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From:
David Post <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
David Post <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Wed, 12 Aug 2015 08:46:38 -0400
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Excellent analysis ...

Now that he's dug into it, do you think Brenden (whom I'm cc'ing 
here) could be persuaded to analyze the current voting model not just 
in terms of the way it matches (or doesn't match) ICANN's historical 
distribution of power, but in terms of the way in which the voting 
allocation would impact the various provisions elsewhere in the 
proposal for community action by majority or super-majority 
vote?  That is, it would be worth knowing exactly (a) which actions 
require a majority of the community votes (15 out of 29), which a 
supermajority (of 66% (= 20 votes) or 75% (= 22 votes)) and (b) what 
kinds of "coalitions" within the community could, under the different 
allocations, block particular actions.  There's a big difference 
among the three alternatives in the way each distributes "veto" power 
over community action; e.g.
         Alternative 3 gives any one of the SOs the ability to 
singlehandedly block any action requiring 75% concurrence, while the 
other three alternatives would require any one SO to join forces with 
some other component in order to reach the veto threshold;
         Alternatives 1 and 2 would allow any two of the groups (e.g. 
the ALAC and the GAC, or the GNSO and the RSSAC, etc.) to join 
together to block any proposed community action; the currently 
proposed allocation differs from this, in that a veto would require a 
coalition between either (a) any two of the "big" components (the 
three SOs along with ALAC and GAC), or (b) any one of them plus the 
two smaller components (RSSAC and SSAC) could do so.

I would think this would have a substantial impact on the way the 
community expresses its collective "will," and it would be great if 
there were a good systematic analysis of the matter out there ...

David



At 02:20 PM 8/11/2015, Mueller, Milton L wrote:
>Dr. Brenden Kuerbis of IGP has developed a very important analysis 
>of the CCWG's proposed voting distribution model, which we need to 
>take into account when developing our comments.
>Read it here: 
>http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/08/11/ccwg-community-mechanism-threatens-to-upset-icann-balance/#comment-40415
>
>Dr. Milton L. Mueller
>Professor, School of Public Policy
>Georgia Institute of Technology
>
>

*******************************
David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America Foundation
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