For example, some bold and stupid move by NTIA could reopen the question
of IANA's ultimate authority.
http://domainincite.com/ntia-says-icann-does-not-meet-the-requirements-for-iana-renewal/
I believe it lies with the people, the global people, that is.
Nicolas
On 3/10/2012 12:14 PM, Nicolas Adam wrote:
> Authority lies where people say it does. Historically, IANA could have
> befell elsewhere (gTLD-MOU, BWG, not to mention competing root
> alliances) and as a matter of present-day political reality, I would
> argue that NTIA authority on the root, which is variously asserted, is
> weak. If enough people agree that it lies elsewhere, it does. Such is
> the politics of "authority". It's never an immovable reified object,
> but always an intersubjectively recasted thing that needs both
> assertions and recognition. The interface between assertion and
> recognition, is an elastic political space which we call legitimacy.
>
> Nicolas
>
> On 3/10/2012 11:58 AM, Carlos A. Afonso wrote:
>> Hmmm... "authority assertion" of the root lies with NTIA... Icann
>> continues to be just a contractor, whatever the nice "affirmations of
>> commitments" say. So in the last instance, domains within TLDs
>> operated by US-based companies (as registries) can be seized, and
>> there may be nothing that registrars can do. Disastrous, but true.
>>
>> --c.a.
>>
>> On 03/10/2012 02:06 AM, Nicolas Adam wrote:
>>> Disregarding the thorny issue that it must be done sometimes for botnet
>>> and such, and just concentrating on the
>>> political/jurisdictional/authority/flow-down-contract issue:
>>>
>>> IANA/Icann can *assert* *its* authority on the root file and say to VS
>>> something like: don't disrupt DNS connectivity in other parts of the
>>> world via changes in the root. You may safely respond to local querries
>>> within your technical capability, but this is off limit.
>>>
>>> I'm not arguing now that this would necessarily be sound policy (it
>>> would clearly be regarding IPR, less clearly with spambots), but it's
>>> got everything to do with authority assertion (or lack thereof) on the
>>> root.
>>>
>>> I will be happy to learn be being contradicted in 7 different ways.
>>>
>>> Nicolas
>>>
>>> On 3/9/2012 9:50 PM, Milton L Mueller wrote:
>>>> I am no fan of the domain name seizures but there is an unfortunate
>>>> level of confusion about what is really at issue here.
>>>> The domain seizures imposed on VeriSign actually have nothing to do
>>>> with the fact that the US controls the authoritative root zone file.
>>>> Rather, they are allowed by the fact that the domains are registered
>>>> under .com, and the .com registry falls under US jurisdiction. We
>>>> could delegate root zone authority to the ITU, the United Nations, the
>>>> IGF, Russia, China or the IGP and it wouldn't make one bit of
>>>> difference to the ability of the FBI, ICE, or any other US authority
>>>> to order Verisign to disable a second level domain registered under
>>>> .com. Only Verisign, the operator of the .com registry, can without
>>>> the consent of the registrant redirect a dns query from the nameserver
>>>> for foo.com to ice.gov.
>>>>
>>>> IANA cannot do this. ICANN cannot do this.
>>>>
>>>> Just so you know.
>>>>
>>>> --MM
>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On
>>>>> Behalf Of
>>>>> Adam Peake
>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 07, 2012 2:01 AM
>>>>> To: [log in to unmask]
>>>>> Subject: Re: [NCSG-Discuss] Fwd: [governance] Verisign seizes .com
>>>>> domain registered via foreign Registrar on behalf of US Authorities
>>>>>
>>>>> Anyone know how many of the take-downs have used Verisign?
>>>>>
>>>>> And wonder how many of the new TLD applicants have selected US-based
>>>>> technical providers.
>>>>>
>>>>> During WSIS civil society frequently commented on US' unilateral
>>>>> control
>>>>> of the root as unacceptable. Many submissions made, can only find
>>>>> this
>>>>> now... from 2005:
>>>>>
>>>>> "We would like to underscore that unilateral control of the root zone
>>>>> file is a public policy issue. We agree with WGIG that in future no
>>>>> single government should have a pre-eminent role in global
>>>>> governance of
>>>>> the logical infrastructure of the Internet."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Perhaps time to make it a public policy issue again? With the AoC and
>>>>> other improvements the US has been pretty good since WSIS. These name
>>>>> seizures are a nasty step back.
>>>>>
>>>>> Adam
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 7, 2012 at 10:58 AM, Nicolas
>>>>> Adam<[log in to unmask]>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>> There is also this article [tech dirt] that is very interesting,
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> goes along the one that you referenced below [blog easyDNS] (and
>>>>>> that
>>>>>> is well worth highlighting a second time for this crowd).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This goes straight to the heart of ICANN's legitimacy. It goes to
>>>>>> who
>>>>>> they cater to, who they don't oppose, to the limit of its autonomy,
>>>>>> what perception of itself it conveys through its actions and
>>>>> inactions, etc.
>>>>>> I don't pretend to have a ready diplomatic/political fix that ICANN
>>>>>> can just roll-out as a guide going forward. But it seems to me that
>>>>>> its political choices, prudent and wise as they may seem to the ones
>>>>>> in charge (or the ones preparing Dan's one-pagers), are
>>>>>> unfortunately
>>>>>> the hallmark of a lack of identity and the signs of a sure downfall.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No new type of political body like ICANN can survive without making
>>>>> its bed.
>>>>>> Somehow, somewhere. How it manages itself now, marvelously
>>>>>> noncommittally, only serves at alienating stakeholders that could
>>>>>> otherwise turn out to support it. And it never gets anything to show
>>>>>> for it from the ones that it punctually accommodate.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I see this as a very important Board-level long term issue, that
>>>>>> needs
>>>>>> strong leadership and attention. The users (writ large) will not
>>>>>> tolerate ICANN if it cannot provide consistency and predictability,
>>>>>> that is, an identity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nicolas
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 3/1/2012 8:17 AM, Adam Peake wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Is this new, or just more of what ICE has been doing before. I don't
>>>>>> remember if Verisign's been used in this way before. Clip from the
>>>>>> blog post (link below)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "We all know that with some US-based Registrars (*cough* Godaddy
>>>>>> *cough*), all it takes is a badge out of a box of crackerjacks
>>>>>> and you
>>>>>> have the authority to fax in a takedown request which has a good
>>>>>> shot
>>>>>> at being honoured. We also know that some non-US registrars, it
>>>>>> takes
>>>>>> a lot more "due process-iness" to get a domain taken down.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But now, none of that matters, because in this case the State of
>>>>>> Maryland simply issued a warrant to .com operator Verisign, (who is
>>>>>> headquartered in California) who then duly updated the rootzone for
>>>>>> .com with two new NS records for bodog.com which now redirect the
>>>>>> domain to the takedown page."
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Adam
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>>>>>> From: michael gurstein<[log in to unmask]>
>>>>>> Date: Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 9:47 PM
>>>>>> Subject: [governance] Verisign seizes .com domain registered via
>>>>>> foreign Registrar on behalf of US Authorities
>>>>>> To: [log in to unmask]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> http://blog2.easydns.org/2012/02/29/verisign-seizes-com-domain-registe
>>>>>>
>>>>>> red-vi a-foreign-registrar-on-behalf-of-us-authorities/
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
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>>>
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