On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 11:17 AM, "Kleinwächter, Wolfgang" <
[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> The GAC has a free seat in the NomCom but it was the decision of the GAC
> not to use it. One reason was the confidentiality under wich the NomCom
> operates and the inability of a potential GAC NomCom member to present a
> consensus among GAC members for the proposed candidates. Whenh I chaired
> the NomCom I offered on "observer" Position but even this was rejected by
> the GAC. My understanding is that this is sdtill an open door but it is up
> to the GAC to enter the room.
>
>
Yes, they were approached by Nomcom during the last cycle about
participation, there was even some public discussion about it (Singapore I
think?), but no resolution.  But what is especially germane to this
conversation is that the GAC seat is a non-voting liaison.

-- BK



> Wolfgang
>
>
>
>
> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> Von: NCSG-Discuss im Auftrag von Mueller, Milton L
> Gesendet: Mo 24.08.2015 15:54
> An: [log in to unmask]
> Betreff: Re: [NCSG-Discuss] Good examples of NCSG member comment on the
> CCWG proposal
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> >
> > I think it is a mistake to equate the apportionment in the SM with the
> > apportionment of seats on the Board of Directors, as the model suggested
> in
> > the comments does.  For one thing, it ignores the fact that half of the
> > directors are appointed by a Nomcom that represents the wider
> > community's interests.  Those interests need to be included in the SM.
>
> Actually our approach does not ignore the Nomcom at all. Where does the
> Nomcom come from? Members are appointed by Constituencies in the SOs, and
> by the ACs - except no members are appointed by GAC, which is as it should
> be. So all the interests in Nomcom ARE represented in the SM in the more
> reasonable voting allocation we have proposed, which should reflect the
> _existing_ balance of stakeholder groups.
>
> Brenden's quantitative analysis of board influence shows that if you
> weight AC/SO representation on Nomcom and combine that weight with the
> Board members elected through the SOs and ALAC, ACs have about 24%
> influence on the board. Yet the CCWG voting allocation proposed would give
> them 48%. This is not "equal footing" this is a massive change in footing
> that tilts the balance that existed before. And it was an agreed principle
> of the enhanced accountability arrangements that we would NOT do that.
>
> In effect Avri, you are admitting that you (and ALAC, apparently) are
> using the transition to alter the balance in accordance with some notions
> of a "more equal" footing for certain ACs. That's not only a violation of
> the prior agreement not to alter the balance, it's dangerous, because such
> rebalancing can have major unintended and unanticipated effects on how
> ICANN works..
>
> > The issue the SM  deals with are not specifically supporting organization
> > issues, they won't be talking about gTLDS.  They will concern oversight
> issues
> > of budget/strategy, changes to the bylaws, and the removal of the Board
> or
> > of individual Board members.  These are issues that require greater
> diversity
>
> I don't agree. Yes, some oversight issues deal with pure corporate
> governance, but most of the issues will deal with the accountability of the
> policy development process. This whole accountability movement was sparked
> by ICANN staff/board's refusal to follow policies recommended by the SOs
> and by its attempt to unilaterally impose policies on us, either due to
> lobbying by business groups or by GAC.
>
>