At 05:34 PM 9/1/2015, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
SNIP
DP:  I get it that there are lots of governments out there that want to dictate policy here, and that we're trying to make sure that doesn't happen.  I think an ENFORCEABLE requirement that the Board can only implement consensus policies relating to the security/stability of the DNS is going to be the only real protection against it happening, regardless of the voting allocation formulas and/or the provisions regarding GAC advice.
 
MM: What if there _is_ a rough consensus among the active constellation of actors in the ICANN regime that it should do something that is outside its mandate? There is, e.g., often consensus and/or a democratic majority in the U.S. that an unpopular speaker’s freedom of expression rights should be suppressed.

That's precisely what the IRP is for, no?  I know most of the discussion has stressed the IRP's role in constraining the Board, and that is as it should be - but if the corporation acts outside of its mandate, the IRP is/should be empowered to declare the action invalid, even if it is supported by consensus. [Put differently: the IRP constrains the community, too ...] I think that's clear from the current language in the proposal, though I could be wrong about that (in which case I'd recommend that it be fixed).
David


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David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America Foundation
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