I want to join the voices of Matthew
Shears, Bill Drake, and James Gannon here on the downside risks of
delay.
There are always risks to any change but the fabric of this change
is strong enough (and flexible enough) to deal with most stresses.
During yesterday's Senate hearing there were excellent
presentations by many and good questions by some. But, there were
areas where it was clear that the Senators do not fully
understand, and areas where ICANN has to explain things with more
clarity.
There was confusion between notions of a fragmented Internet and
the impacts of national policy. The risk of delay is that national
governments will either move to transfer ICANN's remit to another
UN or multilateral organization, which would be bad in that it
exposes the core DNS stability and security remit to a political
domain. That is why delay is risky, but this is confounded by what
I see as some confusion resulting from an inadequate recognition
of the differences between the notion of "fragmentation of the
Internet" within ICANN's DNS remit, and differential Internet
ecosystem policies in different countries. It is important that
this difference be understood. We may care about both but where
core DNS policy making resides should be clearly differentiated
and understood.
Much of regulation, including much around the broadly defined "net
neutrality" may differ from country to country, some with good
policy and some with bad policy. This is not "fragmentation"
within ICANN's remit, it is differential national policy. ICANN
could elect to show leadership and advocate for a sort of best in
class high ethical ground position about "net neutrality" but that
would be ICANN community advocacy outside ICANN's core remit. That
would not compromise ICANN's benefit corporation remit.
However, what needs to be made clear here is that a concern with
"fragmentation of the Internet" is within the security,
stability..and connectedness.. of the DNS system itself, and not
those areas of policy that will always reside within the policy
remit of national governments, and result in good, bad, or
terrible domestic policy. The Senator's question about "Net
Neutrality" suggested the need for more clarity here.
Lastly, another Senator asked "what is broken", and countered with
the principle that "If it ain't broken don't fix it". This too was
a misunderstanding of the intent of the transition, and this needs
to be explained more clearly. I suspect that many of the questions
were prompted by a sense of "Well, if I don't understand this
well, and we 'own' it, lets not give it away". The reality there,
as well put by some speakers, is that the U.S. does not own it in
any event, it is simply "out there". What is being handed over to
wider stewardship is oversight, being handed over to a very public
and transparent process where any constituency, including
governments, can ring an alarm bell should policy impacting on the
security, stability...and connectedness..." of the DNS system
start to wobble on its axis, nothing more and nothing less.
Get this transition behind us and let constituencies return to
worrying about what their respective governments are up to with
regard to Internet ecosystem policy at home, or the harmonization,
or fragmentation, of those policies in UN and multilateral
settings. That is where the next big struggles will occur and they
are beyond the ICANN DNS remit.
Sam L.