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Subject:
From:
Sam Lanfranco <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Sam Lanfranco <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Mon, 25 Aug 2014 10:22:19 -0400
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Kathy Kleiman asked: “p.s. how does 5 GNSO representatives but only 3 
votes mean? ...(currently I think it is one rep, one vote).”

The practice of having delegation memberships larger than delegation 
voting strength can be a good one. Having membership larger than 
delegation votes has two strengths. First, it generates a stronger 
dialogue within delegations and with their constituencies, since it 
requires some degree of consensus within the delegation. That can give 
the delegation more accountability to its constituencies and give 
constituencies more engagement in the deliberations leading up to votes. 
Second, each delegation having a slightly larger membership on the 
NomCom can deepen that delegation's engagement in the reasoned 
discussion leading up to NomCom decisions.

The allocation of votes across delegations (ASO: 3v/5mem; ccNSO: 
3v/5mem; gNSO: 3v/4mem; Technical: 2v/3mem; GAC 1v/1-3mem) reflects the 
proposed distribution of voting power. As Kathy points out, the 
distribution of relative power across constituencies may be an issue in 
its own right from a stakeholder perspective.

This also touches on several issues that will continue to grow as the 
Internet matures. First, what is the impact of a maturing Internet 
ecosystem on who the stakeholders are, and where they go (ICANN, new 
entities, etc.) to represent their interests. This will have an impact 
on the scope of ICANN’s remit. Second, within ICANN’s internal 
procedures and practices, what multistakeholder principles and practices 
are observed and which are not.

Sam L.
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: [log in to unmask] [mailto:ncuc-discuss-
> > [log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Kathy Kleiman
> > Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2014 10:51 AM
> > To: [log in to unmask]
> > Subject: Re: [NCUC-DISCUSS] NCUC Delegate to the 2015 NomCom
> >
> > All,
> > My gut sense says that we should study this proposal closely. It 
> gives an awful
> > lot of weight and votes to Supporting Organizations that do not, 
> themselves,
> > allow ICANN a role in their governance (ASO, ccNSO), but would now 
> be having
> > a much greater weight in appointing representatives to our 
> governance (namely
> > the Board and its work with GNSO issues). The implications could be 
> astounding.
> >
> > I recommend that we talk more. I would value the review and input of 
> those
> > who served on the Nominating Committee, those who have a strong 
> knowledge
> > of the other supporting organizations, and everyone.
> >
> > Like the proposal to change the GAC's power, this is one with great 
> implications
> > for the GNSO.
> > Best,
> > Kathy
> > p.s. how does 5 GNSO representatives but only 3 votes mean? Can anyone
> > previously on the NomCom talk about some complexities that might add
> > (currently I think it is one rep, one vote).
> > 


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