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Subject:
From:
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Mon, 31 Aug 2015 07:16:16 -0600
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Dear Brett,

I understand your suggestion. But I don´t understand the conditional “if”


Thanks

Carlos Raúl Gutiérrez
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> On Aug 31, 2015, at 6:54 AM, Schaefer, Brett <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> 
> 
> Milton,
>  
> Thanks for highlighting this important issue. I think everyone knows our position based on our submitted comment, but Paul and I agree that the joint comment should strongly oppose inclusion of the GAC as a voting participant in the community mechanism if they wish to retain their privileged advisory status.
>  
> Best,
>  
> Brett
>  
>  
>  
> 
> 
> Brett Schaefer
> Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
> Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy
> The Heritage Foundation
> 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
> Washington, DC 20002
> 202-608-6097
> heritage.org <http://heritage.org/>
> 
> 
> From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Mueller, Milton L
> Sent: Sunday, August 30, 2015 3:11 PM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Some ruminations on GAC in relation to NCSG comments on the CCWG proposal
>  
> I’ve been reviewing the transcripts of the ICANN 53 (Buenos Aires) meeting in an attempt to understand better the way the GAC will handle the dilemma it has been put into by the community empowerment mechanism. You can see the preliminary results of my ruminations here: http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/08/29/gac-as-first-among-equals-the-danger-in-the-accountability-plan/ <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/08/29/gac-as-first-among-equals-the-danger-in-the-accountability-plan/>
>  
> So much for “equal footing.” The GAC repeatedly refers to itself as “first among equals” and they revel in this privileged status.
>  
> But these facts need to be reflected in our comments on the CCWG proposal. Ironically, these readings, when considered in connection with an assessment of the impact of GAC “advice” on ICANN’s policy process, might change my prior opposition to including governments in the community mechanism. If we give GAC equal status in the community mechanism and TAKE AWAY their special advice status, we are closer to “equal footing” than we are now. Indeed, it may be that the privileged advisory power is more dangerous and distortive of ‘equal footing’ than their participation in the community mechanism would be. While many of us assume that GAC’s “Advisory” status limits its power, in fact its privileged channel to the board elevates governments above all other stakeholders in the policy making process. If one reviews the history of the new TLD program, for example, one can see how GAC advice was repeatedly used to delay, hijack and change the policy developed by the GNSO. So maybe Heritage Foundation was right: force them to choose between privileged advice or participation in the community mechanism. Or, maybe we should actually PREFER their inclusion in the community mechanism to continued special status of advice.
>  
> Two things to avoid like the plague:  
> 1)      Giving GAC BOTH privileged advisory status AND participation in the community mechanism
> 2)      Giving GAC a similar privileged advisory status over the community mechanism (e.g., GAC would not participate directly but would “advise” the empowered community, which would translate into an effective veto, delay or dilution of the community’s powers).
>  
> Well, it seems unlikely that the special advisory power would be taken away. So if we don’t oppose their inclusion in the community mechanism, there is a risk that they will get both. Indeed, it seems highly likely to me that many members of GAC will respond to the CCWG dilemma by demanding option 1) or 2).  Still not sure how to play this.
>  
> Your thoughts?
>  
> Dr. Milton L. Mueller
> Professor, School of Public Policy
> Georgia Institute of Technology
>  
>  
> 



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