327w2n     
music http://tinyurl.com/davidpostmusic publications etc.  http://www.davidpost.com       
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