Thanks very much for this Pranesh, indeed a topic that is complex and hits many of our activities. Reading this with interest. cheers Stephanie Perrin On 2016-06-29 5:17, Pranesh Prakash wrote: > Dear all, > In CIS's submissions to the WSIS process, to the ICG, to the > CCWG-Acct, we have raised the multi-faceted issue of jurisdiction, and > why dealing with that now (before the transition) is important. Given > that it hasn't been dealt with as part of WS1, I believe the "IANA > transition" ends up being meaningless in terms of what it set out to > achieve, and what were the goals laid down in the Montevideo Statement > and in the NETmundial Statement. > > I believe civil society actors ought to discuss our positions on the > topic of jurisdiction, which frankly hasn't really happened on this list. > > To instigate debate, I've written a long-ish piece on the topic: > http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann > > > Regards, > Pranesh > > > > Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN > ====================================== > > In March 2014, the [US government announced] that they were going to > end the contract they have with ICANN to run the [Internet Assigned > Numbers Authority] (IANA), and hand over control to the “global > multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for > transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have > stakeholders “across the global Internet community”. > > Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract? > ------------------------------------------------------ > > The main reason for the U.S. government’s action is that it will get > rid of a political thorn in the U.S. government’s side: keeping the > contract allows them to be called out as having a special role in > Internet governance (with the Affirmation of Commitments between the > U.S. Department of Commerce and ICANN, the IANA contract, and the > cooperative agreement with Verisign), and engaging in unilateralism > with regard to the operation of the root servers of the Internet > naming system, while repeatedly declaring that they support a > multistakeholder model of Internet governance. > > This contradiction is what they are hoping to address. Doing away with > the NTIA contract will also increase — ever so marginally — ICANN’s > global legitimacy: this is something that world governments, civil > society organizations, and some American academics have been asking > for nearly since ICANN’s inception in 1998. For instance, here are > some demands made [in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet > Governance Caucus at WSIS, in 2005]: > >> “ICANN will negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to >> replace its California Incorporation, being careful to retain those >> aspects of its California Incorporation that enhance its >> accountability to the global Internet user community.”ICANN’s >> decisions, and any host country agreement, must be required to comply >> with public policy requirements negotiated through international >> treaties in regard to, inter alia, human rights treaties, privacy >> rights, gender agreements and trade rules. … “It is also expected >> that the multi-stakeholder community will observe and comment on the >> progress made in this process through the proposed \[Internet >> Governance\] Forum.” > > In short: the objective of the transition is political, [not > technical]. In an ideal world, we *should* aim at reducing U.S. state > control over the core of the Internet’s domain name system.[^1] > > It is our contention that **U.S. state control over the core of the > Internet’s domain name system is *not* being removed** by the > transition that is currently underway. > > Why is the Transition Happening Now? > ------------------------------------ > > Despite the U.S. government having given commitments in the past that > were going to finish the IANA transition by “September 30, 2000”, (the > [White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses] states: > “The U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be complete > before the year 2000. To the extent that the new corporation is > established and operationally stable, September 30, 2000 is intended > to be, and remains, an ‘outside’ date.”) and later by “fall of > 2006”,[^2] those turned out to be empty promises. However, this time, > the transition seems to be going through, unless the U.S. Congress > manages to halt it. > > However, in order to answer the question of “why now?” fully, one has > to look a bit at the past. > > In 1998, through the [White Paper on Management of Internet Names and > Addresses] the U.S. government [asserted it’s control over the root], > and asserted — some would say arrogated to itself — the power to put > out contracts for both the IANA functions as well as the ‘A’ Root > (i.e., the Root Zone Maintainer function that Network Solutions Inc. > then performed, and continues to perform to date in its current avatar > as Verisign). The IANA functions contract — a periodically renewable > contract — was awarded to ICANN, a California-based non-profit > corporation that was set up exclusively for this purpose, but which > evolved around the existing IANA (to placate the Internet Society). > > Meanwhile, of course, there were criticisms of ICANN from multiple > foreign governments and civil society organizations. Further, despite > it being a California-based non-profit on contract with the > government, domestically within the U.S., there was pushback from > constituencies that felt that more direct U.S. control of the DNS was > important. > > As Goldsmith and Wu summarize: > >> “Milton Mueller and others have shown that ICANN’s spirit of >> “self-regulation” was an appealing label for a process that could be >> more accurately described as the U.S. government brokering a >> behind-the-scenes deal that best suited its policy preferences … the >> United States wanted to ensure the stability of the Internet, to fend >> off the regulatory efforts of foreign governments and international >> organizations, and to maintain ultimate control. The easiest way to >> do that was to maintain formal control while turning over day-to-day >> control of the root to ICANN and the Internet Society, which had >> close ties to the regulation-shy American technology industry.” >> \[footnotes omitted\] > > And that brings us to the first reason that the NTIA announced the > transition in 2014, rather than earlier. > > ### ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough > > The NTIA now sees ICANN as being mature enough: the final transition > was announced 16 years after ICANN’s creation, and complaints about > ICANN and its legitimacy had largely died down in the international > arena in that while. Nowadays, governments across the world send their > representatives to ICANN, thus legitimizing ICANN. States have largely > been satisfied by participating in the Government Advisory Council, > which, as its name suggests, only has advisory powers. Further, unlike > in the early days, there is [no serious push for states assuming > control of ICANN]. Of course they grumble about the ICANN Board not > following their advice, but no government, as far as I am aware, has > walked out or refused to participate. > > ### L’affaire Snowden > > Many within the United States, and some without, believe that the > United States not only plays an exceptional role to play in the > running of the Internet — by dint of historical development and > dominance of American companies — but that *it ought to* have an > exceptional role because it is the best country to exercise > ‘oversight’ over ‘the Internet’ (often coming from [clueless > commentators]), and from dinosaurs of the Internet era, like [American > IP lawyers] and [American ‘homeland’ security hawks], Jones Day, who > are ICANN’s lawyers, and other [jingoists] and those policymakers who > are controlled by these narrow-minded interests. > > The Snowden revelations were, in that way, a godsend for the NTIA, as > it allowed them a fig-leaf of [international][] [criticism][] [with > which] to counter these domestic critics and carry on with a > transition that they have been seeking to put into motion for a while. > The Snowden revelations led Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, to > state in September 2013, at the 68th U.N. General Assembly, that > Brazil would “present proposals for the establishment of a [civilian > multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet]”, > and as [Diego Canabarro] points out this catalysed the U.S. government > and the technical community into taking action. > > Given this context, a few months after the Snowden revelations, the > so-called [I\* organizations] met — seemingly with the blessing of the > U.S. government[^3] — in Montevideo, and put out a [‘Statement on the > Future of Internet Governance’] that sought to link the Snowden > revelations on pervasive surveillance with the need to urgently > transition the IANA stewardship role away from the U.S. government. Of > course, the signatories to that statement knew fully well, as did most > of the readers of that statement, that there is no linkage between the > Snowden revelations about pervasive surveillance and the operations of > the DNS root, but still they, and others, linked them together. > Specifically, the I\* organizations called for “accelerating the > globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in > which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an > equal footing.” > > One could posit the existence of two other contributing factors as well. > > Given political realities in the United States, a transition of this > sort is probably best done before an ultra-jingoistic President steps > into office. > > Lastly, the ten-yearly review of the World Summit on Information > Society was currently underway. At the original WSIS (as seen from the > civil society quoted above) the issue of US control over the root was > a major issue of contention. At that point (and during where the 2006 > date for globalization of ICANN was emphasized by the US government). > > Why Jurisdiction is Important > ----------------------------- > > Jurisdiction has a great many aspects. *Inter alia*, these are: > > - Legal sanctions applicable to changes in the root zone (for > instance, what happens if a country under US sanctions requests a > change to the root zone file?) > - Law applicable to resolution of contractual disputes with > registries, registrars, etc. > - Law applicable to labour disputes. > - Law applicable to competition / antitrust law that applies to > ICANN policies and regulations. > - Law applicable to disputes regarding ICANN decisions, such as > allocation of gTLDs, or non-renewal of a contract. > - Law applicable to consumer protection concerns. > - Law applicable to financial transparency of the organization. > - Law applicable to corporate condition of the organization, > including membership rights. > - Law applicable to data protection-related policies & regulations. > - Law applicable to trademark and other speech-related policies & > regulations. > - Law applicable to legal sanctions imposed by a country against > another. > > Some of these, but not all, depend on where bodies like ICANN (the > policy-making body), the IANA functions operator (the proposed > “Post-Transition IANA”, insofar as the names function is concerned), > and the root zone maintainer are incorporated or maintain their > primary office, while others depend on the location of the office > \[for instance, Turkish labour law applies for the ICANN office in > Istanbul\], while yet others depend on what’s decided by ICANN in > contracts (for instance, the resolution of contractual disputes with > ICANN, filing of suits with regard to disputes over new generic TLDs, > etc.). > > However, an issue like sanctions, for instance, depends on where > ICANN/PTI/RMZ are incorporated and maintain their primary office. > > As [Milton Mueller notes], the current IANA contract “requires ICANN > to be incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the > IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and > provides America with greater political influence over ICANN.” > > He further notes that: > >> While it is common to assert that the U.S. has never abused its >> authority and has always taken the role of a neutral steward, this is >> not quite true. During the controversy over the .xxx domain, the Bush >> administration caved in to domestic political pressure and threatened >> to block entry of the domain into the root if ICANN approved it >> (Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, 2010). It took five >> years, an independent review challenge and the threat of litigation >> from a businessman willing to spend millions to get the .xxx domain >> into the root. > > Thus it is clear that even if the NTIA’s role in the IANA contract > goes away, jurisdiction remains an important issue. > > U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction > -------------------------------- > > In March 2014, when NTIA finally announced that they would hand over > the reins to “the global multistakeholder community”. They’ve laid > down two procedural condition: that it be developed by stakeholders > across the global Internet community and have broad community > consensus, and they have proposed 5 substantive conditions that any > proposal must meet: > > - Support and enhance the multistakeholder model; > - Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS; > - Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and > partners of the IANA services; and, > - Maintain the openness of the Internet. > - Must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is > government-led or an inter-governmental organization. > > In that announcement there is no explicit restriction on the > jurisdiction of ICANN (whether it relate to its incorporation, the > resolution of contractual disputes, resolution of labour disputes, > antitrust/competition law, tort law, consumer protection law, privacy > law, or speech law, and more, all of which impact ICANN and many, but > not all, of which are predicated on the jurisdiction of ICANN’s > incorporation), the jurisdiction(s) of the IANA Functions Operator(s) > (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need > to obey), and the jurisdiction of the Root Zone Maintainer (i.e., > which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey). > > However, Mr. Larry Strickling, the head of the NTIA, in his [testimony > before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology], > made it clear that, > >> “Frankly, if \[shifting ICANN or IANA jurisdiction\] were being >> proposed, I don’t think that such a proposal would satisfy our >> criteria, specifically the one that requires that security and >> stability be maintained.” > > Possibly, that argument made sense in 1998, due to the significant > concentration of DNS expertise in the United States. However, in 2015, > that argument is hardly convincing, and is frankly laughable.[^4] > > Targetting that remark, in ICANN 54 at Dublin, we asked Mr. Strickling: > >> “So as we understand it, the technical stability of the DNS doesn’t >> necessarily depend on ICANN’s jurisdiction being in the United >> States. So I wanted to ask would the US Congress support a >> multistakeholder and continuing in the event that it’s shifting >> jurisdiction.” > > Mr. Strickling’s response was: > >> “No. I think Congress has made it very clear and at every hearing >> they have extracted from Fadi a commitment that ICANN will remain >> incorporated in the United States. Now the jurisdictional question >> though, as I understand it having been raised from some other >> countries, is not so much jurisdiction in terms of where ICANN is >> located. It’s much more jurisdiction over the resolution of disputes. >> >> “And that I think is an open issue, and that’s an appropriate one to >> be discussed. And it’s one I think where ICANN has made some movement >> over time anyway. >> >> “So I think you have to … when people use the word jurisdiction, we >> need to be very precise about over what issues because where disputes >> are resolved and under what law they’re resolved, those are separate >> questions from where the corporation may have a physical headquarters.” > > As we have shown above, jurisdiction is not only about the > jurisdiction of “resolution of disputes”, but also, as Mueller reminds > us, about the requirement that ICANN (and now, the PTI) be > “incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA > functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides > America with greater political influence over ICANN.” > > In essence, the U.S. government has essentially said that they would > veto the transition if the jurisdiction of ICANN or PTI’s > incorporation were to move out of the U.S., and they can prevent that > from happening *after* the transition, since as things stand ICANN and > PTI will still come within the U.S. Congress’s jurisdiction. > > Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction? > ------------------------------------------------ > > Will the ICG proposal or the proposed new ICANN by-laws reduce > existing U.S. control? No, they won’t. (In fact, as we will argue > below, the proposed new ICANN by-laws make this problem even worse.) > The proposal by the names community (“the CWG proposal”) still has a > requirement (in Annex S) that the Post-Transition IANA (PTI) be > incorporated in the United States, and a similar suggestion hidden > away as a footnote. Further, the proposed by-laws for ICANN include > the requirement that PTI be a California corporation. There was no > discussion specifically on this issue, nor any documented community > agreement on the specific issue of jurisdiction of PTI’s incorporation. > > Why wasn’t there greater discussion and consideration of this issue? > Because of two reasons: First, there were many that argued that the > transition would be vetoed by the U.S. government and the U.S. > Congress if ICANN and PTI were not to remain in the U.S. Secondly, the > ICANN-formed ICG saw the US government’s actions very narrowly, as > though the government were acting in isolation, ignoring the rich > dialogue and debate that’s gone on earlier about the transition since > the incorporation of ICANN itself. > > While it would be no one’s case that political considerations should > be given greater weightage than technical considerations such as > security, stability, and resilience of the domain name system, it is > shocking that political considerations have been completely absent in > the discussions in the number and protocol parameters communities, and > have been extremely limited in the discussions in the names community. > This is even more shocking considering that the main reason for this > transition is, as has been argued above, political. > > It can be also argued that the certain IANA functions such as Root > Zone Management function have a considerable political implication. It > is imperative that the political nature of the function is duly > acknowledged and dealt with, in accordance with the wishes of the > global community. In the current process the political aspects of the > IANA function has been completely overlooked and sidelined. It is > important to note that this transition has not been a necessitated by > any technical considerations. It is primarily motivated by political > and legal considerations. However, the questions that the ICG asked > the customer communities to consider were solely technical. Indeed, > the communities could have chosen to overlook that, but they did not > choose to do so. For instance, while the IANA customer community > proposals reflected on existing jurisdictional arrangements, they did > not reflect on how the jurisdictional arrangements should be > post-transition , while this is one of the questions at the heart of > the entire transition. There were no discussions and decisions as to > the jurisdiction of the Post-Transition IANA: the Accountability > CCWG’s lawyers, Sidley Austin, recommended that the PTI ought to be a > California non-profit corporation, and this finds mention in a > footnote without even having been debated by the “global > multistakeholder community”, and subsequently in the proposed new > by-laws for ICANN. > > Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why “Work Stream 2” Can’t Address > Most Jurisdiction Issues > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > The by-laws could have chosen to simply stayed silent on the matter of > what law PTI would be incorporated under, but instead the by-law make > the requirement of PTI being a California non-profit public benefit > corporation part of the *fundamental by-laws*, which are close to > impossible to amend. > > While “Work Stream 2” (the post-transition work related to improving > ICANN’s accountability) has jurisdiction as a topic of consideration, > the scope of that must necessarily discount any consideration of > shifting the jurisdiction of incorporation of ICANN, since all of the > work done as part of CCWG Accountability’s “Work Stream 1”, which are > now reflected in the proposed new by-laws, assume Californian > jurisdiction (including the legal model of the “Empowered Community”). > Is ICANN prepared to re-do all the work done in WS1 in WS2 as well? If > the answer is yes, then the issue of jurisdiction can actually be > addressed in WS2. If the answer is no — and realistically it is — > then, the issue of jurisdiction can only be very partially addressed > in WS2. > > Keeping this in mind, we recommended specific changes in the by-laws, > all of which were rejected by CCWG’s lawyers. > > The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement > -------------------------------------------------- > > The [NETmundial Multistakeholder Document], which was an outcome of > the NETmundial process, states: > >> In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US >> Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of >> IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the >> transparency and accountability of those functions after the US >> Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with >> the participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN >> community >> >> \[…\] >> >> It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN speeds up >> leading to a truly international and global organization serving the >> public interest with clearly implementable and verifiable >> accountability and transparency mechanisms that satisfy requirements >> from both internal stakeholders and the global community. >> >> The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN >> structure from all regions is a key issue in the process of a >> successful globalization. > > As our past analysis has shown, the IANA transition process and the > discussions on the mailing lists that shaped it [were neither global > nor multistakeholder]. The DNS industry represented in ICANN is > largely US-based. 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of > America, whereas less than 1% of ICANN-registered registrars are from > Africa. Two-thirds of the Business Constituency in ICANN is from the > USA. While ICANN-the-corporation has sought to become more global, the > ICANN community has remained insular, and this will not change until > the commercial interests involved in ICANN can become more diverse, > reflecting the diversity of users of the Internet, and a TLD like .COM > can be owned by a non-American corporation and the PTI can be a > non-American entity. > > What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience > --------------------------------------- > > It is no one’s case that the United States is less fit than any other > country as a base for ICANN, PTI, or the Root Zone Maintainer, or even > as the headquarters for 9 of the world’s 12 root zone operators > (Verisign runs both the A and J root servers). However, just as having > multiplicity of root servers is important for ensuring technical > resilience of the DNS system (and this is shown in the uptake of > Anycast by root server operators), it is equally important to have > immunity of core DNS functioning from political pressures of the > country or countries where core DNS infrastructure is legally situated > and to ensure that we have diversity in terms of legal jurisdiction. > > Towards this end, we at CIS have pushed for the concept of > “jurisdictional resilience”, encompassing three crucial points: > > - Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions > (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders > from the state in which they are legally situated. > - Division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions > - Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical > implementation functions > > Of these, the most important is the limited legal immunity (akin to a > greatly limited form of the immunity that UN organizations get from > the laws of their host countries). This kind of immunity could be > provided through a variety of different means: a host-country > agreement; a law passed by the legislature; a U.N. General Assembly > Resolution; a U.N.-backed treaty; and other such options exist. We are > currently investigating which of these options would be the best option. > > And apart from limited legal immunity, distribution of jurisdictional > control is also valuable. As we noted in our submission to the ICG in > September 2015: > >> Following the above precepts would, for instance, mean that the >> entity that performs the role of the Root Zone Maintainer should not >> be situated in the same legal jurisdiction as the entity that >> functions as the policymaking venue. This would in turn mean that >> either the Root Zone Maintainer function be taken up Netnod >> (Sweden-headquartered) or the WIDE Project (Japan-headquartered) \[or >> RIPE-NCC, headquartered in the Netherlands\], or that if the IANA >> Functions Operator(s) is to be merged with the RZM, then the IFO be >> relocated to a jurisdiction other than those of ISOC and ICANN. This, >> as has been stated earlier, has been a demand of the Civil Society >> Internet Governance Caucus. Further, it would also mean that root >> zone servers operators be spread across multiple jurisdictions (which >> the creation of mirror servers in multiple jurisdictions will not >> address). > > However, the issue of jurisdiction seems to be dead-on-arrival, having > been killed by the United States government. > > Unfortunately, despite the primary motivation for demands for the IANA > transition being those of removing the power the U.S. government > exercises over the core of the Internet’s operations in the form of > the DNS, what has ended up happening through the IANA transition is > that these powers have not only not been removed, but in some ways > they have been entrenched further! While earlier, the U.S. had to > specify that the IANA functions operator had to be located in the > U.S., now ICANN’s by-laws themselves will state that the > post-transition IANA will be a California corporation. Notably, while > the Montevideo Declaration speaks of “globalization” of ICANN and of > the IANA functions, as does the NETmundial statement, the NTIA > announcement on their acceptance of the transition proposals speaks of > “privatization” of ICANN, and not “globalization”. > > All in all, the “independence” that IANA is gaining from the U.S. is > akin to the “independence” that Brazil gained from Portugal in 1822. > Dom Pedro of Brazil was then ruling Brazil as the Prince Regent since > his father Dom João VI, the King of United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil > and the Algarves had returned to Portugal. In 1822, Brazil declared > independence from Portugal (which was formally recognized through a > treaty in 1825). Even after this “independence”, Dom Pedro continued > to rule Portugal just as he had before indepedence, and Dom João VI > was provided the title of “Emperor of Brazil”, aside from being King > of the United Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves. The “indepedence” > didn’t make a whit of a difference to the self-sufficiency of Brazil: > Portugal continued to be its largest trading partner. The > “independence” didn’t change anything for the nearly 1 million slaves > in Brazil, or to the lot of the indigenous peoples of Brazil, none of > whom were recognized as “free”. It had very little consequence not > just in terms of ground conditions of day-to-day living, but even in > political terms. > > Such is the case with the IANA Transition: U.S. power over the core > functioning of the Domain Name System do not stand diminished after > the transition, and they can even arguably be said to have become even > more entrenched. Meet the new boss: same as the old boss. > > [^1]: It is an allied but logically distinct issue that U.S. > businesses — registries and registrars — dominate the global DNS > industry, and as a result hold the reins at ICANN. > > [^2]: As Goldsmith & Wu note in their book *Who Controls the > Internet*: “Back in 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce promised to > relinquish root authority by the fall of 2006, but in June 2005, the > United States reversed course. “The United States Government intends > to preserve the security and stability of the Internet’s Domain Name > and Addressing System (DNS),” announced Michael D. Gallagher, a > Department of Commerce official. “The United States” he announced, > will “maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or > modifications to the authoritative root zone file.” > > [^3]: Mr. Fadi Chehadé revealed in an interaction with Indian > participants at ICANN 54 that he had a meeting “at the White House” > about the U.S. plans for transition of the IANA contract before he > spoke about that when [he visited India in October 2013] making the > timing of his White House visit around the time of the Montevideo > Statement. > > [^4]: As an example, [NSD], software that is used on multiple root > servers, is funded by a Dutch foundation and a Dutch corporation, and > written mostly by European coders. > > [US government announced]: > https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions > [Internet Assigned Numbers Authority]: https://www.iana.org/ > [in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus > at WSIS, in 2005]: > https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/sca/hbf-29.doc > [not technical]: > [White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses]: > https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/white-paper-2012-02-25-en > [asserted it’s control over the root]: > http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/mueller_icann_and_internet_governance.pdf > [no serious push for states assuming control of ICANN]: > http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/05/24/threat-analysis-of-itus-wcit-part-1-historical-context/ > [clueless commentators]: > http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303563304579447362610955656 > [American IP lawyers]: > http://www.circleid.com/posts/20140316_if_the_stakeholders_already_control_the_internet_netmundial_iana/ > [American ‘homeland’ security hawks]: > http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/who-controls-the-internet-address-book-icann-ntia-and-iana/ > [jingoists]: > http://homepages.wmich.edu/~cooneys/poems/cummings.nextto.html > [international]: > http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4529516c-c713-11e3-889e-00144feabdc0.html > [criticism]: > https://www.rt.com/usa/nsa-fallout-relinquish-internet-oversight-002/ > [with which]: > https://twitter.com/carolinegreer/status/454253411576598528 > [civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the > Internet]: > https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf > [Diego Canabarro]: https://icannwiki.com/Diego_Canabarro > [I\* organizations]: https://www.apnic.net/community/ecosystem/i*orgs > [‘Statement on the Future of Internet Governance’]: > https://www.apnic.net/publications/news/2013/montevideo-statement-on-future-of-internet-cooperation > [Milton Mueller notes]: > http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96 > [testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and > Technology]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v-yWye5I0w&feature=youtu.be > [NETmundial Multistakeholder Document]: > http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf > [were neither global nor multistakeholder]: > cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder > [he visited India in October 2013]: > http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-22/news/43288531_1_icann-internet-corporation-us-centric-internet > [NSD]: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/nsd/ > >