+1

On Tue, 15 Jul 2014 10:04:32 -0400, Stephanie Perrin  
<[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> I have hesitated to comment on this, professing no particular expertise
> in this area of govt.  However, it seems to me that:
>
>   * IANA transition is inherently political, possibly more so than other
>     GAC issues where chances of agreement are always slim
>   * I see three obvious blocs in the GAC and potentially more (Europe, 5
>     Eyes, BRICS, then the others)
>   * Forcing the GAC to pick (or even enunciate) who the reps would be if
>     there were only two would actually cause more harm than the benefit
>     of having limited representation, by forcing matters and alignments.
>   * The important thing here as Sam has recently pointed out is to keep
>     the scope limited for this committee (they are not sorting out the
>     policy)
>
> For those reasons, I would let them have 5, with caveats that this is a
> one time deal, don't be looking for it in all future cross-constituency
> working groups (good luck with that one, I nominate Milton to police
> that).  Note that I am aware that the IANA transition should not be as
> political as it is, (given the technical nature of the matter) but
> that's life I think.
>
> I could be all wrong in this, (note caveat in first line) but here is my
> 2cents.
> Stephanie
>
> On 2014-07-15, 7:41, Amr Elsadr wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>> Yeah…, 5 out of 30 wouldn’t make GAC a super power, but what regional  
>> organisational structure are you referring to? Is there a regional  
>> organisational structure within the GAC (similar to the RALOs of the  
>> At-Large community for example)? I am not aware of one. There is a  
>> chair and there are vice chairs. The vice chairs are meant to (to the  
>> extent possible) represent the geographic diversity of the GAC members.  
>> This, as far as I can tell, excludes nation states that are not members  
>> of the GAC.
>>
>> So although 5 out of 30 won’t necessarily be detrimental to the outcome  
>> of the group, I see no practical reason why they need 3 additional  
>> reps. They obviously feel this need exists. The reason they provided  
>> doesn’t seem to make sense (to me at least), and has nothing to do with  
>> the ration of govt. to non-govt. members of the group.
>>
>> Before rushing to comply with their request, I would suggest that  
>> further clarification of their reasoning be provided.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> Amr
>>
>> On Jul 14, 2014, at 5:13 AM, Adam <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>
>>> On Jul 14, 2014, at 7:20 AM, Robin Gross wrote:
>>>
>>>> I agree that we should resist GAC demands to obtain preferential  
>>>> treatment or disproportionate make-up of this coordination group.
>>>
>>> Disagree very strongly.  5 members from what would become a 30 strong  
>>> group is not disproportionate.  If "multi-stakeholder" is to have any  
>>> meaning then for one of the core representative groups to only have 2  
>>> members from 27 is ridiculous.
>>>
>>> <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-06-06-en#annex-one>
>>>
>>> 5 of 30 would not in anyway cause government to be come some super  
>>> power, but it would allow them to select representatives to reflect  
>>> their regional organizational structure.
>>>
>>> If we want this process to work, then preparing for  the first meeting  
>>> by welcoming five members from GAC would be a good start.
>>>
>>> Adam
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> I'd leave it at 2 members from GAC in the coordination group (unless  
>>>> GNSO and especially noncommercial users) are provided additional  
>>>> positions in the group).
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Robin
>>>>
>>>> On Jul 12, 2014, at 12:45 PM, Amr Elsadr wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Dan, Milton and all,
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jul 12, 2014, at 8:52 PM, Dan Krimm <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> [SNIP]
>>>>>
>>>>>> If GAC is really trying to gain proportionally greater influence on  
>>>>>> the CG,
>>>>>> then I think that should be forcefully resisted.
>>>>> +1.
>>>>>
>>>>>> If GAC just wants to have accurate expression of its varied views  
>>>>>> (and thinks that requires all
>>>>>> "viewers" being explicitly present), then that should be extended  
>>>>>> equally
>>>>>> to other SGs at the same time.  All or nothing.
>>>>> As per my understanding, GAC communiques are drafted using consensus  
>>>>> amongst their members (in the absence of any formal objection). In  
>>>>> the case of an inability to reach the required level of  
>>>>> decision-making, the GAC Chair is required to convey the full range  
>>>>> of views expressed by the membership. It has always been their modus  
>>>>> operandi to use this decision making mechanism. I don’t understand  
>>>>> why it is suddenly becoming an issue with this coordination group,  
>>>>> unless of course, it is an attempt to (as Milton puts it) make the  
>>>>> group into a voting body rather than a representative one liaising  
>>>>> with its own AC within the ICANN community. This kind of  
>>>>> representation doesn’t apply to a collective of the four SGs within  
>>>>> the GNSO, so I would (IMHO) avoid conflating the two issues. Four  
>>>>> (or more) representatives from the GNSO shouldn’t equate to more  
>>>>> reps from the GAC.
>>>>>
>>>>> One representative should be enough to liaise with the GAC. A second  
>>>>> one serves as backup, which may very well be needed. Five (one for  
>>>>> each world region) sounds a bit over-the-top to me.
>>>>>
>>>>> For more on GAC operating procedures in this context, please check  
>>>>> Principle 47 and the footnote at the bottom of the page found here:  
>>>>> https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/GAC+Operating+Principles
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks.
>>>>>
>>>>> Amr
>


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