On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 11:17 AM, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" < [log in to unmask]> wrote: > The GAC has a free seat in the NomCom but it was the decision of the GAC > not to use it. One reason was the confidentiality under wich the NomCom > operates and the inability of a potential GAC NomCom member to present a > consensus among GAC members for the proposed candidates. Whenh I chaired > the NomCom I offered on "observer" Position but even this was rejected by > the GAC. My understanding is that this is sdtill an open door but it is up > to the GAC to enter the room. > > Yes, they were approached by Nomcom during the last cycle about participation, there was even some public discussion about it (Singapore I think?), but no resolution. But what is especially germane to this conversation is that the GAC seat is a non-voting liaison. -- BK > Wolfgang > > > > > -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht----- > Von: NCSG-Discuss im Auftrag von Mueller, Milton L > Gesendet: Mo 24.08.2015 15:54 > An: [log in to unmask] > Betreff: Re: [NCSG-Discuss] Good examples of NCSG member comment on the > CCWG proposal > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > I think it is a mistake to equate the apportionment in the SM with the > > apportionment of seats on the Board of Directors, as the model suggested > in > > the comments does. For one thing, it ignores the fact that half of the > > directors are appointed by a Nomcom that represents the wider > > community's interests. Those interests need to be included in the SM. > > Actually our approach does not ignore the Nomcom at all. Where does the > Nomcom come from? Members are appointed by Constituencies in the SOs, and > by the ACs - except no members are appointed by GAC, which is as it should > be. So all the interests in Nomcom ARE represented in the SM in the more > reasonable voting allocation we have proposed, which should reflect the > _existing_ balance of stakeholder groups. > > Brenden's quantitative analysis of board influence shows that if you > weight AC/SO representation on Nomcom and combine that weight with the > Board members elected through the SOs and ALAC, ACs have about 24% > influence on the board. Yet the CCWG voting allocation proposed would give > them 48%. This is not "equal footing" this is a massive change in footing > that tilts the balance that existed before. And it was an agreed principle > of the enhanced accountability arrangements that we would NOT do that. > > In effect Avri, you are admitting that you (and ALAC, apparently) are > using the transition to alter the balance in accordance with some notions > of a "more equal" footing for certain ACs. That's not only a violation of > the prior agreement not to alter the balance, it's dangerous, because such > rebalancing can have major unintended and unanticipated effects on how > ICANN works.. > > > The issue the SM deals with are not specifically supporting organization > > issues, they won't be talking about gTLDS. They will concern oversight > issues > > of budget/strategy, changes to the bylaws, and the removal of the Board > or > > of individual Board members. These are issues that require greater > diversity > > I don't agree. Yes, some oversight issues deal with pure corporate > governance, but most of the issues will deal with the accountability of the > policy development process. This whole accountability movement was sparked > by ICANN staff/board's refusal to follow policies recommended by the SOs > and by its attempt to unilaterally impose policies on us, either due to > lobbying by business groups or by GAC. > >