hi milton

please don't mind if i skip right to the end of your piece.. and say 
'yes - i'm glad i asked' ;) - this is useful..

i realise of course that most of this is about the political process 
- so now, i feel like i have a goodly amount of both..
politics and process

would anyone else like to comment on milton's lively description of 
the GNSO/PDP process? ( read your comments mawaki, thanks..)

karen

At 17:24 18/02/2007, Milton Mueller wrote:
> >>> karen banks <[log in to unmask]> 2/18/2007 10:58 AM >>>
>
> >i'm interested in this now when thinking about the nomcom process..
> >how one would describe the nature of GSNO policy development to
> >potential candidates who aren't necessarily ICANN insiders.. but who
> >may bring useful skills, expertise and perspectives to the process..
>
>One must start with a political analysis, not a process analysis. Who
>has power over which decisions?
>
>Start with the Board and CEO/staff. They make the basic decisions and
>are basically agents of the USG., operating with some slack. The slack
>tightens around the time the IANA contract or MoU (JPA) is renegotiated,
>and loosens as those dates become farther away. Any major interest (IPR,
>VeriSign, registrars) can also threaten to litigate or make noise before
>the US Congress, thereby swaying or influencing the Board/staff to some
>degree. Since WSIS, GAC has also become more important, its so-called
>"principles" or communiques act as guides or constraints. For people on
>the Board, GNSO Task Forces are perceived as tiny little peeps in the
>cacophony oflobbying surrounding them. ICANN Board is partly
>self-perpetuating with NomComm always more or less under the control of
>a group of ISOC-linked old timers.
>
>How is the GNSO and its PDP related to the Board?
>
>GNSO Council is supposed to formulate policy on anything having to do
>with domain names. Board can ask GNSO for policy on something, or GNSO
>can initiate. Whatever the GNSO can decide on becomes "policy advice"
>that is fed up to the Board and is supposed to guide its decisions. It
>usually does to some degree, but Board always feels free to make its own
>modifications and interpretations, and God is always in the details of
>staff implementations. Chair of the GNSO engages in constant liaison
>with staff and Board and serves a very important gatekeeping role wrt to
>what is acted on and how it is acted on.
>
>To understand the GNSO Council, one must look at its constituencies and
>members, and do the basic political arithmetic. There are 6
>constituencies. Each constituency elects 3 Council members, plus 3
>additional members are put on by the Nomcom. Three of the constituencies
>-- Business, Trademark and ISPs -- consistently support a restrictive
>and regulatory approach to DNS policy in order to protect trademark and
>copyright. ISPs are in that category because they are all owned by big
>telecom companies. Two constituencies -- registrars and registries --
>represent the domain name industry and have double votes on the Council.
>Registries, with only about 9 members, are a tightly knit group that
>always votes the same; registrars are a diverse, competitive lot and
>have trouble reaching consensus. Then there is NCUC, the only
>non-business group. To achieve what is rather cynically called
>"consensus" the Council must get a 2/3 plus vote. So, do the math:
>Total votes: 27. Axis: 9 votes. Registries and registrars: 12 votes.
>NCUC: 3 votes. Nomcom appointees: 3 votes
>
>A coalition of NCUC, registrars, registries, and Nomcoms can push
>something through.
>A coallition of Axis, registries and registrars can too. etc., etc. --
>do your own permutations.
>On many if not most issues this group will be deadlocked, reaching
>sub-consensus levels. This serves the interest of the status quo. If any
>proposal for serious policy change, a lack of complete consensus at the
>GNSO level leaves the door open for conservative forces on the board to
>modify or ignore GNSO initiatives.
>
>To formulate policy, GNSO Council decides to create a "Task Force" (TF)
>along the lines suggested by the formal policy development process PDP.
>The Task Force mus tbe guided by a "Terms of Reference" (ToR) describing
>what it is supposed to do. Agreeing to create a TF and drafting its ToR
>is very time consuming and difficult. Basically it's impossible without
>the support of the GNSO Chair.
>
>TFs are chaired by some Council member. The chairs are often amateurs
>in terms of moderating the people and process. TFs often turn into mush
>because they have no clear voting procedures or procedural guidelines
>for what is in or out of order, so they can be and are gamed; e.g., huge
>delaying tactics, introducing dilatory proposals, endless telephone
>discussions. As the Whois process shows, controversial issues can remain
>in the TF stage for years.
>
>Recently, ICANN staff members have taken a more active role in managing
>TFs. Their basic interest is to show that ICANN can actually accomplish
>something. Some staff are more aggressive than others. Years ago it used
>to be the case that staff reports reflected shadowy internal ICANN/USG
>politics but this is no longer the case they have become much more
>professional and autonomous. Probably staff should supplant Council or
>TF members as the de facto administrative chairs of the TFs, so that the
>trains run on time.
>
>TFs don't really make policy they make reports that are put up for
>public comment and then voted on by the GNSO Council. After passing the
>Council they go to the Board. See the section on Board politics....
>
>aren't you glad you asked?
>
>
>
>Dr. Milton Mueller
>Syracuse University School of Information Studies
>http://www.digital-convergence.org
>http://www.internetgovernance.org