Thanks all - interesting perspectives, cheers. 
Another naïve question: would the fact that some governments may have
applied for new gTLDs in the new round have implications for their future
relationship with the GNSO? 

Joy 

-----Original Message-----
From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of
Milton L Mueller
Sent: Monday, 14 May 2012 6:21 a.m.
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: FW: [council] Prague - please read!

> -----Original Message-----
> 
> We've talked about this with the GAC before, and it mostly ended up 
> with them telling us about all the reasons why they can't really 
> engage much in joint working relationships with GNSO and prefer to 
> deal with the board.

Yes, Bill is right. I am wondering how long it is going to take everyone
involved to understand what I have been saying for years now: the GAC is a
major structural flaw in ICANN's governance model. 

When the GAC says that they can't engage in joint working relationships with
the GNSO, what they are really doing is creating a parallel, competing
policy development entity that contends with GNSO in the offering of policy
advice to the board. This is probably not deliberately destructive on the
part of its members; it stems from their belief that it is inappropriate for
governmental representatives to work in the bottom up, WG method used by the
GNSO. It is also a reflection of their inability to work bottom up, as GAC
members usually lack expertise on the issues and do not have the freedom to
commit themselves to any compromises or positions without passing it up and
down bureaucratic hierarchies.

Whatever the motives, these contending policy advisors shatter the
legitimacy and accountability of both GAC and GNSO, and undermine board
accountability as well. There really is no defined policy making process,
where balanced representation and "consensus" holds sway. There is, rather,
a bunch of different entities tugging and pulling on the board's sleeves,
trying to get its attention and sway their decision.